Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

242. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, April 13, 1977, 0630Z

3564. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subj: Allegations Persist of US Support for Pak Opposition.

1. Five weeks after the Pakistan general elections, reports persist here and elsewhere in country that USG is financially backing and otherwise supporting opposition Pakistan National Alliance. These reports, which include such wild stories as one we just heard today alleging that Ambassador Byroade was being expelled by the GOP for his role in bankrolling the PNA, are circulated almost entirely by word of mouth. We have seen only a handful of press items making the charge either directly or indirectly. Despite the absence of these allegations in print, it seems likely that large numbers of politically-aware Pakistanis are familiar with them, and that many either accept them at face value or are not easily prepared to dismiss them as the nonsense they are.

2. The circulation of such rumors, and the acceptance they seem to have won, comes as no surprise. The phenomenon is hardly a new one here. Pakistanis tend naturally to view politics in conspiratorial terms, and the notion of sinister foreign intervention in Pakistan domestic affairs has been trotted out repeatedly in the past. As we have mentioned before, the apparent ability of the PNA to garner more campaign funds than its own slender resources seemingly made possible added to the natural suspicion that a foreign hand was involved. The widely-held and long-standing belief that Air Marshal Asghar Khan was somehow “close” to the US, the allegation that the US would naturally prefer a “conservative” PNA regime to the “progressive” and activist Bhutto government, and the supposition that the USG would see in the downfall of Bhutto an opportunity to halt the Pak-French reprocessing deal appear to have helped bolster the idea of US involvement. The delay—as it seemed to many Pakistanis—in President Carter’s sending a congratulatory message to Bhutto until the PM was actually sworn in for a second term also contributed to the impression here that the US was siding with the opposition.² (The fact that other major powers also waited and did not congratulate Bhutto immediately after the March 7 PPP election victory was overlooked, and much was made of the contrast between our silence immediately after the Pak election and our enthusiastic public reaction to the Indian results a few weeks later.)³

4. The hand of the Pakistan Government in all of this is difficult to determine. We have already reported (in Islamabad 2888) H.K. Burki’s provocative March 26 Pakistan Times article, which could only have been printed with GOP approval.⁴ In his inauguration speech a couple of days later, Bhutto ostensibly exonerated the USG, and other powers, of charges of financing the opposition. But the way the PM discussed the issue led many to conclude that what he actually meant to convey was that the US had been involved. The PM’s remark that “if we get half of the 25 crores of rupees”—$25 million, the amount the PM says the opposition boasted of receiving abroad for the elections—“we will be prepared to discuss even human rights” is still cited as evidence for this conclusion. (The Embassy does not share it.) More recently, ConGen Karachi reported⁵ that Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed addressed armed forces officers there and told them that there is proof that the US provided 280 million rupees to the PNA. The well-informed Reuters correspondent here tells us that Aziz Ahmed made a similar allegation to an officers’ gathering in Multan.

5. We have not discussed this issue with GOP officials and see little purpose in doing so.⁶ There is no evidence that the allegations have led to any significant change in public attitudes toward the US or that they have created an atmosphere in which American lives or property are endangered.

Byroade

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770128–0687. Confidential. Sent for information to Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and CINCPAC.
2. In telegram 2396 from Islamabad, March 13, the Embassy recommended postponing a congratulatory message to Bhutto until he was sworn in as Prime Minister because “a message sent now could be seen as reflecting our considered judgment on the disputed honesty of the election. With the opposition charging that there was massive manipulation at the polls, especially in the Punjab, and this view evidently gaining increasing popular credence, the receipt and publication of a congratulatory message now could be potentially embarrassing to the USG and involve us—through our placing our informal imprimatur on the results—in an unnecessarily exposed position both here and in the US.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770086–0644) Telegram 70596 to Islamabad, March 30, transmitted Carter’s brief message of congratulations to Bhutto on his assumption of office. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770109–0751)
3. Less than a week after the Indian election was complete, the New York Times reported that the Carter administration, “emphasizing human rights in its foreign dealings, called the Janata Party’s victory a ‛noteworthy’ example of democracy.” (“The Millions Judge: India Clearly Prefers Its Democracy,” New York Times, March 27, 1977, p. 147) According to the Washington Post, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted on March 30 to repeal an “anti-India measure adopted by Congress in reaction to that nation’s May, 1974, nuclear explosion.” The measure required U.S. representatives to the World Bank to vote against low-interest loans to India. (Don Oberdorfer, “Senate Unit Votes Repeal Of Anti-India Measure,” Washington Post, March 31, 1977, p. 24)
4. In telegram 2888 from Islamabad, March 26, the Embassy reported on an article in the Pakistani Times (described as a newspaper that “carries only government approved news”) in which the “most disturbing line, from our viewpoint, is comment, while speaking of the opposition, that ‛judging by the level of organization, size of the agitation and the inexhaustible funds, it seems that the imperialist powers that were behind the Indonesian operation (we assume a reference to Sukarno’s overthrow) are backing this bloody adventure in Pakistan.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770104–0550)
5. Not found.
6. Telegram 3866 from Islamabad, April 19, reported that at an April 18 dinner given by Bhutto for Byroade to mark the occasion of the latter’s departure from post, Bhutto “dismissed his note taker and asked if he could talk to me as a personal friend and not as the American Ambassador.” Bhutto then confronted Byroade on the subject. After some discussion, “Bhutto made clear that he trusted me personally without question but he still was concerned about remarks and activities of some of my people that I might not know about and the local effect this was having. I told him I did not run that kind of an outfit. Every man under my command knew of my strict personal instructions that they stay completely out of internal politics. My reputation for firing people on the spot was well known in the service and I did not think there was any in my command that would go against me. [1 line not declassified]” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770135–1065)