Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

126. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Desai to President Carter¹

New Delhi, February 10, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I appreciate your letter of the 22nd December recalling the Delhi Declaration in which we jointly affirmed our faith in the democratic form of Government and the common objectives which we pursue independently of peace and stability, and mutual respect between nations of the world.² I am also deeply touched by your message³ recalling with warmth and satisfaction your visit to India last year. As I was giving final touches to my reply to your letter and the message, I received your letter of the 5th February⁴ and I thought it would be best if I also replied to your latest letter. We both have met and discussed matters of common interest twice during the last year. The continuing exchange of letters in which we have maintained our commitment to free, frank and friendly expression of our views has reinforced our personal understanding and promoted healthier respect and understanding between our Governments.

I am convinced that it is only in this way that we can continue to work for a world order in which nations, big and small, enjoy a sense of justice, fairplay and equality and thus help consolidate the fabric of peace, security and stability. Great powers have greater responsibilities. The world order will become safer for diversity and the manifold forms of Government specially democracies only if it is made secure for smaller countries. This cannot be done by some big powers seeking to create zones of influence or determining the political or economic dispensation of a region or the world at large. The international scene must be a pluralist order and attempts at international discipline must ease their competitive play on the world platform. In this, nations with constructive, peaceful and responsible roles like ours have to play a role against the forces of disruption and involvement outside their own frontiers. In our own humble way we are trying to act up to that approach.

I should like to take this opportunity to express myself on some problems which I believe are of common concern to India and USA. In my last letter, I had expressed my thoughts and anxieties at the situation in Iran.⁵ Events moved relentlessly at a rapid pace and the Shah has had to withdraw from his country. As I write, it is not clear how the situation will develop and what Government may be finally established and whether it would soon be in a position to restore stability and rehabilitate its economy. In view of your past commitments in Iran and your stake in the uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States and the major industrial nations, it must be a matter of serious concern for you. Our relations with Iran, limited in comparison but nevertheless important, were developing well but they were primarily of an economic nature, of benefit to the two countries and directed against no other country. The recipe for resolving this difficult situation rests on the wisdom for reconciliation of the civil leaders and the armed forces of Iran.

The situation is undoubtedly of significance from the point of view of stability of the region as a whole but it does seem to me that the utmost restraint must be exercised specially by the great powers if the situation is not to deteriorate and become more dangerous. The Soviet Union perhaps also recognises the imperatives of stability in this area. In this context I do appreciate both your concern and your restraint in regard to these developments and agree with you that we must leave it to Iranians to find a way out of the thicket of troubles and confusion in which they find themselves.

With developments in Iran and change in Afghanistan and the continuing internal problems of Pakistan, there is a completely changed picture in the area west of India. The developments in each of these countries have their own distinct origin and circumstances and in none of them is the problem due to a serious external threat. We have sought to encourage Afghanistan to bend her efforts to internal developments and seek to encourage international cooperation to give continuing support for their efforts. They seem to be somewhat unorthodox in their modes of behaviour but I am sure that they will settle down as they gain more experience of affairs.

I must, however, express my concern at reports that, in the wake of all those developments, the United States might consider inducting or making available sophisticated arms or equipment to Pakistan either on sale or on transfer from Iran. Pakistan already has a disproportionately large armed strength. Your own declared policy is not to contribute to an arms race in the sub-continent. The experience in Iran surely teaches us that the accumulation of arms is no substitute for the resolution of domestic economic and political problems of a country.

I hope that the reports are not true but if sophisticated arms are in fact made available or the transfer of American equipment and military hardware authorised, it would be viewed in India with grave concern, and, incidentally, may hinder the quest for stability or even the protection of US economic and political interests in the region. Our approach to Pakistan is not tactical but part of an integrated policy to resolve problems and promote confidence through a good-neighbourly policy with all the countries around us. We rejoice that through mutual effort, in a reasonably short period of 18 months, the climate of relations has improved simultaneously with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. We look upon this improvement as our contribution to the process of international detente in the widest sense. But I must share with you that relations with Pakistan continue to pose a problem for us even though on a personal plane mutually good feelings prevail between General Zia and me. We are trying our best to come closer but it seems that General Zia for reasons of his own cannot avoid the temptation of bringing in the question of Kashmir whenever a public pronouncement has to be made although the problem has ceased to be of any international concern and remains only a bilateral issue under the Simla Agreement.⁶

It is all the more a matter of regret that the movement towards stability in South East Asia which only a few months ago looked propitious should have suffered a setback in Indo-China. We had tried, in a limited way, to promote our relations with Vietnam by responding to their request for economic cooperation. We believe this was the correct policy when Vietnam, after its heroic and nationalistic struggle, faced the gigantic task of reconstruction and wanted to diversify her relations. We had also welcomed Vietnamese efforts to promote understanding and resume commercial and economic relations between the ASEAN countries and Vietnam. Though we have always recognised Kampuchea, we had withdrawn our mission when the Pol Pot regime was established and we had not made any bilateral contacts with that Government. Even if we did not comment on it, we were also distressed to hear of the brutalities and the harsh policies pursued by the Pol Pot regime after it assumed control and the Chinese attempts to bolster that harsh regime. While holding no brief for the internal policies of the Pol Pot regime, we are nevertheless distressed at the armed support for the Salvation Front in Kampuchea by Vietnam. If reports of Chinese concentration on Vietnam’s border are true and if China resorts to any overt action, it would greatly exacerbate an ugly situation and the resultant situation will be fraught with serious threat to peace in this region and perhaps in the world. We would like to see that the process of building confidence between the independent countries of South East Asia should continue, making the region immune from competitive great power involvement. All countries, big and small, are sensitive about their nationalism. But with mutual respect, economic cooperation between countries can grow and help development and curb the process of insurgencies and tensions which bedevil South East Asia. In all this, I am sure, you will understand and appreciate that India is staying on course in adhering to our policies of non-alignment and the search for positive bilateral cooperation and regional stability in the whole of our continent.

I note your observations on the visit of Vice-Premier Deng to USA and greatly appreciate the sentiments you have expressed regarding Indo-US relationship.⁷ I particularly value your remark that development of relationship with China will not in any way be at the expense of US relationship with any other nation. Nevertheless, I hope you will forgive me if I say that the enthusiastic treatment Deng received in the press—if not in official circles—might have caused dismay in the U.S.S.R. and may create complications in the conclusion of SALT–II and the CTB at this delicate stage of your negotiations with the U.S.S.R. As it is, U.S.S.R. is sensitive to any country showing the least gesture to China and vice versa and we note that they sometimes become unnecessarily sensitive on this score. I do hope, however, that you will succeed in obtaining the balance on these complex and important relationships.

Mr. President, let me dwell briefly again on the subject of our bilateral nuclear problems. We have urged your Administration, through your Embassy and our Embassy in Washington, to expedite the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station by the concerned authorities in the United States. We have been concerned over the delay in the clearance of our applications; the clearance of the 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium took more than one year, while the clearance of 16.8 tonnes has taken nearly 11 months and the process of clearance of the third application is yet to begin. The Agreement for Cooperation of 1963 between our two Governments envisages timely supplies for the continuance and efficient operation of Tarapur Atomic Power Station. It is a responsibility which obviously was intended to be discharged without any unreasonable delay. The consequences of the delay affect not only the plant but the thousands of beneficiaries of the generation of power. Inevitably the good faith in the implementation of the agreement also becomes a matter in issue at least on the part of those who are keen to exploit any opportunity to throw a spanner in our relationship. In this case the public is apt to make comparison of this delay with the speed with which the U.S. Government gave its clearance to the sale of the two nuclear reactors of US design by France to the peoples Republic of China without safeguards. The technicalities of being a signatory of NPT or not, or being a recognised weapon power are not of any significance when public psychology gets affected. I am somewhat reassured by the expectations that you entertain that the supply of 16.8 tonnes of enriched uranium will be cleared shortly and there will be no further delay on this. Equally, I am encouraged by your assurance that our subsequent application for 19.8 tonnes of enriched uranium could be dealt with expeditiously.

I am also grateful for your assurance that supplies will be continued during the period provided by law. While recognising the independent character of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission I cannot help feeling that the Commission is unnecessarily inquisitorial and dilatory and does not seem to pay any heed to the fact that political and economic consequences are involved and that the delay in the discharge of contractual obligations raises suspicions of bona fides.

Having discussed our own nuclear problem I should also like to refer to the problem of Pakistan’s nuclear development. We have reason to believe that under the cloak of some other uses Pakistan has been importing equipment openly or clandestinely which might enable it to attain a nuclear capability in directions which may not be consistent with peaceful purposes. It is also possible that your own policy to meet its wishes partially or wholly in regard to defence equipment may fail to deter or dissuade it from that course. There are rather uneasy forebodings of its efforts to acquire this capability and I am wondering whether you have information about these developments.

Should our information about nuclear developments in Pakistan get confirmed, namely that it has obtained clandestinely what it would have been prevented from getting openly, it would, along with earlier and even now current impressions about such unauthorized exports, mean that those who have the resources, presumably because of their non-peaceful pursuits are not taking adequate precautions against pilferage or clandestine operations of subversive elements. In any case, it shows the utter ineffectiveness of the policy of confining safeguards and inspections to those countries which are committed to pursuit of nuclear research and developments for peaceful purposes.

You have also referred to the situation in West Asia. I have already indicated to you earlier my appreciation of the attitude of President Sadat. I am sorry to find that Israel has failed to make adequate response to Sadat’s bold initiative and is adopting an intransigent attitude in respect of an issue on which, as far as I can see, Sadat’s credibility with the other Arab powers depends. I wish Israel showed greater recognition of the realities of the problems involved in securing a peaceful existence in the midst of Arab States and the stake of world peace in the security and stability of countries in that region. It has also to appreciate that it has expanded far beyond its originally conceived frontiers and therefore the legitimacy of acquisition of the territories in which Palestinians are interested is bound to be challenged by the Arabs and questioned by the world community. I do hope that your efforts to bring them to the conference table and thereby secure a just and lasting peace in that region will be successful. I wish the meeting between Mr. Brezhnev and yourself could be arranged soon so that on this question also some understanding between both countries on how to secure that peace could be reached. I am quite prepared to help you in solving this problem in whatever way you feel I can.

I am glad that you are satisfied with the mission you entrusted to your Secretary of Commerce, Kreps. I was very glad to meet her and to find in her a sympathetic approach to our problems.⁸ I fully appreciate your difficulties in meeting our request fully but as a country in the process of development and particularly in view of our improved relationship I feel that we are entitled to some extra consideration.

I share your view of the importance of consultation between the senior officials of our two countries on bilateral and international matters to the further build-up the fruitful and beneficient relationship between India and USA and am sure that they will benefit from the close bond that exists between us.

I much regret the length of this letter. I thought it best to deal with the issues in some detail so that you may be able fully to understand the working of my own mind on these issues.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

(Morarji Desai)⁹

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890025–2462. Secret; Personal. Daniel McHale, Director of the Information Management Section of the Executive Secretariat, forwarded the letter to Dodson under a February 21 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790062–1553)
2. Telegram 327058 to New Delhi, December 29, 1978, transmitted Carter’s brief December 22 letter to Desai, in which he noted the anniversary of the Joint Declaration signed in New Delhi on January 3, 1978, during Carter’s visit (see Document 92). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780538-1137)
3. Not further identified.
4. See Document 124.
5. See Document 118.
6. The Simla Agreement, signed on July 2, 1972, ended hostilities between India and Pakistan after the 1971 crisis over East Pakistan. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 272 and 274.
7. See footnote 6, Document 124.
8. See Document 117.
9. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.