Office of the Historian

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, February 18, 1977, 1606Z

37591. Subject: Namibian Settlement.

1. We have decided to make another attempt to unblock the current impasse on Namibian negotiations by gaining the acceptance of all the pertinent parties, starting with the South Africans. Of the Seven Point Proposal which was developed in September, 1976 after consultations with the Front Line Presidents and the SAG and refined in communications thereafter.2

2. At base the proposal calls for parallel Geneva conferences on Namibia at which the Namibians, including SWAPO and Turnhalle representatives, meeting together under UN auspices would determine the shape of a future independent Namibia and then together negotiate the details of South Africa’s withdrawal from the territory and its future relations with the independent state. South Africa has agreed in advance to accept the results of the conference among the Namibians.3

3. South Africa has previously accepted the Seven Points and has made some additional concessions and SWAPO and the Front Line states are aware of its agreement.4 In addition South Africa has agreed that only a representative delegation from Windhoek will attend the international conference and has agreed to a substantial release of political prisoners.5 SWAPO has not accepted the South African proposal and encouraged by the Front Line states is sticking to its basic negotiating preconditions, including its demand for direct talks exclusively with the SAG.6

4. We have called in Ambassador Botha and requested his government’s reconfirmation of its agreement to the proposals.7 If that is received we will re-approach Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Obasanjo and urge them to use their influence with SWAPO to accept the Seven Points or modifications thereof as the basis for negotiations. In these [Page 101] conversations we would note that while we take no position on the substantive merit of the Seven Point Proposal, it seems to us to present a course worthy of serious consideration.

5. For London: We intend to inform the British Embassy in Washington of our initiative and you should do the same with the FCO. We will keep you informed of developments.

6. For other addressees: No action necessary at this time. Any thoughts you may have on how to refine our approach would also be appreciated.

Hartman
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Davidow (AF/S); cleared by Wisner (AF/S) and Sebastian (S/S); approved by Schaufele. Sent for information Priority to Gaborone, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Lagos, and Maputo.↩
  2. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 203.↩
  3. Not further identified.↩
  4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 207.↩
  5. Ibid.↩
  6. See Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28367.↩
  7. See Document 260.↩