330. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Team Visit to South Africa
On September 6, 1977, the President approved the following steps in regard to the South African nuclear situation:2 (1) to present a demarche urging the South African Government to make an immediate commitment to adhere to the NPT, and to submit the Valindaba enrichment plant to IAEA safeguards as an interim measure; (2) once the ground work had been laid, to send a team of proliferation experts to South Africa for detailed discussions and a possible visit to Valindaba.
Having presented our demarche on September 15,3 we are now sending a small team of nuclear experts, led by a political officer from the Department, to engage under Ambassador Bowdler’s guidance in a technical exchange with the South African Government on two issues that must be resolved at the technical level if we are to have negotiations on resolving the nuclear problem. The issues are:
(1) whether, given South Africa’s adherence to the NPT, the US could fuel the Safari reactor with other than highly enriched uranium in addition to fueling the Koeburg power reactors;
(2) whether application of interim safeguards to Valindaba could be consistent with South Africa’s legitimate needs to maintain the commercial secrecy of its enrichment technology.
Briefly, our efforts thus far can be summarized as follows:
[Page 1002]—In presenting the demarche in September, we indicated that if South Africa took the steps we urged we would be prepared to permit shipment of low enriched uranium fuel for the Koeburg power reactors. The South African side asked what our intentions were with respect to fueling the Safari reactor and we indicated that this question would have to be addressed at a later date.
—On October 13 Prime Minister Vorster responded to our demarche in a letter to President Carter.4 He reiterated South Africa’s peaceful nuclear intentions, listed a series of grievances regarding US and multilateral discrimination against South Africa on nuclear matters, and asked for high level negotiations that would address this range of issues. Vorster indicated that if the US would agree to such in-depth discussions, “a major step could be taken toward opening the way for South Africa’s adherence to the NPT.”
—In a conversation in Washington on November 10,5 Brand Fourie (number 2 in the South African Foreign Ministry) said that a decision on NPT adherence would not be a difficult one for the South African Government, but that two issues caused the South African Government concern:
(1) If future nuclear cooperation was limited to fueling the Koeburg reactors the prospects for a successful resolution of the overall problems were nil;
(2) The US request for interim safeguards on Valindaba had surprised the South African Government, and had raised doubts about US intentions. The South Africans have a strong interest in protecting the commercial secrets in their unique enrichment process.
The technical team will address these issues as follows:
—On Safari, the team will describe efforts the US would be prepared to take to supply lower enriched fuel (37%) for an interim period until technology now under development permits fueling the reactor on low enriched uranium (20%). Consistent with the President’s direction, the team will not indicate US willingness to supply any further amounts of highly enriched, weapons-grade fuel. If the South Africans argue that supply of some HEU for an interim period of time would be necessary to prevent shutdown of the reactor, and if they make uninterrupted operation of the reactor a sine qua non for a settlement, the team will urgently report this position to Washington for further consideration.
—On Valindaba, the team will propose a safeguards research and development program that could be put into place at the enrichment [Page 1003] plant as a South African-IAEA project with US technical support. A key element of the proposal is protection of South African commercial secrets while establishing effective accounting for materials delivered to and removed from the plant. This program would not constitute safeguards in a formal sense, since the IAEA will not assume safeguards responsibility before it is satisfied that appropriate and effective safeguard techniques are feasible. However, if implemented along the lines of our proposal, it would provide an opportunity to maintain an international presence at Valindaba to insure that we know what is happening there. This would be an interim step leading to application of full IAEA safeguards at Valindaba and at any follow-on commercial enrichment plant. The US contribution to such a program would be relatively small and within existing capabilities of our current research programs and would not require significant expansion of our relationship with the SAG.
An additional issue which the SAG may raise concerns US refusal to supply equipment and technology to be used eventually in South Africa’s enrichment program. This point was included in Vorster’s letter to the President, and has been raised a number of times by South African officials at lower levels. The team will report any South African views on this subject to Washington for study in the context of the President’s April 7 policy statement,6 which prohibits US exports which would contribute to enrichment capabilities abroad. We have underway, with the Department of Energy, a study of South Africa’s needs and previous requests in this area, and we will be prepared to offer recommendations at an appropriate time and in light of the position this issue appears to have in the negotiating process.
A remaining key issue is the suspect nuclear test site in the Kalahari. If we begin to move toward a settlement with South Africa which involves continued US nuclear cooperation, it will be essential that we be in a position to resolve uncertainties in the US and elsewhere with respect to the nature of the site. The team will ensure that the SAG understands the need to clarify the Kalahari situation. This will serve to remove any grounds for South Africa to contend later that we have added a condition to further negotiations. The team will be receptive to any South African overtures in this area, including the possibility of visiting the site. It will not, however, press the SAG for inspection of the site or in any way raise Kalahari as an obstacle to conduct of the technical exchange which is the team’s primary purpose.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 1–5/78. Secret.↩
- See Document 306.↩
- See Documents 307–309.↩
- See Document 311.↩
- See Document 320.↩
- For text of the statement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 587–588.↩