306. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance 1

SUBJECT

  • South Africa

The President has approved the following steps to be taken in regard to the South African nuclear situation:

1. A demarche urging the SAG to: (1) make an immediate commitment to the NPT including a formal public statement of intent; and (2) to unilaterally submit the Valindaba enrichment plant to IAEA safeguards as an immediate interim measure. The demarche is to be made by Gerry Smith to Ambassador Sole in Washington.2 Once the groundwork has been laid, a team of proliferation experts will visit South Africa for detailed discussions and a possible visit to Valindaba.

2. Make clear that we will continue to monitor the Kalahari site and that we will view with the utmost gravity any activity there which appears to be inconsistent with previous assurances.

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3. If our conditions are met, the US would agree to supply low-enriched fuel for the two French reactors.

4. For the present, the US will not agree to supply highly-enriched uranium under any conditions. The President wishes to see solid evidence of the SAG’s willingness to cooperate before any commitment is made for further supply of weapons-grade material.

5. Regarding the export of equipment for enrichment plants, the President requests that a paper be prepared explaining what items would be considered “non-sensitive” in this context, and analyzing whether the proposal made in the Department’s Strategy Paper3 is consistent with the Administration’s overall non-proliferation policy. Pending a further Presidential decision, the US position shall be non-committal if this issue is raised by the SAG.

6. The various approaches to Paris, London, Bonn, Moscow, Ottawa and Tokyo outlined in the Strategy Paper are approved. The President also directs that Lagos be kept informed.

7. If negotiations with the SAG appear promising, immediate consultations with members of Congress are to be undertaken concerning future nuclear cooperation with South Africa.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 9/77. Secret.
  2. See Document 309.
  3. Reference is to an undated document entitled “Strategy Paper: Next Steps on South African Nuclear Issue,” in which the Department recommended: “If raised by the SAG, we should remain non-committal on revising our present restrictions on exports of equipment for South Africa’s enrichment plant, consistent with our general policy of not contributing to the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. If pressed, we should indicate our readiness to consider on a case-by-case basis certain non-sensitive transfers.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 64, PRC 032, 8/25/77, S. Africa Nuclear Threat)