341. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador Francois de Laboulaye, French Embassy
  • Ambassador Gerard Smith
  • Philip J. Farley

SUBJECT

  • Jacomet Visit to South Africa

de Laboulaye came in to give an account of Andre Jacomet’s recent visit to South Africa. Brand Fourie and Dr. Roux were the principals on the South African side.

[Page 1040]

Jacomet said that from the French point of view there was no reason why South Africa should not find it in its interest to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to accept full-scope safeguards. Brand Fourie replied that in principle South Africa was prepared to adhere to the NPT, but could only do so if discrimination against South Africa were to cease. This would be the area to be explored during Ambassador Smith’s visit to South Africa at the end of June.2 As a counterpart to signature of the NPT, South Africa envisaged not only commitments regarding nuclear cooperation but also assistance in maintaining South Africa’s international position.

Brand Fourie then enumerated six areas in which it would seek U.S. nuclear assurances.

1. Highly enriched uranium was required for continued operation of the Safari research reactor. HEU of 93% enrichment was needed promptly, with a guarantee that supplies would continue until studies had been completed and showed that it would be feasible to operate the reactor effectively with fuel of lower enrichment.

2. LEU fuel for the Koeburg reactors was needed, with a guarantee of long-term supply.

3. There was a question requiring clarification regarding reprocessing and reutilization of spent fuel from Safari. Spent fuel had been returned to the U.S. some 18 months ago. South Africa wished it to be reprocessed and refabricated, or reimbursement to be made.

4. Assurances were desired that the application of controls by the IAEA to the Valindaba enrichment facility would not prejudice industrial secrets.

5. South Africa expected the U.S. to use its influence in order to recover the South African seat on the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

6. South Africa would expect the U.S. to change its policy to permit export of non-essential components for construction of the planned South African large-scale enrichment plant.

Brand Fourie continued that, while these nuclear commitments were important, their value as counterparts for South African adherence to the NPT was diminished because either they had already been promised, were a matter of fulfilling an existing treaty, or might be nullified by subsequent United Nations action. Therefore, South Africa expected from the three Western permanent members of the UN Security Council that, if South Africa signs the NPT, these powers would oppose in the UN the further escalation of pressures and threats against South Africa. Smith noted that this formula was open-ended, not related [Page 1041] to nuclear matters, and thus probably went farther than the U.S. would be prepared to go.

de Laboulaye continued that Brand Fourie had asked Jacomet whether the French would be in a position to supply fuel for the Koeburg reactors if the U.S. did not. Jacomet replied that the French could not consider such a substitution commitment without U.S. knowledge of it. They could however explore the possibility of some mutually reinforcing trilateral French-US-South African fuel supply arrangement.

Jacomet took note of the South African position, observing that his mission was limited to nuclear problems and that the scope of what South Africa was seeking might be too much to load onto the nuclear equation. Brand Fourie characterized what he had said as the South African final position. He suggested that French-South African talks might resume after the Smith visit and that it might then be examined whether it would be useful to organize a trilateral conversation with the U.S.

Jacomet had commented in his report that there was evidence of much South African bitterness toward the U.S. The South Africans appeared to have lost confidence in U.S. reliability, and feared that concessions on their part would lead to new demands on the part of the U.S. This lay behind their desire to bring France and the UK, the other Western members of the Security Council, into the picture. They assessed the NPT as very important to the U.S., and the Koeburg reactors to France, and thus saw possibilities for a trilateral understanding.

Smith stated his appreciation for this full account of Jacomet’s talks, which would be very useful to him in preparing for his own visit.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 82R00034R, Policy Files (1974–1978), Box 3, Country Files South Africa 1978 (April through July). Secret. Drafted by Philip J. Farley (S/AS). The meeting took place in Ambassador Smith’s office at the Department of State.
  2. See Documents 343345.