Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

37. Memorandum From Donald Gregg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 12, 1979

SUBJECT

• Anti-Cuban Covert Action in Angola (S)

On 7 September CIA sent a short memo (Tab A) saying in effect that there are opportunities for anti-Cuban covert action in Angola that CIA could undertake were it not for the Clark Amendment. I called CIA to ask what they would like to do if the Clark Amendment were repealed. The CIA response was that it did not want to get “too far out front” in seeming to push for a covert action program in Angola. I replied that the death of Neto and the coming Angolan power struggle which is forecast by recent intelligence (Tab B) argued for CIA to be more forthcoming in terms of outlining possible covert action options which the recent situation appears to make possible.² (S)

The result of this dialogue are talking points on “Cuban and Angola” attached at Tab C. CIA characterizes these as “informal, and in-house thoughts about a problem.” I assured CIA that I would make clear that it was I that had asked for these thoughts. Frank Carlucci has seen the Tab C attachment and has agreed to its being sent down. (S)

I call particular attention to the proposed covert action options outlined in paragraph six of Tab C. Several of them appear to be particularly worth consideration at this time. The immediate problem, however, is the Clark Amendment. Paragraph seven of Tab C spells out the problem posed by the Clark Amendment very clearly. (S)

I also attach at Tab D a piece of analysis from CIA indicating that while Cuba has some problems in Angola it may be a tough presence to dislodge.³ (S)

What this adds up to in my view is both an opportunity (in Angola) and a problem in Congress (the Clark Amendment.) I recommend that the following steps be taken. (S)

1. Request CIA to come up with a covert action program designed to reduce or remove the Cuban presence in Angola. This program should be written as though the Clark Amendment does not exist. (S)

2. This program should be judged on its merits and if it appears worth undertaking, CIA should be instructed to take quiet soundings with the two intelligence oversight committees to ascertain their views on the merits of the program and the chances of quietly repealing the Clark Amendment.⁴ (S)

3. Direct CIA to ascertain as best it can what other covert action opportunities are represented by the various factions which will contend for power in the wake of Neto’s death.⁵ (S)

Final Comment

This issue is a clear illustration of the way in which this country (read Congress), in a burst of moralistic zeal, has hamstrung itself in terms of dealing quietly and covertly with a promising situation in Angola. (S)

An attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment would most probably become a contentious issue which would draw attention to the fact that the United States was trying once again to influence events in Angola. The only hope is that recent developments in and around Cuba may have changed Congressional viewpoints sufficiently to allow quiet repeal of the Amendment. I think it is worth trying.⁶ (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)⁷

Washington, September 7, 1979

SUBJECT

• NSC Interest in “Morale of Cuban Advisors in Angola”—A Possible Exploitation of Relations Between Cubans and Angolans

REFERENCES

• Your Memorandum of 3 August 1979⁸

1. Attached is a memorandum which responds to your query on what CIA is doing to exacerbate tensions between Cuban soldiers and the local population in Angola.

2. Although the Agency continues to carry out a worldwide propaganda campaign exposing Soviet and Cuban interference in Angola, we are legally restricted from taking a more direct course in exploiting this Cuban vulnerability.

ALL PORTIONS SECRET.

Stansfield Turner ⁹

1. The reporting on tensions between Cuban soldiers in Angola and the local population is correct. These frictions are long-standing and have been featured in many of the propaganda items cited in paragraph 3 below.

2. We believe it would be useful to exacerbate this vulnerability but we are precluded from taking additional action by the so-called Clark Amendment (Section 404a of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976). This legislation prohibits CIA from supplying military or paramilitary support to anyone in Angola.

3. Since the November 1977 Presidential Finding on exposing the Cuban and Soviet role in Angola, we have conducted a worldwide propaganda campaign on that subject. This effort may have had some indirect impact on the internal Angolan situation. This continuing campaign has included:

a. Worldwide Propaganda. We have placed more than 500 major items in the world media and briefed liaison government contacts in 45 countries.

b. Radio into Cuba. Since March 1979, we have prepared three broadcast scripts monthly for a [place not declassified] radio station heard in Cuba. These items focus on the economic waste of Cuba’s African adventures.

c. Informing Cubans. Four packets of press clippings in Spanish, English and French, all of which condemn the Cuban role in Africa, have been sent to field stations for distribution to local Cuban officials.

4. In sum, we have not had policy authority to take advantage of this opportunity in a direct and effective manner.

All portions of this document are SECRET.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹⁰

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Cuba and Angola

1. The continuing large Cuban presence in Angola, and the spread of Cuban troops to other countries in Africa such as Ethiopia and Congo Brazzaville, represents a growing threat to the stability of Africa. Castro’s military imperialism is succeeding in Africa partly because of the lack of Western support to those who oppose his activities.

—Cuban influence in Africa particularly in Angola and Ethiopia is pervasive and growing.

—The indigenous elements which oppose Castro in Africa are too weak to overcome Cuban military effectiveness.

2. U.S. Administrations have sought to reduce Cuban adventurism in Africa.

—In 1975–76, the Agency spent $30 million on political and paramilitary support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the Soviet/Cuban backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). This program was halted in early 1976 by the Tunney-Javits Amendment to the CIA Appropriations Act. The Clark Amendment of 1976 imposed a permanent prohibition on military and paramilitary support to anyone in Angola.

—In November 1977, a Presidential Finding directed the Agency to publicize the facts about Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola. This activity continues in terms of worldwide propaganda radio broadcasts into Cuba and efforts to reach Cuban officials abroad.

—In early 1978, Dr. Brzezinski stimulated an Agency review of covert action options in Angola. Action to pursue any one of these options was foreclosed because of the Clark Amendment.¹¹

—In April 1978 the DCI told the SCC it would be necessary to go to Congress before conducting any covert action in Angola. Congressional, including Senator Clark’s, opinion was sought, with the result that a Congressional source told the press that the Agency was reconsidering covert action in Angola. The resultant publicity caused the Administration to deny that any such program was being actively considered.¹²

—Several unsuccessful attempts have been made since then to alter the Clark Amendment to permit U.S. Government aid to the MPLA regime.¹³

—State has authorized the sale of jet transport aircraft to the regime, arguing that the Clark Amendment does not apply to private sector sales to Angola.

3. Drafts prepared by State for the current policy review on Angola contain the following U.S. policy objectives:¹⁴

—Continued Angolan help for a Namibian solution;

—Significant reduction, total withdrawal if possible, of Cuban military forces (from Angola);¹⁵

—Reconciliation between Angola and Zaire, with attendant border security and stability in the area;

—Full operation of the Benguela railroad with attendant benefits to the economies of the region;

—National reconciliation of the major political/ethnic groups, especially the integration of UNITA into the body politic of Angola;¹⁶

—Reduction of Soviet influence, including a denial of naval/air facilities, and a more non-aligned position on the part of Angola;¹⁷

—Protection and enhancement of our commercial interests.

Also, at this time the merits of formal U.S. diplomatic recognition of the MPLA are under review.

4. The African country which offers the best potential for covert action against Cuba is Angola.¹⁸ This is because:

—An entrenched armed opposition, UNITA still maintains effective control over one third of the country, and inflicts meaningful casualties on Cuban troops (over 1,500 killed since 1976).¹⁹

—Two other guerrilla groups, FNLA and the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), tie down major Cuban forces in northern Angola and Cabinda, and also inflict some losses on the Cubans.²⁰

—Frictions exist between the Cubans and both the ruling MPLA and the Angolan people.²¹

—Angola is the only place in Africa where a viable armed opposition such as UNITA exists and which appears to have some chance of thwarting Castro militarily.²²

5. Given necessary executive and legislative approvals, as well as the State Department’s concurrence, and appropriate funds, the Agency could through existing and quickly renewable covert contacts and mechanisms take steps to:²³

—Encourage senior MPLA officials to insist on drawdowns of the Cuban military presence;

—Increase the cost of the continuing Cuban presence in Angola;

—In general make the continuing presence of Cuban troops in Angola an embarrassment to the Cuban Government.

6. Examples of the kind of new covert action activities that might be quickly established include:²⁴

—Encourage and recruit MPLA politicians who have come to resent and oppose the continuing Cuban military presence in Angola;²⁵

—Promote agreements between certain MPLA leaders and UNITA troops which would enable UNITA to focus its armed attention on Cuban forces;

—Stimulate other nations to increase military support to UNITA to enable UNITA to expand its effort and increase Cuban casualties in Angola;

—Fund UNITA efforts to enable UNITA spokesmen to present its case against Cuban involvement in Angola to world opinion makers;

—[3 lines not declassified] to provide external security for Angola. This would of course require guarantees and inducements for UNITA to secure its cooperations;²⁶

—Utilize covert action channels to other African leaders to bring significant pressure for a reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA, a condition of which could be a significant reduction of Cuban forces;²⁷

—Let the MPLA know that if U.S. efforts to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola fail, the U.S. will explore other options to attain that result.

7. We conclude that the Agency could conduct the above activities in Angola, with some chance of affecting the Cuban military presence there. The initiation of any of these activities would require the repeal of the Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment prohibits giving assistance of any kind to anyone which would have the direct or indirect effect of augmenting the capacity of anyone to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola. This has been broadly interpreted to preclude the kind of activities noted above. An attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment would probably result in a debate in Congress, and the press, in which the proponents of repeal would be met with the same arguments which caused the passage of the Clark Amendment in the first place. Thus we believe that a major Administration effort would be required with Congress as well as the press and public, to repeal the Clark Amendment. It should also be noted that the House, in voting on the Foreign Aid Bill for FY 80, specifically prohibited even indirect aid to Angola through international financial institutions to which the U.S. contributes funds.²⁸

All portions of this document are SECRET.

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–E, Box 25, Angola 7 May 1978–September 9, 1979. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote in the left-hand margin: “DA Should M Alb be brought in? ZB.”
2. Tab B, Intelligence Information Cable TDFIRDB–315/15861–79, September 11, is attached but not printed.
3. Tab D, a September 10 paper entitled “Cuba: Havana’s Interests in Angola,” is attached but not printed.
4. Brzezinski underlined “quietly repealing” in this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin “amending.” Aaron wrote in the right-hand margin: “That is not possible except in connection with Charters.”
5. Brzezinski initialed and checked the approve option.
6. Aaron wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “ZB, How about a modification of the Clark amendment that would add ‘Except that this provision should not preclude whatever actions may be necessary to curb Cuban military intervention in Angola and elsewhere in Africa.’” Brzezinski drew an arrow from his earlier margin comment “amending” to this comment and wrote “good.”
7. Secret.
8. Brzezinski forwarded Intelligence Information Cable TDFIR DB–315/13526–79 to Turner under an August 3 covering memorandum that noted the cable “reports that there is general resentment among the Angolan population against the Cubans in that country and that relations between Cuban advisors and their Angolan ‘apprentices’ are tense.” Brzezinski asked if the information was reliable and, if so, “what are we doing about this?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country File, Box 13, Cuba: 8/1–14/79)
9. Carlucci signed for Turner.
10. Secret; Sensitive
11. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
12. Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph in the left-hand margin.
13. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
14. Brzezinski underlined “State.”
15. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this and the following point.
16. Brzezinski underlined “integration of UNITA” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
17. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin.
18. Brzezinski underlined this sentence.
19. Brzezinski underlined “UNITA,” and the phrase “inflicts meaningful casualties on Cuban troops,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
20. Brzezinski underlined the phrases “Two other guerrilla groups,” and “also inflict some losses on the Cubans,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
21. Brzezinski underlined “Frictions” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
22. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
23. Brzezinski underlined this sentence and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to the following three points.
24. Brzezinski underlined the phrase “new covert action activities.”
25. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this and the following three points.
26. Brzezinski placed two checkmarks in the left-hand margin. Aaron placed a question mark in the right-hand margin and wrote “Non starter.”
27. Brzezinski underlined the phrases “a reconciliation” and “a condition of which could be a significant reduction of Cuban forces,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin.
28. Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph and underlined the sentence “The Clark Amendment prohibits giving assistance of any kind to anyone which would have the direct or indirect effect of augmenting the capacity of anyone to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola. This has been broadly interpreted to preclude the kind of activities noted above.” He also underlined the sentence “Thus we believe that a major Administration effort would be required with Congress as well as the press and public, to repeal the Clark Amendment.”