Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

241. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 9, 1977

SUBJECT

• Pakistan: Reprocessing and Arms Sales Negotiations

The attached memorandum (Tab A) sets forth State’s strategy for responding to Bhutto’s request for quick discussions on the nuclear reprocessing issue. Since the memo was drafted, the French have told us that, unless the Pakistanis request otherwise, France will send the last (and critical) technical drawings of the reprocessing facility to Pakistan by April 15. An early objective of talks with Bhutto would be to slip this basically artificial deadline.

State’s package of incentives goes back to a Kissinger promise of a wide variety of items if Pakistan gave up reprocessing. From your point of view, the key issues within the package are these:

Military assistance. The basic military package suggested by State (page 3) is highlighted by 100 F–5s, with perhaps an admixture of A–4s. All agencies believe this package will be tolerable in terms of regional political impact and congressional reaction, and it is extremely important for Pakistan.² Its dimensions are such, however, that it will put heavy strain on your arms sales restraint policy, raising annual sales from the current $150 million to about $250 million. There is universal opposition to the sale of A–7 aircraft which are of greatest interest to Bhutto and were reportedly promised by Kissinger. Defense recognizes a legitimate Pakistani need for 60 A–7s and believes that we will have to put them in the package ultimately. These aircraft would, however, severely damage our relations with India, meet firm congressional opposition, and reverse your decision to shut down A–7 production.

Economic assistance. AID opposes providing assistance as a political payoff and OMB feels even more strongly that it would create an undesirable precedent, highlighted by the need for a supplemental budget request.³

FMS Credits. All military sales to Pakistan are for cash. FMS terms for this incentives package would be very attractive to Bhutto and, OMB points out, would have advantages for the U.S. when compared to economic assistance. State firmly opposes FMS because of its high political symbolism here and in South Asia, and soundings in Congress have been uniformly negative. We and OMB, however, would not exclude an offer to explore FMS financing for this one transaction as an ultimate fallback or as a trade-off for some other highly costly or politically difficult element of the package.

Are the political and economic costs of this package worth paying?⁴ Your arms sales policy, our South Asian policy, and our relationship to the new Indian Government will be jeopardized; and we will have set a tempting precedent for other potential proliferators. You may want to consider the possibility of simply telling Bhutto that his reprocessing plant will cost him the totality of his relationship with us. Given his weak domestic political situation, he might well throw in his hand. As tempting as this approach is, we cannot recommend it to you with confidence since its failure would almost certainly result in a strident Pakistani nuclear policy and a severe blow to non-proliferation. It is, however, a close call.

The approach set forth in State’s memorandum is, however, too restrained. We recommend Ambassador Byroade be instructed to conduct a very tough negotiation, emphasizing your concerns, moving to incentives only after he is convinced that Bhutto will not fold, and offering incentives gradually, rather than as one package. The sequence of offers would, illustratively, be (1) energy assistance and ground and naval equipment; (2) F–5/A–4 aircraft; and (3) economic assistance. FMS credits would be a fallback; A–7s would be excluded; we should simply face Bhutto down on this.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the State Department’s request subject to modifications set forth above.⁵

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter⁶

Washington, April 8, 1977

SUBJECT

• Negotiations with Pakistan on the Nuclear Issue: Congressional Reactions

We have been consulting informally with key members of the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee on our negotiating problem with Pakistan and the possible elements of a package proposal designed to persuade Pakistan to forego its nuclear option. During these consultations we have emphasized that there has been no Administration decision on the nature of a package but that we wanted to obtain Congressional reactions before we made a final decision and began negotiations.

The Congressional reaction to this form of consultations has been enthusiastic. Both Chairman Zablocki and Senator Humphrey went out of their ways to express appreciation for being consulted before final decisions were made. There was unanimous agreement that it was highly desirable to prevent Pakistan from obtaining a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and that we should be prepared to offer Bhutto a package of trade-offs designed to enable him to take on the political costs he would incur in cancelling or indefinitely postponing this project.

A number of Congressmen and Senators expressed concern about the arms supply aspects of such a negotiation. These members want to be assured that items included in the military package will not destabilize the military status quo on the subcontinent and will not foreclose opportunities for improving the U.S.-Indian relationship.⁷

Specifically, members recommended against offering the A–7 and FMS credits to Pakistan. Chairman Zablocki of the HIRC stated that we should offer “no more modern equipment than the F–5,” (although he later conceded that the A–4 would not be objectionable in small quantities) and that we “should not agree to FMS credits.” Senator Humphrey stated, “I want to go on record as strongly opposing the A–7. It has offensive capabilities which would be destabilizing on the subcontinent.”

We indicated that, because of discussions held between Bhutto and the previous Administration, Pakistan may insist on A–7s and FMS credits.⁸ The members seemed to understand the difficulty this problem poses, but warned that selling a package to Congress which includes these two components will be exceedingly difficult. We stated that we would consult further before making any offer of these items.

Members expressed concern that an FMS credit relationship with Pakistan would constitute a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Lee Hamilton expressed concern that such a change might signal that “we have yet to understand that India is the most important country on the subcontinent.” Senator Humphrey, while stating that he is sympathetic to Pakistan’s legitimate military needs, warned that the extension of FMS credits would represent “a fundamental change of policy,” and advised, “I would feel out the Indians on all these matters.”

There was general agreement that other items in our proposed package are not unreasonable and would face no strong Congressional objections. Some concern was expressed about the A–4, but the members seemed to accept the fact that the A–4 would not be perceived by the Indians to be as threatening as the A–7. It is clear that the recent Indian election has markedly transformed Congressional attitudes toward that country.

With some qualifications, the members support the concept of an economic aid package, although they pointed out that enactment of any foreign aid legislation is difficult. Senator Humphrey stated that the SFRC “is much more sympathetic to economic needs (than to military).” Congressman William Broomfield said that “those affected by the President’s decision on water projects will be looking very hard at foreign aid.” Congressman Bingham, who is strongly in favor of the course we propose, told his colleagues that we will have to pay a high price but that “stopping the reprocessing facility will be well worth the price we have to pay.” Senator Humphrey concluded the meeting by stating that further consultations would be welcomed; the views he and other Senators had expressed represented their “druthers.”

To sum up, we believe that these consultations have produced a better understanding of the difficult trade-offs we face in developing military and economic packages adequate to convince the Government of Pakistan to cancel its contract with France. Within the limits described above, these members are prepared to support a negotiating package aimed at stopping the delivery of the reprocessing facility. All members with whom we consulted appreciate the dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation and seem willing to pay a reasonable price to prevent this transaction.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1–12/77. Secret. Sent for action. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig, go over entire pkg of memos with Cy, J.” Aaron initialed for Brzezinski. An unknown hand wrote next to Aaron’s initials: “ZB concurrence.”
2. In the right-hand margin next to the two preceding sentences, Carter wrote: “Bribery may be a mistake.”
3. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “I agree.”
4. In the right-hand margin next to this question, Carter wrote: “no.”
5. In the margin below this sentence, Carter wrote: “I hate to pay for French avarice—J.”
6. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Cy—I’m not inclined to bribe him. My inclination would be to go no further than A–5’s—if he cancels the reprocessing plant—J.”
7. In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “I agree.”
8. Carter underlined the words “may insist” and wrote in the right-hand margin next to the sentence: “Why do they have a right to insist?”