340. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador Donald B. Sole, South Africa Embassy
  • Ambassador Gerard Smith
  • Donald Peterson, African Affairs
  • Robert Kelley, S/AS, Special Assistant (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

  • Proposed US-South African Talks on Nuclear Issues

Ambassador Sole came in at his request. He said he wanted to follow up on the discussions in Pretoria on April 16 between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Botha regarding a Smith visit to South Africa.2 Sole said that he had no instructions and that he had not been briefed on the April 16 conversations other than having been told that the Secretary and Foreign Minister Botha had agreed that the next step would be for discussions to take place on nuclear issues in South Africa with the US side to be led by Ambassador Smith. Sole asked what the timetable for such discussions might be. Smith said that would be for South Africa to say.

Credibility of US Supply Assurances

Sole said that as soon as we have “stability” on Southwest Africa it would be desirable to begin the nuclear discussions. Before turning in detail to the question of timing, Sole made a strong statement on the need for the US to be a reliable fuel supplier. Sole said the credibility of US supply assurances is a major problem for South Africa. The present state of US supply credibility would not satisfy the very large body of opinion in the South African government that doubts any US assurances to supply the Safari and Koeburg reactors would be implemented. Sole referred to the New York Times article reporting the President’s decision to override the NRC and to ship fuel to India’s Tarapur reactor.3 He asked rhetorically whether there would be any justification for not taking the same action with respect to supply decisions on South Africa. Any agreement concluded between the US [Page 1036] and South Africa must carry with it the assurance that it can be implemented at all times, Sole emphasized.

Sole said the United States has spoken of regional fuel centers and one rationale for their establishment is that it would remove decisions as to fuel supply from the hands of individual governments. However, South Africa’s experience is such that it would have no confidence in an African regional center. Sole suggested that if the United States wanted to assure South Africa, it should consider a fuel center located in South Africa. Such a center could have full safeguards and any other precautions that the United States thought advisable. Sole said he thought no other alternative would suffice to assure the South African government.

Smith replied that discussions of regional fuel centers do not anticipate their establishment over the next few months. We must think of something that can be done in the short term rather than concentrate on a regional fuel center. South Africa should be able to take comfort from the fact that the President did override the NRC on the India supply issue, that a fifth commissioner was now on his way to the NRC, and that the new nonproliferation legislation provided for rapid processing of export licenses. Smith pointed out that in administering a worldwide nonproliferation policy the United States had to think carefully about precedents; what we agreed to do with respect to country A has implications for country B.

Smith said that he assumed South Africa understood that the US could not do anything to return South Africa to the Board of the IAEA.

Technical Team Results

Turning to the visit of the US technical team to South Africa in January, Smith said we found South Africa’s response that the visit was “interesting and useful” somewhat puzzling.4 Smith asked if Sole could provide any amplification.

Sole said that, as a result of the technical team’s visit, South Africa now has a much clearer understanding of what the United States wants in the area of safeguards. The Valindaba pilot enrichment plant was designed to enable safeguards to be applied without disclosing the commercial secret of the South African enrichment process. The technical team’s proposals had reassured South African officials that safeguards were feasible without compromising trade secrets. As an aside, [Page 1037] Sole said he can visualize South Africa would have great difficulty adjusting the pilot plant to meet its own needs for enriched uranium.

Scenario and Timing for Nuclear Discussions

Sole said that the key issues are those stated in the Prime Minister’s letter of last fall.5 Smith said that it was his impression that the Secretary was thinking of a two-stage process: nuclear talks by Smith in South Africa after which we would welcome a discussion of broader issues. Smith asked if that was Sole’s understanding. Sole, as indicated above, replied that he had not been briefed on the Secretary’s conversation with Brand Fourie beyond being told that it was agreed that the next step would be discussions in South Africa with Smith.

On timing, Sole suggested that the latter half of May was desirable from the South African point of view. It is necessary to wait until then because Brand Fourie will be a key participant in the Smith discussions and yet he will be fully occupied with the Southwest African issue until the UN finishes consideration of that question. Sole described his understanding of the UN’s timetable: the General Assembly will consider the Southwest African question until May 3; thereafter the matter will be put to the Security Council for a vote. If the Security Council approves, then the “special concentration” of South African officials on this issue will no longer be necessary. Thus, the nuclear discussions could begin in the latter half of May.

UN Discussion of the Nuclear Issue

Smith asked if Sole believed that the nuclear discussions in South Africa might have some effect on the UN’s consideration of a resolution on nuclear cooperation with South Africa. Sole replied that he doubted that anything could be done to affect such a development. Smith said that then it seemed less urgent to begin the nuclear discussions with South Africa. Mr. Peterson suggested that the discussions might deflect UN consideration of a resolution directed against South Africa. Sole said that the US-South African nuclear issue could not be resolved on the basis of three or four days discussion in South Africa between Smith and South African Ministers.

Structure of the Talks

Smith asked how the talks might be structured. Repeating that he had no instructions and that he could only say how he would set them up, Sole said that there might be an initial meeting between Smith and Foreign Minister Botha and Minister of Mines Fanny Botha. This would [Page 1038] be followed by more detailed discussions with Brand Fourie and Roux and several of their assistants.

Sole stressed that it would be very important for Smith to establish his personal credibility in the first meeting with the two Ministers. He pointed out that Smith was coming to them new and the question of Smith’s personal credibility would be vital. It is these two Ministers who will decide the question in South Africa, Sole said.6 The Ministers will not go into the details of any discussion or agreement because they do not have the requisite expertise but they will be the decision-makers. Sole said that the talks should be planned so that Smith would have one or more opportunities to meet informally with the two Ministers. In view of the above, Sole believed that a week should be allowed for the talks.

Press Notice

Smith asked whether the talks could be held in privacy. Smith said it was his view that more useful work could be accomplished if the talks could be carried out without notice to the press.

Sole said that it can’t be expected that the negotiators will be left alone by the press. It just will not work to attempt to conceal the talks from the press and to try to do so would create more problems than are desirable. Sole suggested that the parties should agree on a statement to the press that this is the beginning of an endeavor to move progressively towards a renewal of the traditional nuclear cooperation that has marked US-South Africa relations and that these talks will be delicate and thus the press should not expect that there will be much in the way of briefings or other information. Mr. Peterson pointed out that Namibian negotiations did not escape the glare of publicity and that the South African press is very assiduous.

Kalahari

Smith said that to secure Congressional approval of any agreement with South Africa on nuclear questions there must be some clarification of the Kalahari site. Sole responded that the “tower has been moved” and that he understands US intelligence people are revising their initial assessments.7 Smith said that South Africa should be aware that we will be asking for further clarification on Kalahari. Sole said “why would we move the tower?” apparently implying that this was an effort on the part of South Africa to remove any question that the site [Page 1039] was not designed for peaceful purposes. Smith responded by asking why the tower was there in the first place. On this point, Sole said “I am not authorized to say but we have told you that the site though not nuclear had a military purpose.”8 Smith urged South Africa to clear up this puzzle and Sole responded saying he appreciated this point.

South African Invitation

Sole concluded the meeting by pointing out again that he had come not pursuant to any instructions, but that he simply wanted to be informed as to our thoughts on timing for a Smith visit. He had given Smith his view as to how the talks might be set up and that much depended upon the availability of Brand Fourie since he is key for both nuclear and Southwest African issues. Smith said that in view of the fact that Brand Fourie’s availability was a critical factor, Smith would await an invitation from South Africa specifying the time which would be most convenient for it. Sole said he was very pleased to hear this.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 82R00034R, Policy Files (1974–1978), Box 3, Country Files South Africa 1978 (April through July). Secret. Drafted by Robert Kelley (S/AS). The meeting took place in Ambassador Smith’s office at the Department of State.
  2. See Document 338.
  3. James T. Wooter, “President Discloses Conflict With India Over Nuclear Fuel: But He Promises Shipments,” New York Times, January 3, 1978, p. 1.
  4. In telegram 698 from Cape Town, April 7, the Embassy conveyed the South African Government’s oral response to the technical talks: “The South African Government found these talks interesting and useful, and as previously indicated it is ready for, and in fact is looking forward to, discussions of broader issues on the basis of PM Vorster’s letter to President Carter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–1935)
  5. See Document 311.
  6. An unknown hand underlined this sentence and placed a question mark in the right-hand margin.
  7. An unknown hand underlined “he understands US intelligence people are revising their initial assessments” and wrote in the margin: “? Is this a ‘guess’ or a ‘leak?’”
  8. An unknown hand underlined “had a military purpose.”