176. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
6822. For Under Secretary Newsom from the Ambassador. Subject: Indian Attitudes Toward US Policy and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Ref: State 88475.2
1. S–Entire text.
2. GOI initial reaction and response to Soviet invasion—Framing of the official Indian response to the Soviet invasion was complicated initially by the absence of an established government in New Delhi, [Page 464] the invasion occurring just before the national parliamentary election on January 3–6. Mrs. Gandhi took office as Prime Minister on January 14, thus, over a three to four week period the Indian position veered from interim Prime Minister Charan Singh’s December 29 demand for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops,3 to virtual endorsement of the Soviet explanation for the invasion by India’s UN PermRep on January 11,4 to the more balanced position eventually adopted by Mrs. Gandhi. Even before her election, while deploring foreign intervention in Afghanistan, she was equally forceful in criticizing the US response and in decrying the development of a Cold War confrontation in South and Southwest Asia. These equivocal views, expressed in several public statements and interviews, appear to have been the basis for the January 11 UN speech by PermRep Mishra, the effect of which was to make India appear as an apologist for the Soviet invasion.
3. Change over time of GOI attitude—
India’s isolation within the non-aligned group and a strongly hostile domestic reaction led almost immediately to distancing from the language and pro-Soviet alignment expressed in the Mishra statement to formulation of the more nuanced “balanced policy” which now exists. The GOI is committed to “defusing” what it regards as the threat of superpower confrontation in South Asia arising out of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its approach is to insist on the unacceptability of foreign troops in Afghanistan, to reiterate frequently and publicly Soviet assurances that their troops will be withdrawn, but without seeking to “condemn” Moscow. In addition to wishing to insulate India’s all important bilateral relationship with the USSR, Mrs. Gandhi and official spokesmen assert that Soviet security interests must be recognized and a way devised to reassure the Soviets that these will not be endangered. The GOI balances its stress on Soviet withdrawal with equal attention to what it claims has been a long history of foreign intervention in Afghanistan. This, it claims, is the context in which the Soviet intervention must be perceived.
4. GOI attitude toward US response to Soviet invasion—
There has been unswerving Indian hostility, both official and popular, to US military support for Pakistan in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Indians assert that US arms for Islamabad would represent a direct threat to India against a background of three wars between the two countries since 1947. The GOI has also been critical of US efforts to strengthen our military presence in the Indian Ocean and our security links with littoral states, describing these as [Page 465] contributing to the superpower confrontation which now jeopardizes regional peace and security. The GOI also remains very sensitive to any suggestion of US-China-Pakistan cooperation as a link-up which could be turned against India. Mrs. Gandhi also sometimes suggests that such cooperation increases the Soviet sense of insecurity and helps explain Soviet actions in Afghanistan. From the outset the GOI has asserted that while it has no objection to US economic aid to Islamabad, military assistance will not enhance Pakistan’s security against the Soviets but may only encourage a fragile and unpopular Zia regime to seek national support by developing an aggressive posture toward India. This possibility, in the Indian view, represents a more serious threat to India and the region than the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
5. Change in GOI attitude toward US response to Soviet invasion—
Para 4 is more a formal posture and a set of basic perceptions about the present situation in South Asia than a reflection of current Indian priorities in dealing with Afghanistan. US arms to Pakistan have not materialized, while the Soviet presence continues to be increasingly seen as of indefinite duration. In addition, the series of intensive consultations with the Indians at both the political and working levels has also allayed much of the initial concern with the US response by detailing the specific limits to our assistance and making clear our basic objectives with respect to Pakistan, China and the region. The Clark Clifford visit in late January,5 followed by CODEL Obey,6 helped reassure Mrs. Gandhi and the GOI about the limited character of our response and our sensitivity toward Indian interests. These exchanges, as well as the intensive and continuing consultations at the working level, have persuaded the Indians that, regardless of disagreement on specific tactics, we recognize India’s key role in coordinating a possible regional response to the Soviet invasion. In short, the change in Indian attitudes cited here flows from their assessment that the US response has also evolved and that includes a recognition that India’s role is vital. The fact that the possibility of US arms for Pakistan has receded puts our dialogue on a better footing. This dialogue could profit from more high level US attention.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800169–0698. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩
- Not found.↩
- The statement was issued on December 28. See footnote 3, Document 162.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 166.↩
- See Document 169.↩
- Telegram 2930 from New Delhi, February 11, reported on Congressman Obey and his delegation’s visit to New Delhi February 7–9. Obey met with Indian members of Parliament, attended a briefing at the Defense Ministry, and attended a reception with Goheen. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800073–0817)↩