79. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
499. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: First Contact Group Foreign Ministers Meeting With South African Foreign Minister Botha, February 11.
1. Summary: As agreed earlier by the Five Foreign Ministers, Secretary Vance, acting as Chairman, queried Botha regarding South African positions on outstanding issues including:
—Size of the UN civilian and military forces in Namibia
—Restriction of SAG troops to two bases in Namibia
—UN monitoring of ceasefire, SAG and SWAPO forces and infiltration
[Page 208]—Political prisoners
—Status of Walvis Bay
Botha made his expected historical, moral and legal justification of South African stances but without histrionics. SAG positions were re-stated and clarified but, other than willingness to reduce troops in Walvis Bay in return for withdrawal of Cuban forces in Angola and general description of South African contacts with Luanda, nothing new was said. There were no concessions and no new ground was broken. End summary.
2. The Foreign Ministers of the Five Contact Group nations met with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha February 11 to obtain clarification of the South African position on certain issues stemming from the proposal of the Five for a Namibia settlement. Acting as Chairman, Secretary Vance made the opening statement and put most of the questions to Botha, with other Foreign Ministers joining in as they felt appropriate. Botha provided the South African position on the following subjects:
3. Size of the UN civilian and military forces in Namibia: Botha replied that, in keeping with South African’s agreement that the UN Special Representative (SR) could satisfy himself regarding the fairness of the political process, the SR could place several of his people at each polling place so that there could be as many as 2400 poll watchers alone, without considering the many logistics and administrative personnel who would presumably be assigned to Windhoek. This would be the largest such UN contingent in history. As for the UN military wing, Botha repeated the South African position of December 3; reluctantly and against the opinion of the anti-SWAPO leaders of Ovamboland, South Africa agreed to 2,000 UN observers. Of these, 1000 must be placed in Angola to monitor SWAPO bases there and the others at various points in northern Namibia near the troubled areas. The SAG would have preferred not to have a precise number of UN military personnel, had originally hoped that the “observer corps” could be as few as 125 but went to the figure 2000 when it was proposed to them.
4. Restriction of SAG troops to two bases in Namibia: Somewhat disingenuously, Botha stated that, up to the time he first read the proposals of the Five, he had been under the impression that South Africa would maintain platoon size units at approximately eight “points for the protection of logistic, communications, storage and staging installations” in northern Namibia under UN monitoring. Some of these sites are located in towns where there are hospitals, waterworks and other public service institutions (comment: the implication was that the troops at the sites somehow help with the public service missions of these organizations.), while others are purely military. Botha did not make it clear if South Africa continues to insist that they be able [Page 209] to maintain the small units at the northern sites although he indicated that their presence was primarily for psychological and maintenance purposes.
5. Size of residual SAG force in Namibia: As the bare minimum level of troops which will be necessary to maintain order and security, particularly in Ovamboland if this should be necessary, Botha insists on retaining 3000 soldiers, 1400 combat troops and 1600 logistics personnel. Other than SWAPO, no Namibian leaders wanted the level of South African troops reduced to a figure lower than 5000 and consequently they were seriously concerned when they learned that the SAG had agreed in December to reduce the number to 3000. Now SWAPO, which claims erroneously that there are 50,000 SAG soldiers in Namibia, is taking the minimum figure of 3000 as a starting point and trying, with the support of the Five, to halve it. UN forces would be unable to provide logistics for the South African combat troops: in fact the South African army may have to assist the UN with its logistics.
6. UN monitoring of ceasefire, SAG and SWAPO forces and infiltration: According to Botha, South Africa has agreed in principle to: UN monitoring of their restriction to bases and their eventual withdrawal, UN monitoring of the ceasefire, and UN monitoring of the border situation, which would include SWAPO activities.
7. Political prisoners: South Africa holds about 60 Namibians, most of whom have been properly sentenced by South African courts. The remainder can be freed but release of the sentenced majority is dependent upon creation of “a watertight mechanism” for the release of SWAPO’s political prisoners in Tanzania and Zambia. Botha does not accept the Zambian claim that the prisoners they were holding have resigned from SWAPO and elected to become refugees in Zambia, but noted that the now scrapped proposal for a panel of jurists would have provided a means to deal with disputes of this and other sorts which would arise during the course of the transitional process. South Africa would like to see some alternate mechanism involving a third party for the settlement of disputes.
8. Status of Walvis Bay: Walvis Bay is an integral part of South Africa, as affirmed by international law and treaty. The SAG could not give the enclave away even if it wanted to. Under the South African Constitution, only the Parliament could do that. It matters not if the new Namibian Government is friendly, Walvis Bay is South African and any other status is out of the question. However, if the new Namibian Government, regardless of its feelings towards South Africa or its ideological preferences, wants to use the port of Walvis Bay and its other facilities, this could be worked out, as was done in somewhat similar circumstances with Mozambique. South African troops in Walvis Bay are not counted among those which the SAG would leave [Page 210] in Namibia. South Africa would agree to the reduction of its troops in Walvis Bay only in return for the withdrawal of the 23,000 Cubans in Angola.
9. With respect to Angola, Botha also noted, very confidentially, that South Africa had had a series of promising meetings with the Neto government in Pretoria and in Angolan cities, but that, inexplicably, the process had come to an end (he did not say when). The Angolans had made proposals less harsh than those of the Five, including only verified withdrawal from the immediate border area.
10. Comment: The meeting served to clarify for the Ministers the South African positions on the issues generally regarded as the most contentious. No concessions were offered but these, if they come, are more likely to appear during the restricted session planned for later in the day.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780065–0319. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, and Cape Town.↩