342. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Discussions with South Africa
The following positions are approved for the forthcoming talks with the Government of South Africa on nuclear issues.
1. The basic US conditions for future supply, namely: (a) NPT adherence including a formal public statement of intent; and (2) submission of the Valindaba enrichment plant to IAEA safeguards as an immediate interim measure, remain unchanged.
2. If these conditions are met the US is prepared to agree to supply low-enriched fuel for the French reactors at Koeberg.
3. Also if our conditions are met, and if SAG explicitly agrees to convert the Safari research reactor to operate on lower enriched fuels as soon as such fuel becomes available, the US will urge NRC approval for limited shipments of HEU fuel for Safari on the following basis:
• until the reactor can be fueled with uranium of lesser enrichment (18–24 months);
• timing and quantity of shipments limited to avoid accumulation of more than 15 kilograms of unirradiated HEU in South Africa;
• spent fuel returned to the US after cooling (as provided by existing contracts); and
• establishment of additional measures (e.g., supervised loading and unloading of the reactor) to further minimize the risk of diversion.
4. Concerning the compatibility of safeguards with the protection of South Africa’s enrichment process, the US is still awaiting a response to the points made by our technical team on an earlier visit. We continue to desire to protect SAG’s commercial secrets but cannot accept this as a reason for exempting any nuclear facility from appropriate international safeguards.
5. Regarding the export of “non-sensitive” equipment for South Africa’s enrichment plant, emphasis should be placed on determining precisely what is of interest to the SAG. The US side should explain in detail our policy on sensitive nuclear exports and on national enrichment facilities in general, and may indicate US willingness to supply certain “non-sensitive” equipment. As an example of the type of export [Page 1043] that might be agreed to, the US side is authorized to cite in general terms, measuring and analytical equipment that would support an enrichment plant safeguards research and development program.
6. No explicit commitments should be made with regard to most favored nation or least favored nation treatment.
7. If the SAG raises the question of US commitments to oppose any future trade embargo (including those from which nuclear supplies were exempted), the US side is authorized to make clear that the US will not commit itself to oppose any future embargo or make any other broad political commitment. The US does not intend, however, to take away with one hand what it has given with the other, and is therefore prepared to explore ways in which the continuity of future nuclear supply to South Africa could be ensured if the above conditions are met.2
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 1–6/78. Secret.↩
- In a June 21 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski wrote: “As per call from Ambassador Smith, in addition to generally exploring ways to ensure the continuity of future nuclear supply, the US side is authorized to specifically advise the South Africans that we would not allow the escalation of pressures in the Security Council against South Africa on specifically nuclear questions if they agree to our conditions. If the South Africans raise broader political linkages, the US side should indicate that it is not prepared to discuss those matters in this forum.” (Ibid.)↩