Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

184. Memorandum From Gerald Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 19, 1980

SUBJECT

• Tarapur (U)

You asked about the implications of the NRC’s unanimous vote against granting an export license for the two pending Tarapur applications.² (U)

A negative NRC vote was considered probable. A unanimous vote, including two conservative Commissioners known to favor a more permissive non-proliferation policy, is very damaging. The President must now issue an Executive Order authorizing the exports, which must be reviewed by the Congress. That will be a tougher battle, and the general political fallout will be worse, in the light of the NRC vote. (C)

Perhaps more important, the NRC unanimously rejected State’s position that the full-scope safeguards requirement of the NNPA, which became effective on March 10, 1980, does not apply to these two licenses. Congress is now more likely to view the statutory basis for the Executive Order as defective. We could get around this difficulty if the President were also to waive the full-scope safeguards requirement (he may do so), but that would be viewed as an even stronger signal that our non-proliferation policy has been mortally wounded to please the Indians. (C)

In short, the chances of success in Congress will be lower, and the costs even if we succeed will now be higher. As the initial reactions from Argentina and Japan suggest (see my evening report today),³ those costs may be specific and large. (C)

One facet of this worth keeping in mind: if Congress appears to strongly favor the NRC’s interpretation of the full-scope safeguards provision—i.e. that it does apply to these two licenses—the President could accept this as authoritative and not proceed. That would of course be more difficult in view of his letter to Mrs. Gandhi,⁴ but it may be worth considering if the political weather becomes too rough. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 45, Proliferation: India: 5/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton and Kimmitt. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Need a brief DR [Daily Report] item for the P[resident]. ZB.”
2. A May 16 memorandum to Brzezinski from the NSC Staff for Global Issues reported: “The NRC voted 4–0 today against issuing the first of the two pending licenses (one Commissioner was absent but said he would have voted the same way).” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 4–6/80)
3. In the May 19 NSC Staff for Global Issues Evening Report to Brzezinski, Oplinger summarized reactions to the decision to issue an Executive Order: “Embassy Buenos Aires reports that the Argentines were particularly upset. We have been pressing Argentina to accept full-scope safeguards; but will not insist on the same thing from India, which has detonated a bomb. The Argentines call this ‛strictly a political decision which proves that US nuclear policy is not consistent but expedient;’ Japan has asked us to postpone a visit by a US team to discuss renegotiation of our nuclear agreement; MOFA officials cited recent heated debate in Diet, ‛with specific attention paid also to US approval of fuel shipments to India.’” (Ibid.)
4. See Document 182.