110. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
11907. Subject: Some Reflections on the Nuclear Policy Debate Within India. Ref: (A) New Delhi 11700;2 (B) New Delhi 11697;3 (C) New Delhi 11462.4
1. The attacks on Prime Minister Desai’s nuclear policy in both houses of Parliament (reftels) once again demonstrate that the nuclear policy is a political issue which cuts across party lines and engages national prestige perhaps more than any other issue in the country. Although the harshest criticism not unexpectedly came from the opposition, the Lok Sabha debate was initiated by a Janata (albeit gadfly) MP who, we suspect, reflects the view of many of his fellow partymen on the necessity for nuclear research and application to the future of India’s development. The Prime Minister’s unilateral eschewal of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is, simply, not a popular one in India.
2. The argument that India must not miss out on the technological revolution as it had on the industrial one, has strong appeal. It arouses nationalistic sentiment for self reliance, feeds on pride in India’s scientific establishment, and draws upon all the arguments of discrimination and exploitation which underlie other developed/developing country issues. The nuclear states, in particular the United States, are viewed as seeking to monopolize nuclear technology and to deprive India of the full benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Even MPs [Page 295] sympathetic to the Prime Minister thus sometimes do not take at face value his assertions that he has banned nuclear explosions out of conviction. Instead, they suggest that his decision, if not a result of US and Soviet pressure, was, at the least, adopted in recognition of India’s helpless dependence on nuclear material imports. They further criticize him for having given away this, his only chip, early in the game of negotiating with the nuclear powers and of getting nothing in return.
3. In this respect, the Prime Minister’s criticism of the Pokharan explosion of 1974 was probably not politically adept. He faulted it on two counts: (a) it has caused trouble in negotiations with nuclear suppliers, and (b) has added nothing to India’s scientific knowledge. On the first count, this leaves the Prime Minister open to charges that he is overly concerned with and dependent on the reactions of the super powers and therefore is himself making a political issue of Pokharan. On the second count, in his bald assessment of the valuelessness of the Pokharan test, he offends his critics by seeming to denigrate the accomplishments of India’s scientists. His unfortunate muddle and subsequent failure to clarify his distinction between blasts and explosions adds further to the accusations that he does not understand the nature of and need for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and to the demands that there be a full scientific review of his policy. The Prime Minister’s remarks that if necessary India can go it alone in nuclear development over the long term get lost in the controversy generated by his stand that he will not debate policy in public with scientists who are themselves divided on the issue and that he alone has the responsibility for making the final decisions.
4. For a man who himself espouses so strongly the independence and self reliance of India, this is hard criticism to take. In response, the Prime Minister has appealed to his critics to see his policy not only in scientific and nationalistic terms but also in the larger humanitarian and political context of controlling the inherently destructive powers of nuclear energy. He has asked them to see his unilateral ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as a goal toward which the whole world is moving. To vindicate his policy and to stress that the issue is an international one which ultimately must be resolved by negotiations among all the nations, the Prime Minister cites the declaration of the SSOD and the negotiations for a CTB. So far, his critics have not responded to his appeals.
5. As the Prime Minister searches for ways which may permit accommodation between our views on safeguards and his, he makes himself increasingly vulnerable to his domestic critics. We do not see the Prime Minister succumbing to these critics. He has taken what he sees to be a principled position on nuclear explosions, and he is a stubborn and courageous man. He will, however, be increasingly belea [Page 296] guered unless his basically unpopular position is buttressed by real progress internationally on a comprehensive test ban and on nuclear weapons limitations.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321–0938. Confidential. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Islamabad, London, Madras, Moscow, and Paris.↩
- Telegram 11700 from New Delhi, August 1, reported on the July 31 session of the Rajya Sabha and analyzed Desai’s statement that reiterated his opposition to nuclear explosions. Desai condemned the 1974 Pokharan test and argued that it had put India in the difficult position that it now found itself in. The telegram also reported on opposition voiced against Desai in the Rajya Sabha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780317–0028)↩
- Telegram 11697 from New Delhi, August 1, relayed the text of Desai’s July 31 statement at the Rajya Sabha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780314–1063)↩
- Telegram 11462 from New Delhi, July 27, provided an analysis of the criticism in the Lok Sabha and in the press of Desai’s policy on nuclear explosions, reporting that “the Indian press has seized on a remark by the Prime Minister in the July 26 parliamentary debate to proclaim that Desai has declared nuclear blasts for constructive purposes are permissible. We have studied the uncorrected transcript of the debate and are quite sure the Prime Minister did not intend to modify his stand on nuclear explosions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780308–0320)↩