Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, August 15, 1978, 2202Z

206714. Subject: Presidential Letter Dated August 14 to Prime Minister Desai.

1. Please transmit to Prime Minister Desai the following text of a Presidential letter dated August 14, the signed original of which is being pouched.

2. Begin text: Quote—Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have read your letter of July 24² with great care and appreciate your views on various matters of mutual interest. I shall be equally candid in my comments in the belief that you would wish this to be characteristic of our exchanges. I too have given further thought to the issues you raise.

There is no doubt that we share a deep-felt commitment to containing the dangers of nuclear proliferation; I believe that this was manifest during your visit to the United States. I hope that you derived from your visit and from the subsequent debate in Congress on shipment of additional fuel for Tarapur a sense of the deep concern the American public and the Congress feel about nuclear proliferation. I welcome your strong hope that our two countries can reach agreement on the key issue of comprehensive safeguards.

In this connection, we are ready to explore with you the idea of a committee of independent scientists who would review India’s concerns about the impact of safeguards on peaceful nuclear research and development.³ The IAEA provides a universally accepted safeguards system designed to avoid adverse effects of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. I would see the proposed committee’s task as examining the impact upon your programs of various types of safeguards under the IAEA system. The committee could also be useful in assessing the safeguards experience of other nations such as Japan and Sweden which, like India, have advanced nuclear programs. To achieve the goal we desire, we must be sure to define the committee’s scope so as to make it clear that neither of our nations is casting any doubt on our confidence in the IAEA or its safeguards system.

I believe our experts should meet in the near future to agree on the functioning of the committee. In the meantime, we intend to recommend very soon to the NRC that it approve the pending shipment of about 17 tons of enriched fuel for Tarapur. The cooperation, during the period which our law permits, is further evidence of our willingness to cooperate. We hope it will improve the atmosphere for talks between our experts.

With respect to the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel, I must candidly say that we are simply not in a position to proceed to a joint determination. As you know, we have ceased construction of the commercial reprocessing facility in the United States primarily because of our conviction that the spread of commercial reprocessing presents significant proliferation risk.⁴ At the same time, we are working to limit the spread of sensitive facilities generally. We believe that such activities should be minimized until we examine, with all our partners, ways to satisfy energy needs with technological and institutional approaches that are most resistant to proliferation. This issue is under intensive study within the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) program. We appreciate India’s participation in this important undertaking.

I fully share your concerns over the continuing need for a non-discriminatory CTB with safeguards against clandestine breaches. I can assure you that such a treaty remains a high priority goal of this administration. We want a treaty which will gain the widest possible international support including—very importantly—that of India. The treaty which we seek would be a comprehensive ban which would not permit kiloton-level testing. We will also continue to seek adequate verification arrangements.

On duration, we have decided to pursue a limited duration treaty but a final decision as to the length of the duration has not been made. Whatever the treaty duration that is agreed on, there would, of course, be a multilateral review conference of treaty parties during the concluding year to consider whether there should be a replacement treaty.

As you know, Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko met in Geneva last month as part of our continuing effort to resolve the issues remaining in SALT.⁵ The meeting was useful and provided a basis for further narrowing of our differences. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Soviet SALT delegations are continuing their intensive work in Geneva.

I can assure you that my own determination to seek prompt conclusion of an equitable and verifiable SALT agreement is as strong as ever, and we are vigorously pursuing the negotiations to that end.

We fully share your view that an agreement on Indian Ocean arms limitations would promote peace and stability in the region and would be in the interest of all states concerned. I personally reiterated my strong interest in concluding such an agreement in my recent speech at Annapolis.⁶ We have delayed setting a date for the fifth round of the Indian Ocean talks. As you know, we believe that Soviet and Cuban interventions in the area are destabilizing. We have made our view on this issue clear to the Soviets. The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been returned to its pre-buildup levels only very recently. During this entire period, however, the U.S. has carefully refrained from increasing its own military levels in the area. We are keeping the situation under close scrutiny and will seek to resume the talks when the circumstances are appropriate.

Concerning the Middle East, I certainly share your view that assuring Israel that the key Arab states and the Palestinians are willing to live in peace is the central peacemaking problem. It is because of this problem that we have tried so hard to encourage the Sadat initiative, which in large measure was undertaken to reassure the Israelis of the Arabs’ peaceful intentions. Secretary Vance has just returned from the Middle East. His discussions and the early September summit meeting at Camp David of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are evidence of our determination to move the peace process forward. We would welcome Soviet support in this endeavor and hope the USSR will use its influence in a positive and constructive way. I hope to be able to discuss this question again with you as the situation evolves. India’s great influence could have a significant role to play in the peace process.

I am happy that you welcome the normalization of our relations with Pakistan and that you share my concern about the reprocessing plant. I assure you that we are very conscious of the importance for world peace of a normal and productive relationship between India and Pakistan. A basic element of our policy toward South Asia for some time has been not to provide arms that would introduce new generations of military technology, encourage a regional arms race, or disturb the normalization of relations in the subcontinent. It is on this basis that we have refused to sell A–7 strike aircraft to Pakistan. These same criteria would likewise preclude sales subject to U.S. approval of aircraft of the capability which India is now considering. We will continue to apply these standards which, though stringent, do not rule out other aircraft which do not introduce a new level of military technology. I can assure you that improvements in our relations with Pakistan will not come at the expense of peace in the area. By considering ways to support Pakistan—especially when, in the wake of events in Afghanistan, its anxiety about its security is at a peak—we believe we would be making a contribution to regional stability. At the same time, I hope that you will use discretion and caution in any decision about new aircraft purchases for India at this delicate stage in South Asian relations.

Turning to the issue of human rights, a principal goal of our foreign policy is still to promote, in cooperation with others, the universal observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries. I believe we agree on a balanced and objective emphasis on the advancement of human rights. I know I have your personal support and encouragement in this respect. I continue to hope that India will share with us in these efforts wherever possible.

Finally, I will turn to the interest you expressed during our meetings in improving educational and cultural exchanges between our two countries. I share that interest. I have asked our officials, both here and in New Delhi, to continue seeking with their Indian colleagues ways of enhancing that important activity.

Numerous exchange programs already exist, some on a government-to-government basis, but many involving private institutions. U.S. Government-sponsored programs are designed to complement and reinforce privately sponsored initiatives. Though specific programs have waxed and waned in given years, the overall level of exchange activities has not, I believe, declined appreciably.

Since the creation of the Indo-U.S. Subcommission on Education and Culture, an important portion of our support to educational exchanges has been funneled through this entity and our assistance to this effort has increased substantially over the past three years.

In the field of academic exchanges there exists one problem area. I understand that lengthy clearance procedures required for research and study projects in India have discouraged applications by American social scientists. We have had discussions in New Delhi seeking ways of simplifying these procedures so as to increase the number of American scholars able to study in India. I hope these discussions prove fruitful.

The sharing of ideas and experiences through personal contact is the best and most fundamental means of enhancing understanding between our two countries. We are committed to supporting and strengthening exchange programs, and I am very pleased that you have similar interests. You may be certain that we will continue to give these programs the careful attention they merit.

With all best wishes. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. His Excellency, Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi. End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780334–0415. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in the White House; cleared in S/S–O and NEA/INS; approved by Miklos.
2. See Document 109.
3. See Document 108.
4. See Document 65.
5. Vance met with Gromyko in Geneva July 11–13.
6. See Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 1052–1057, or Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 87.