Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, August 2, 1978, 2050Z

195044. Subject: Prime Minister’s Letter to President Carter.

1. The following is text of copy of a letter from Prime Minister Desai to the President received in the Department August 1. Embassy states that original was delivered directly to the White House July 28. Letter itself is dated July 24.

2. Begin text: My Dear President: You will recall that when we met in Washington last month you very kindly told me that we should keep in touch with each other and exchange views on such important developments as may be worthy of attention. I have devoted some further thought to the problems of nuclear proliferation including its disarmament aspects, to the problem of the Middle East and the very delicate yet relevant question of human rights. I have also had the benefit of a discussion with Mr. Newsom² who will doubtless convey to you the substance of that discussion when he returns to Washington.

I have now had the benefit of being fully briefed on the detailed discussions our respective officials had both in New York and Washington on Tarapur and related issues. I have also made myself familiar with the discussion in the Congress on Tarapur fuel subsequent to my departure from USA including the vote in the House of Representatives the other day.³ I feel I should put before you my point of view frankly and without any reserve. In this I am encouraged by my conviction that you and I fully share the same commitment to save the world from nuclear danger. It is therefore up to us both to appreciate each other’s problems and predicaments and make a sincere effort, without sacrificing our principles or national interests, to resolve the issues which continue to elude mutually satisfactory solutions.

I shall first deal with the specific problems relating to Tarapur.

On the question of the continued supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur station, I continue to feel, as I explained to you in Washington, that the existing contractual obligations, under which the United States is required to supply enriched uranium fuel, as and when needed, until 1993, should be fully respected. While we understand the objectives of the U.S. Non-Proliferation Act, 1978, we hold that existing contractual obligations cannot, in any way, be abrogated by a unilateral legislation. I am glad that the U.S. Congress has concurred with your decision to permit the export of 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium. I was particularly pleased to know that in its testimony before Congress on the current pending shipment to Tarapur, the Executive Branch had stressed that the issue under consideration was continued supply over the period provided by law for negotiations and not just the single shipment over which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was divided.⁴ I would assume by this that there will be no insuperable difficulty in the way of future shipments. I understand from both your Ambassador and Mr. Newsom that that is the position and I do hope that you share this view.

I understand that the question of re-processing the spent fuel from the Tarapur station was also discussed by our officials. Quite frankly, I do not understand why there should have been and now should be any delay in initiating the ‛joint determination’ as provided for in our agreement.⁵ The Tarapur station and the reprocessing plant are under safeguards and, in fact, the reprocessing plant was set up with the knowledge and concurrence of your government. If there are any technical problems connected with the safeguarding of the reprocessing plant, these can be looked into by a joint team of experts. The delay in reprocessing the spent fuel from the Tarapur station is causing serious storage problems apart from adverse effect on parliamentary and public opinion. I sincerely hope that this issue can be resolved without further delay.

During our talks, I have repeatedly assured you that we fully share your concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But as is stated in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the recent United Nations Special Session on Disarmament,⁶ ‛non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all states to apply and develop their programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs’. The Final Document also stated that international cooperation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis. It is in this context that we view the problem of safeguards. We are perfectly willing to accept safeguards provided they are applied in equal measure to nuclear activities in all states and are devised in conformity with the objective of preventing proliferation and switchover to military purposes, without any injury to peaceful pursuit of atomic research and development. Any other basis for the application of safeguards would be discriminatory and prejudicial. I have always maintained and I think I am right in doing so that the real danger to the world and mankind comes from the military use of nuclear energy.

We have indicated our willingness to engage in a technical study aimed at reaching agreement on what would constitute the essential elements in a standardized and universally acceptable safeguards system. I have reason to believe that your advisers would be amenable to the idea of a small committee of independent scientists who should subject this question to expert objective study of what is required to serve the purpose of non-proliferation without adversely affecting peaceful pursuit of exploitation of atomic research and development.⁷ Perhaps the countries concerned could be U.S.A., India, West Germany, U.K., Brazil and Japan. I hope that this suggestion, which is entirely prompted by our keen desire to be cooperative and constructive will be acceptable to you.

During our talks in Washington, we touched upon the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I was greatly encouraged by your assurance that the negotiations on this treaty were making good progress. I was, therefore, very distressed at the reports that the CTB would exempt testing in the low kiloton range and that the duration of the treaty is likely to be reduced to three years.⁸ I hope for the good of all of us that this is not true. If, on the other hand, these reports are true, the so-called Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be yet another threshold treaty, permitting the continued testing and development of nuclear weapons. I would appreciate it very much if you could clarify the situation. I doubt whether without a non-discriminatory and really comprehensive treaty with safeguards against clandestine breaches we would find it possible to subscribe to it.

As regards SALT II, I realize that you are greatly concerned at the slow progress, but unfortunately every time some delay occurs, USSR publicly expresses its grievance against USA. USA’s version of the discussion seldom sees the light of the day. The result is that international opinion which insists on an early conclusion of the talks in order to take the implementation of this policy further becomes both critical and impatient. In the meantime the situation changes, further disillusionment takes place and the world feels that there is more of talk and much less of action for implementing these pre-conditions to nuclear disarmament. At present the whole burden of securing early result in this task falls on the USA and the USSR.

One most unfortunate result of this delay is that countries which wish to take meaningful steps towards disarmament are precluded from doing so. The U.N. Special Session devoted to disarmament has just finished. Some results have been achieved but in a number of matters the onus of not going forward falls heavily on nuclear military powers. Consequently the role of nuclear military powers is highlighted in the public mind and psychologically the movement towards disarmament receives a setback. If we have to achieve meaningful progress in disarmament, we must avoid creating this sense of disillusionment and disappointment. I know how sincere and committed you are to nuclear disarmament and am very happy that in spite of difficulties in your bilateral relations with the USSR, you have decided to de-link SALT from other issues and to press on with the negotiations in which your Secretary of State is playing such an important role.

Similarly, it is unfortunate that the talks on Indian Ocean between USA and USSR appear to have been suspended.⁹ You are aware of the very strong feelings that this question arouses in this part of the world. I earnestly feel that since most of the previous colonial countries are situated in this geographical region it is very necessary that at least USA’s role on this particular question is better understood and better appreciated. You had created a very good impression with your attitude to this question earlier and so far as I am concerned I know that you feel the same way even now but the suspension of the talks is now having an adverse effect particularly since generally the case is presented in such a manner as to ascribe to USA the role of being obstructive or dilatory. My own request to you is to consider the matter in isolation from other sensitive matters the impact of which probably accounts for the suspension of the talks.

On the question of Middle East I have been thinking in the light of our discussions. I have made my position clear to you. I just want to say that according to my reading of the situation the question of withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, on which the world opinion is practically unanimous, cannot be divorced from measures to instill a sense of security in the government and people of Israel. The strategic position of Israel is such that it is only the good intentions and peaceful attitudes of the neighbouring states which can promote a feeling of security and inviolability of its frontiers. The guarantee which USA and USSR may offer might in the light of previous similar guarantees be treated with a great degree of caution and circumspection by Israel. I am wondering whether we can try to arrange for some positive assurances from Arab countries on this issue. As far as I can see, Israel does not seem to entertain fears from Egypt but is uneasy about the attitude of other states in the region, the PLO and the Palestinians. I feel that we must address ourselves to this problem in right earnest and am wondering whether a meaningful effort on this question on the part of USA and USSR will not be fruitful. President Sadat’s attitude of understanding and cordiality towards USA and the Russian influence on Syria and the helpful attitude on the part of Jordan might be of some help in this direction.

Finally, I come to the question of our relations with Pakistan and your statement at our discussions combined with what Mr. Newsom told me regarding the normalization of your relationship with Pakistan. I certainly welcome such normalization if it is not at the cost of misunderstanding of the moves by Indian public opinion and causing an arms race between us and Pakistan. I realize that public opinion in the two countries is easily aroused by any adverse trend that occurs in the other. I share your concern at the collaboration between Pakistan and France in the matter of the re-processing plant but I would earnestly suggest to you to consider whether the expansion of the already increased air force of Pakistan is a satisfactory alternative. As it is, Pakistan’s Air Force has received considerable accretion after 1971. On the other hand, we have not added any serial [serious?] strength to our Indian Air Force and in fact qualitatively rather due to the obsoleteness of our equipment for our 7 or 8 squadrons there has been some worsening of the relative situation to our disadvantage. The fact that we are replacing those obsolete aircraft by modern aircraft at a reduced strength cannot be made a ground for grievance, particularly when our peaceful intentions are not only well known but have stood the test of time. To my mind the task of statesmanship lies in bringing about normal situation between us and Pakistan for which we are striving to the utmost of our capability rather than adversely affect the relative situation that exists between the two countries and thereby put normalization in jeopardy. I can assure you that notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan has again begun to harp on the internationally dead question of Jammu & Kashmir and the recent refusal to continue the trade agreement that we had concluded some years ago, I am prepared to play a constructive role in whatever efforts can be made to secure normalization in the relationship between our two countries. But I would not be able to resist countermeasures on our side if the expansion of Pakistan’s air force is facilitated by resumption of hitherto banned sales.

On the question of human rights I have only one submission to make. I think we should not appear to over-stress this issue to the point when it is likely to affect the attitude on other vital and sensitive matters. We have to deal with this problem in a manner which will not result in pushing the countries concerned to the entertainment of any feeling that we are interfering in their internal affairs. While keeping the question alive and dealing with the matter with moderation we should ensure that we avoid creating a situation in which strains and tensions in international relationship are increased.

I must apologize for the length of this letter but I thought that I should communicate to you my thinking on these subjects with a view to helping you to understand us and our stand and to look at the situation in the light of the reactions of the world at large.

With warmest personal regards to you and Mrs. Carter,

Yours sincerely,

(Morarji Desai)

His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.

End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780316–0945. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Albert A Thibault (NEA/INS); cleared in S/S and NEA/INS; approved by Miklos.
2. See Document 107.
3. See footnote 5, Document 107.
4. For the text of Nye’s statement before the House International Relations Committee on May 23, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 1978, pp. 45–47.
5. See footnote 6, Document 60.
6. The Final Document of the United Nations 10th Special Session of the General Assembly, which was the first session to be devoted to disarmament, held May 23–July 1, was contained in UN Resolution S–10/2 adopted on June 30. The document made “recommendations concerning new international machinery for disarmament negotiations.” For the full text, see Yearbook of the United Nations 1978, pp. 19–23.
7. See Document 108.
8. See footnote 5, Document 106.
9. The U.S.-Soviet talks on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean were suspended in February. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region, Arabian Peninsula, Document 121.