275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]
3. Agha Shahi’s Call on me—Pakistan’s defacto Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, in a call yesterday, asked for U.S. support in the Special [Page 661] Session on Disarmament for a Pakistani proposal on security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states.2 Essentially, he proposes that nuclear weapons states undertake not to threaten to use, or use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states who are not parties to a security arrangement of a nuclear weapons state. Shahi believes that Peking will support the Pakistani resolution, France is favorably inclined, and the USSR is “not opposed”. I said we would give the Pakistani formulation most serious consideration but pointed out that Korea presents a problem.
Shahi noted the improvement in relations with both Afghanistan and India. In the case of Afghanistan, however, he fears that the USSR may use its influence to prevent a final resolution of the outstanding border problem between Pakistan and Afghanistan. With India, there is a point beyond which Pakistan cannot go without greater Indian flexibility on Kashmir.
Shahi, noting Pakistan’s military weakness, asked us to consider aircraft sales, specifically the F5–E’s. He noted that Indian acquisition of the Jaguar or other Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft, would exacerbate the situation and upset the military balance on the subcontinent, thus rendering invalid our reason for turning down the A–7 request last spring.
We expressed our strong concern over the nuclear reprocessing plant and the effect on our relations should the Glenn Amendment be triggered. Both Jerry Smith and Joe Nye tried out various compromise formulations which would involve the deferral of work on the reprocessing plant while studies were made in the context of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation.3 Shahi was completely inflexible on deferral asserting that it would be politically impossible. He said that Pakistan would be prepared to have “triple safeguards” and even accept French inspectors in addition to IAEA safeguards. Pakistan was also willing to explore co-management with Iran although the Shah seemed reticent. We pointed out that the application of the Glenn Amendment would inevitably affect other aspects of our relations, possibly including Congressional approval of arms sales.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 3/78. Secret. Carter wrote: “Cy, J” at the top of the memorandum.↩
- A more extensive report of Vance’s meeting with Shahi is in telegram 76866 to Islamabad, March 24. Also attending the meeting were Yaqub Khan, Mehdi, Gerard Smith, Nye, Dubs, and Coon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780131–0116)↩
- See foonote 2, Document 267.↩