Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

138. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 24, 1979, 9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee

PARTICIPANTS

• INDIA

  • Foreign Minister Vajpayee
  • Ambassador N.A. Palkhivala
  • Foreign Secretary Mehta
  • A.B. Gokhale, Minister
  • G. Parthasarathy, Counselor
  • B.B. D’Souza, Ministry of External Affairs

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Robert F. Goheen
  • Thomas R. Pickering, Assistant Secretary, OES
  • Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Jack C. Miklos, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Peter W. Lande, NEA/INS (Notetaker)

SECRETARY VANCE: May I open this meeting by stating that I look forward to a wide range of discussions on a large number of issues. I would like to stress that the U.S. attaches the greatest importance to its relations with India. We will not always agree on every issue with India but we share the same values. Which issue would you like to address first?

FOREIGN MINISTER: I would like to discuss the nuclear issue first. We are grateful that another shipment of enriched fuel has been approved for Tarapur. We hope the next shipment will also be approved. Indeed, we hope that there will be a continuing supply relationship past 1980.

Pakistan is causing some problems in the nuclear area and we do not know why they are seeking a nuclear capability. They are not seeking this capability for peaceful purposes only. We would like to see the Pakistani program stopped. I do not know how this can be done. Pakistan’s problems are economic and political. India is not a threat to Pakistan. Our policy is to reassure Pakistan of India’s good intentions. We thought we had succeeded in doing so. We wish Pakistan well.

We don’t know who is financing Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan cannot sustain such a program economically and it has no military justification. Prime Minister Desai has invited General Zia to come to Delhi. If he agrees, all questions can be considered.

We are concerned about attempts to equate Pakistan and India. This would be unfair since Pakistan’s program has a military purpose while India’s program is peaceful. Public opinion will not accept any attempt to use Pakistan’s non-peaceful program as a means to put pressure on India.

We share your objectives in preventing further proliferation of weapons. India has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. However, vertical proliferation continues.

Pakistan may argue that India’s 1974 nuclear explosion justifies Pakistan’s current activities. This argument is not convincing. India is using restraint in not developing nuclear weapons despite China’s weapons program, including testing. If India can use restraint, why can’t the Pakistanis? We do not have nuclear weapons. Now is not the time to offer carrots to Pakistan. Pakistan does not need military hardware vis a vis Afghanistan. We will discuss the Afghanistan situation later. How can the U.S. persuade Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program?

Last year when Prime Minister Desai visited Washington, he had discussed the CTB with President Carter.² Now the CTB appears to be relegated to the background. If there were real and genuine progress on a CTB and SALT II, arrangements could be devised, including safeguards, for all countries.

We note that you have stopped economic assistance to Pakistan but understand that you are proposing to make military sales.³

SECRETARY VANCE: Our intelligence agrees with your’s on the nature and objectives of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan is several years away from an explosion. However, it is easier to deal with this problem now than later. We are working with other countries to try to deal with this problem. While earlier the primary problem was reprocessing, it is now enrichment. International cooperation has been good but we have not yet been successful in bringing the Pakistani program to a halt. The Pakistanis do appear to be willing to talk.

MR. PICKERING: We are working with other countries to try to prevent the Pakistanis from obtaining equipment for their centrifuge enrichment operation. The Pakistanis are avoiding the supplier guidelines by buying small bits and pieces from various countries. They have evaded government restrictions. In spite of our past efforts, we have no sense of certainty that over a period of years we will be able to prevent a Pakistani explosion. We were required under U.S. law to cut off economic assistance.

(In response to the Foreign Minister’s question), private parties handled all exports from West European countries. Some of the goods the Pakistanis were acquiring were not covered by export controls.

U.S. law states that we must cut off assistance to any country engaged in the import or export of enrichment or reprocessing equipment. There is a limited and strict waiver provision. The law provides that the U.S. cannot extend economic or military assistance other than PL 480. There are no subsidies involved in the sale of military equipment, and cash sales are still permitted.

AMBASSADOR PALKHIVALA: Who is financing Pakistan’s program?

MR. PICKERING: We have given careful study to this matter. We estimate that at present the nuclear program is only costing Pakistan about $10–20 million per year. Such a sum would present no insuperable burden for Pakistan. We do not know of any direct assistance to Pakistan for its nuclear program. There is indirect assistance since money is fungible.

FOREIGN MINISTER: We are suspicious about Islamic links. We note that Bhutto referred to the Islamic bomb. We don’t rule out financial help from Libya or Saudi Arabia.

MR. PICKERING: We have our suspicions about this. Pakistan may have asked but we are not certain. While our experts say that Pakistan’s current enrichment program only costs $10–20 million, these costs would increase in future years if the program were continued. Reprocessing would cost much more.

The French are no longer delivering reprocessing equipment and do not intend to do so. Pakistan apparently has two reprocessing facilities, one laboratory size and one somewhat larger. Reprocessing would take longer than enrichment. It is our estimate that it would take 3–5 years for Pakistan to develop material through enrichment sufficient for a weapon.

SECRETARY VANCE: Does your intelligence differ from ours?

FOREIGN MINISTER: No. What is Pakistan doing about the trigger device?

MR. PICKERING: Triggering is not a major impediment if enrichment techniques are used.

FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA: Would Pakistan explode its bomb below ground or in the atmosphere?

MR. PICKERING: Either.

FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA: Have the Pakistanis obtained designs for a reprocessing plant?

MR. PICKERING: Yes, but it is very difficult to move from a design to actual production. Reprocessing facilities are very sophisticated and delicate.

FOREIGN MINISTER: How did Pakistan obtain this know-how despite export controls of other countries?

SECRETARY VANCE: Prior to this Administration, various other countries had been prepared to export reprocessing equipment and technology. The Carter Administration addressed itself to this problem and has brought other countries around. However, substantial transfers of technology had occurred before the cut-off.

MR. PICKERING: Reprocessing is very difficult. Enrichment is much easier and more troublesome. One Pakistani individual spent considerable time in Europe and evidently stole plans for enrichment facilities.

SECRETARY VANCE: All European countries have cooperated. Enrichment facilities are not technologically difficult.

AMBASSADOR PALKHIVALA: Which European countries have not been responsive to U.S. requests for export controls?

SECRETARY VANCE: All European countries have cooperated. Other countries have enrichment capabilities.

FOREIGN MINISTER: Does South Africa have this capability?

SECRETARY VANCE: Yes. We have urged South Africa to forego both enrichment and reprocessing. If they agree to this and are prepared to sign the NPT, we are prepared to supply them fuel for their power facilities. For a while it looked like we were making progress. Now we have strained relations. South Africa has uranium and is seeking to enrich it. They have not yet enriched it to weapons grade levels.

FOREIGN MINISTER: Was any of the South African material illegally diverted from the U.S.?

SECRETARY VANCE: No. All we have supplied them is non-weapons grade.

FOREIGN MINISTER: What are you doing to persuade Pakistan not to develop nuclear weapons?

SECRETARY VANCE: Ambassador Hummel is talking to the Pakistanis. We need your help and cooperation in dealing with this problem. We should stay closely in touch.

MR. PICKERING: We should work closely together and help and cooperate on this problem.

FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA: What is the Pakistan rationale? It could be prestige or it could be India. However, India’s ability to influence Pakistan is very limited.

SECRETARY VANCE: Pakistan has not crossed the point of no return. We will continue our efforts. You have the same objectives and we should work together.

FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA: India has little leverage. If Pakistan has gone so far, would it be prepared to abandon its program?

SECRETARY VANCE: I don’t know. We have been successful in preventing reprocessing. Now we will try to prevent enrichment. We may fail but we should try. (Vajpayee nodded in agreement.)

AMBASSADOR GOHEEN: We recognize that there are public pressures inside India. However, in light of this issue, what could we do together or separately? What could India do?

FOREIGN MINISTER: We have refused to cause any difficulties for Pakistan. We have assured Pakistan that we accept the Durand Line.⁴ If Pakistan is still apprehensive, they have a psychological problem. What else could we do other than accept full scope safeguards which is unacceptable to Indian public opinion. The Pakistanis are likely to explode a device and to say it was peaceful.

SECRETARY VANCE: Not necessarily. If we can stop the enrichment program, they will not be able to explode a device.

MR. PICKERING: Our goal is to get Pakistan to accept safeguards and to prevent explosions. This would reassure us both. We would like to stop Pakistan’s enrichment program.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Lande; approved on April 27 by Wisner. The meeting took place in Vance’s office.
2. See Document 104.
3. See Document 340.
4. The Durand Line refers to the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.