Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Zanzibar¹

Washington, February 5, 1977, 2250Z

26792. Zanzibar for Amb Young from Asst Secretary Schaufele. Subject: Namibian Interim Government. Ref: London 1950² (Nodis).

1. During the South African Ambassador’s meeting with Secretary Vance on January 25³ the Secretary raised with Botha the question of an interim government in Namibia. Secretary Vance on that occasion said “With respect to Namibia, we have told the Front Line Presidents, the Nigerians, and other African leaders that we remain committed to Namibian independence and a negotiated settlement which will achieve this objective. They know our good offices remain open. We are currently reviewing what steps will move the settlement along and we trust that your government will continue to refrain from taking any decisions that might foreclose the possibility of an internationally acceptable settlement.”

2. Botha called me on February 3 with reference to the President’s statement on Southern Africa last night.⁴ Ambassador Botha said that the US had made a distinction between South Africa on the one hand and Rhodesia and Namibia on the other. He sought reassurance that we continue to hold to our view. Botha said that he regarded the President’s statement as a bland one not unlike statements made in the past. Speaking privately, he foresaw problems in our relations if South Africa concludes the United States is treating all three Southern African questions in the same manner. I told Botha that United States policy supports majority rule in the region.

3. I took advantage of his call to turn the subject to Namibia and South African intentions with respect to an interim government. I reminded Botha of the point which Secretary Vance had made. Botha defended the work of the Constitutional Committee of the Turnhalle Conference.⁵ I replied that whether or not an interim government was logical from South Africa’s point of view, it would not be internationally acceptable. The United States expected that South Africa should not let matters go too far, and thereby preclude the possibility of reaching an internationally acceptable agreement. Botha agreed to pass my message to his government.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zanzibar: 1/77–1/81. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information to Cape Town. Drafted by Wisner; cleared by Helman (IO), Tarnoff, Goldsmith (S/S), and Habib; approved by Schaufele.
2. In telegram 1950 from London, February 3, the Embassy reported on Young’s meeting with SWAPO’s London representative, Peter Katjavivi. Young emphasized the administration’s commitment to a Namibian settlement. He noted that new obligations and responsibilities would be imposed on SWAPO and warned against “sloganeering.” Young also suggested that the Department consider telling Vorster that a provisional government established by the Turnhalle Conference would complicate the issue and would be considered the equivalent of the “internal option” in Rhodesia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77)
3. See Document 260.
4. Reference is to Carter’s “Report to the American People” in which he noted that Andrew Young was “on a visit to Africa to demonstrate our friendship for its peoples and our commitment to peaceful change toward majority rule in Southern Africa.” The President spoke at 10 p.m. from the White House library. The address was broadcast live on radio and television. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 76)
5. The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference started discussions in September 1975. The Committee was unable to reach an agreement on the structure of the interim government until March 9, 1977. (Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28366)