Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

260. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 25, 1977, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • The Secretary
  • William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
  • Peter Tarnoff, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
  • Frank G. Wisner, AF/S (notetaker)

• South Africa

  • R. F. Botha, Ambassador
  • Jeremy Shearer, Minister

SUBJECT

• The Rhodesian Negotiations

Vance: Did you have a message to convey to me?

Botha: This is the first opportunity we have had to meet. I want to express my congratulations to you on your assuming your official duties. You hold one of the key posts in the world and the responsibilities which fall upon you are heavy. I wish you good luck.

Vance: Thank you. I appreciate that.

Botha: I sent a message to Bill Schaufele earlier to say that my government had advised the Rhodesians not to shoot down the British proposals.² We believed that Smith would not shoot them down but would give them sympathetic consideration. The news yesterday took us by complete surprise.³ There was no consultation between my government and Smith on the position he took. Ivor Richard is now in Johannesburg. The British Ambassador, Sir David Scott, called Cape Town and spoke to Brand Fourie. Scott said that Richard was available to meet the Prime Minister if the Prime Minister wished. That was an unfortunate way to put the case. We had to reply that there was nothing immediate but I don’t know if Richard went to Cape Town or not.

My Prime Minister had two friendly and useful meetings with Richard. I was present at the first. During those meetings, my Prime Minister said that the talks in Geneva had not gone as well as we had hoped. We have no doubts about the merits of the case. Secretary Kissinger cleared the Five Points⁴ which we discussed in Pretoria with President Kaunda and Nyerere. We understood that the Presidents had agreed to the Five Points as put to them by Secretary Kissinger.⁵ We received through your Ambassador in Pretoria a message confirming the fact that Kaunda and Nyerere had seen the points.⁶ Kissinger recommended that two points be added. He said that it would be possible for Smith to mention in his speech that the Ministers of Defense and Law and Order stay in white hands and that the Chairman of the Council of State could be a European. To confirm exactly what we understood to be the Five Points, your message spelled them out once again. On the basis of that message, we sent a signal to Smith. We mentioned no difficulties in obtaining African agreement. Had we known there were difficulties, we would have cited them. We were thus in good faith in transmitting exactly what you gave us. Smith was pleased and thereafter made his September 24 speech.⁷

It came to us as a great shock when the situation changed. Smith’s speech was greeted in newspapers throughout the world. His commitment to majority rule was hailed. Kissinger’s achievement was called a miracle. But on the Sunday after, the Front Line Presidents met in Lusaka and shot down Smith’s offer.⁸ Let me repeat we had understood that the Secretary had discussed the Five Points with the African Presidents and that they had accepted them. Had we known that the Points had not been cleared with the Africans, we would have warned Smith differently. We would have said that he could advance the Five Points with the addition as his maximum position and then fall back at a later point. This, in our judgment, is where the negotiations went wrong.

No South African Prime Minister has ever gone back on his word. We assured Secretary Kissinger that we would hold Smith to whatever he announced. We knew there would be a great deal of suspicion among Africans that Smith would break his guarantee. We had hoped that we could dispel this suspicion with our own guarantee that Smith would agree to majority rule in two years. That’s what the whole war has been about. When the Prime Minister agreed to hold Smith to his commitment, I can assure you that had Smith moved back we would have moved.

Faced with this back-sliding, the Prime Minister feels that the rug has been pulled out from under him. We can only hold Smith firmly in the context of the Five Points. These are the facts, as we see them.

In Geneva, black suspicions were whipped up. Certainly, the Rhodesians contributed. There were documents circulated that the Rhodesians did not intend to keep their word and would carry on the struggle, but even more important, there was a great deal of jockeying for power among the black delegations which went to Geneva and their demands increased.

When Ivor Richard was received by my Prime Minister, we repeated our understanding of what happened to him. We were surprised to learn that the British were saying the Five Points were purely American proposals. This, we know, is not the case. We knew that Secretary Kissinger left Zurich for London to discuss British papers. We have the documents and they are typed on British stationery. We had always understood the process to be a British plan which was based on American leverage. All of this has given us to be suspicious of the British. I don’t understand why all the parties don’t put their cards on the table. This is not the time to play tricks. It’s the time to move openly, and we don’t like the British assertion that they were kept in the dark by you.

Despite this, my Prime Minister listened to Richard and Richard said that if he could get an African commitment on the British proposals, as well as a commitment to stop the war once an interim government was formed, could he count on South African support. The Prime Minister said yes Richard could proceed and that he would consider talking to the Rhodesians based on the results of Richard’s meetings with the Africans. He could, of course, make no commitment as to the position we would take.

Richard then returned to see my Prime Minister and he had nothing definite in hand. His talks were only at the interim stage. I understand Richard did not even expect a firm reply from my Prime Minister. Then, we got your message asking that we use our influence with Salisbury.⁹ Despite everything, we passed our desire that the Rhodesians not reject the British proposals. Then came Smith’s speech.

We are interested in a peaceful solution, but we have come to the reluctant conclusion that it doesn’t matter what we put into play because the black side will advance new claims which are more radical. Every American and British move is seen by them as weakness. You can’t achieve a solution if this goes on.

Your predecessor saw us frequently. We were told that our attitude on Rhodesia and Namibia was reasonable. We were told that we had acted honorably. We were told that the process launched could lead to understanding, but we would like the United States Government to say that South Africa has been reasonable. Otherwise, there will be erosion of the peace potential. The change in proposals has given Smith a chance to get off the hook and we can’t hold him with the same degree of firmness that we could have held him to the Five Points. The Front Line Presidents have concluded they have a green traffic light. They have you on the run. You are scared of Soviet intrusions and will go to any lengths to try to head this off. Thus, they are prepared to leave their position open until victory is fully on their side.

I saw the Tanzanian Ambassador, Bomani, on January 20. He and I talked at some length and I reminded him South Africa sought a peaceful solution. I asked him if an independent Rhodesia under black rule within a reasonable period was not both of our nation’s objectives. I asked him if his government did not want Rhodesia to emerge with its economy intact. He agreed. I then said I did not understand why we could not work out problems together.

Bomani replied that the Africans had to recognize Mugabe. The Africans are not interested in Muzorewa, even if he has a majority of the votes. We don’t need, Bomani said, majorities of this sort in Africa. It’s not voting majorities we are interested in, but power. I understand the Africans predicament about Mugabe and Nkomo and trying to control the war. But they run a serious risk of turning Muzorewa against Mugabe and producing the very war they are trying to stop.

I asked Bomani why the Africans couldn’t agree to elect one black leader. He would then negotiate a settlement with Smith and consult on how elections could be carried out and independence achieved. Bomani told me that Mugabe would continue the civil war. If these are really his views, then what he is saying is that a few men with guns must rule the situation. We will have another FRELIMO or something like the MPLA in Angola. This is an awesome possibility. We simply can’t give up majority rule and let it be replaced by gun rule.

I told Bomani that we, the British and the Americans have tried to reach a settlement. Bomani questioned his President’s acceptance of the Five Points. He said Nyerere had never agreed to Kissinger’s proposals. I disagreed and told him what had happened, but I said, whether you believe me or not, at least you can admit that we have acted in good faith based on the assurances we received from the Americans. Bomani said that Vorster must play a key role. I told him that we can’t play if the carpet is continually being pulled out from under our feet. In the end, there will be a bloodbath. This, Bomani agreed, must be avoided.

I also discussed with him the Seven Points on Namibia.¹⁰ I told him the United States had assured us these were reasonable propositions. We knew the conditions that Nyerere had said would be acceptable—moving the conference from Windhoek to someplace outside of Africa so that there would be no manipulation, as well as some way to include SWAPO. You know how difficult accepting SWAPO was for us. SWAPO is Communist-based with white origins. We know all about it. But we said we would make a conference possible in which SWAPO could take part. We believed these were the points that Nyerere asked you. But I must say we feel left in the lurch by the United States.

Vance: What points are in the lurch?

Botha: The United States did not stand by the Five Points. Nor did the British, even though South Africa was prepared to stand by them. We don’t expect you to support South Africa or whitewash us, but where apartheid is not in the picture and where we are contributing to peace we hope you will back us. Otherwise, we don’t know how to continue. I told Bill Schaufele that we might think about getting together at a high level—South Africa, the Front Line states, the British, the United States and France. If debates in the United Nations proceed as they have in the past, there will be trouble. We have the same aim, but we must be frank to realize that you cannot produce agreements through trip after trip and exchanges which produce misunderstandings. A high level understanding could close the process and make it work.

Vance: Thank you. Let me reply. I have talked to The President and he has asked me to convey his assurance that the United States is going to continue its search for peaceful solutions to the problems of southern Africa. He wants that message to be passed to your Prime Minister.

We have given similar assurances to the Front Line Presidents and other African leaders.

Needless to say, Smith’s January 24 speech greatly complicates the Rhodesian negotiations.

—The internal solution is not realistic and as we have told Smith the United States will give it no support.

—We are trying to keep the door to negotiations open and have said publicly the British proposals are a basis for continued talks. Smith must realize no settlement can be based on the Five Points alone. His statement that he is willing to negotiate the original Five Points with flexibility is no help at all.

As a matter of fact, Smith’s rejection of the British proposals has given the Africans an opportunity to reject further negotiations. If a deadlock is reached, he must be aware that he will face nothing short of stiff American opposition.

We will move to repeal the Byrd amendment and will review our policy of sanctions with a view to closing any existing loopholes.

Until an interim government is formed, Rhodesia cannot count on American interest or sympathy, nor will it emerge from its current state of isolation.

As I have said, we continue our search for a negotiated settlement and are discussing the matter with the British. We need to have your government’s views on what steps can be taken to correct the present situation and expect to stay in close consultation with you. With respect to Namibia, we have told the Front Line Presidents, the Nigerians, and other African leaders that we remain committed to Namibian independence and a negotiated settlement which will achieve this objective. They know our good offices remain open. We are currently reviewing what steps will move the settlement along and we trust that your government will continue to refrain from taking any decisions that might foreclose the possibility of an internationally acceptable settlement.

Your government may wish to communicate to Salisbury the gist of my remarks on the Rhodesian question.

We have maintained useful communications to your government through you. We wish to continue to use your good offices and I am asking Assistant Secretary Schaufele to stay in touch so that our communications remain as effective in the future as they have been in the past.

Botha: Could I ask a question?

Vance: Yes.

Botha: When you say that the internal solution will receive no American support, have you told Smith that?

Vance: Bill, when was it?

Schaufele: In Geneva, we told Smith. Not now.

Botha: You mentioned the Byrd Amendment. What are your intentions there?

Vance: There is a bill to repeal the Amendment.

Botha: Would you shelve it if Smith came back to the conference table?

Vance: The bill is moving through the Congress but if asked the Administration will say that it supports repeal.

Botha: Even if Smith shows flexibility?

Vance: We must be frank. As far as the Byrd Amendment goes, it should be repealed.

Botha: But if Smith is negotiating, is it wise under these circumstances to move forward? Shouldn’t Smith be given some kind of encouragement.

Vance: Smith has shown no flexibility.

Botha: I appreciate the time you have given me.

One more question. Mr. Young, my new colleague, has asked me to meet him. When I do, I will have to say that statements like those which refer to the pressures we can bring to bear are not helpfully made in public. You must leave it to us.

Vance: I understand.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on January 26 by Wisner; approved on February 10 by Twaddel. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. Vance’s talking points for this meeting are attached to Document 131.
2. Botha’s message to Schaufele was not found.
3. See footnote 2, Document 131.
4. The proposal for a Rhodesian settlement, the Five Points, is printed in Tab 1, Document 264.
5. Kissinger explained the Five Points, to President Kaunda and President Nyerere on September 20 and 21, 1976, respectively. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 207.
6. Not found.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 209.
8. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 212.
9. Not found.
10. The Proposals for a Namibian Settlement, the Seven Points, is printed as Tab 2, Document 264.