80. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
500. Capetown for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: Contact Group Foreign Ministers Meeting With SWAPO, February 11.
1. Summary: The Western Five Foreign Ministers met with SWAPO morning of February 11. Discussion focused on key settlements issues: South African troop withdrawal, size and nature of the UN presence, monitoring of SWAPO forces, release of political prisoners, Walvis Bay, and conditions affecting post-settlement use of the present police force. For the most part, SWAPO reiterated its previous positions, including those contained in its February 11 proposals given the Five,2 however, we noted some SWAPO flexibility on the size of the UN presence. On Walvis Bay, SWAPO adopted a rigid posture. Nujoma stated that there [Page 211] could be no ceasefire if South Africa continued to occupy the enclave. End summary.
2. The Western Five Foreign Ministers met with SWAPO morning February 11. Atmosphere was businesslike and discussion focussed on key issues which will have to be resolved if a settlement is to be reached.
3. South African troop withdrawal. Jamieson of Canada, who chaired session, questioned Nujoma on SWAPO’s February 10 proposal to confine a 1500-man SAG residual force at Karasburg in southern Namibia. The SWAPO President explained that since all South African troops, “including those at Walvis Bay”, would ultimately be withdrawn to South Africa, there was “no need” to confine them at Oshivello and Grootfontein in the north. When the Secretary and Jamieson pointed out that the Five’s proposal fulfilled requirements for UN monitoring and rapid post-election withdrawal, Nujoma countered by stating that SWAPO simply did not want any SAG troops “in the center of our country.” (Comment: Having made what it portrays as a major concession, SWAPO showed no further “give” on this issue.)
4. Size and nature of the UN presence: There appeared to be some flexibility in SWAPO’s stated requirement for 5,000 UN troops and 1,000 civilians. SWAPO seemed basically willing to leave a decision on the numbers required up to the Secretary General, although Nujoma added that this was “not entirely” the case because it depended in part on the “situation”. When pressed by the Secretary on actual numbers, Nujoma said two or three thousand UN troops would be too few but that SWAPO “could accept 4,000.” (Comment: We understand that the Secretary General found SWAPO forthcoming on this issue.)
5. Defining the relationship between the UN Special Representative (UNSR) and the SAG Administrator General remains a serious problem. SWAPO continues to insist that the UNSR have all real administrative power and control and that what it terms the “senior South African civil servant” have only clerk-like, subordinate functions. Nujoma stated that the UN must control the entire administrative process during the transition. SWAPO does not accept our formulation of having the UNSR satisfy himself with the Administrator General’s actions even though we pointed out that this gives the UNSR the power of veto.
6. Monitoring of SWAPO forces. SWAPO is willing to [be] cooperative on the monitoring of its “soldiers in Namibia.” However, it will not permit monitoring of SWAPO camps in neighboring countries and refused to discuss any arrangements the Five might seek to make with these countries on the grounds that it would not be right for SWAPO to discuss matters impinging on their sovereignty.
7. Release of political prisoners. SWAPO repeated its pledge that for the “sake of a settlement” it was prepared to release the “eleven counter-revolutionaries” (in Tanzania) “at an appropriate time.” [Page 212] Nujoma emphasized that there could be no linkage with the release of Namibian political detainees held by South Africa. Concerning SWAPO detainees in Zambia, Nujoma denied there were any, said that the persons involved who were at a camp at Mahemba (phonetic), had resigned from SWAPO, and claimed that the UNHCR was familiar with the situation. With regard to a procedure for settling disputes on the release of political detainees, Nujoma said SWAPO felt the UNSR’s legal section could deal with such cases. He brought up the panel of jurists concept for the purpose of rejecting it once again.
8. Walvis Bay: SWAPO rejected any notion that the status of Walvis Bay could be decided after independence. Nujoma stated that there would be no ceasefire if South Africa continued to occupy Walvis Bay, and that the territory would have to be part of any agreement SWAPO might sign. He told the Five that SWAPO wished Walvis to be an official part of its discussion with them. (Comment: Walvis Bay has taken its place as a new and difficult obstacle to a settlement.)
9. SAG police: SWAPO repeated its demand that the UN assume command and control of the police as part of any agreement. However, Nujoma seemed amenable to permitting the police to continue their normal law and order duties as long as they were limited to sidearms and deprived of their “machine guns” and other heavy weapons.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780065–0325. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Maputo, Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, and Cape Town.↩
- In telegram 478 from USUN, February 10, the Mission transmitted the text of SWAPO’s proposals to the Five. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063–0699)↩