Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the United States Representative to the United Nations (McHenry) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 23, 1979

SUBJECT

• Angola After Neto: Next Steps

Neto’s death² may give us an opportunity to look for ways to follow up on the progress that has already been made toward attaining key U.S. objectives in dealing with Angola. This progress includes:

—the reconciliation between Zaire and Angola and subsequent stability in the region;

—Angola’s willingness to collaborate with us toward a settlement in Namibia;

—as a front line state, Angola’s willingness to be helpful on Britain’s Rhodesia initiative;

—Angola’s opening to Western political and economic ties, specifically as an oil producer, and her denial of base facilities to the Soviets;

—Neto’s indication, just before his death, that a settlement in Namibia would be followed by a significant reduction of Cuban troops.

Several African leaders—Mobutu, Tolbert and the Presidents of Cape Verde and the Congo—say that President dos Santos and the rest of the Angolan leadership intend to follow Neto’s policies; and President dos Santos’ reply to your message of condolence supports this view. However, our African friends also advise us to move quickly to seize the opportunity provided by the moderate succession process to encourage continuance of the Angolan opening toward the West.

We believe that it is in our interest to have more frequent contact and a continuing dialogue with the Angolans. It was quite clear under Neto, and is still the case, that the Angolan condition for closer relations with us is the establishment of diplomatic relations, without preconditions. We believe as well that we should now address the issue of normalization with the Angolans and that we can do so in ways which will advance our interests substantially with the dos Santos government. What we propose is to offer recognition without preconditions, but handle it in such a way as to reinforce the Angolans’ motivation to respond with a reduction in Cuban troop presence and a forthcoming position on our other interests in the area.

We recommend the following:

—send Frank Wisner, our Ambassador to Zambia and a man who knows the issues, to Luanda for talks with dos Santos.

—Wisner’s brief would be to reiterate to the Angolans our views on the range of issues outlined above, seek dos Santos’ views, and confirm that the new regime indeed wants to continue to work with us.

On the question of diplomatic relations, Wisner would be authorized to say:

a) that we understand the importance of this question to the Angolan side, including the insistence that normalization take place without preconditions.

b) we are prepared to normalize without preconditions and begin talks on the modalities for establishing our diplomatic presence. At the same time, the Angolan side must realize that the continued presence of Cuban combat troops will be a burden on our new relationship. Congressional and public concern about the large-scale troop presence will continue to hinder any consideration of assistance programs.³

c) Neto understood this and had indicated that there were indeed circumstances—like those surrounding a Namibian settlement—which could lead to a withdrawal or reduction of Cuban combat troop presence. What is the position of the dos Santos government in this regard?

We believe this approach to dos Santos at a time he is setting the new Angolan government’s policies could have a positive impact. We would send a welcome signal to the new regime, reaffirm our commitment to a settlement in Namibia and to stability in the region, and we would obtain a current and direct reading of Angolan views. Our offer to recognize without preconditions could even make clearer to the Angolans their own interest in beginning a draw-down of the Cubans, with or without a settlement in Namibia.

Such a move would also be welcomed by the African moderates, the Front Line states and Nigeria, as well as by key Western European leaders who favor gestures that could have the effect of lessening Angolan dependence on the Soviets and Cubans.

In accordance with our discussion of the issue, we are consulting with some of the key people on the Hill.⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1–12/79. Secret.
2. Neto died in Moscow on September 10, while undergoing treatment for cancer.
3. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “I need to know dos Santos’ reaction before we’re bound by a commitment. J.”
4. Carter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. In an October 29 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski recommended approval of the Vance/McHenry memorandum, and Carter checked the approve option. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 123, 11/1–14/79)