31. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State1
12221. Subj: Angolan Talks: Morning Session, Nov 22.
[1.] Summary: Morning session Nov 22 continued with discussion of Angolan security concerns, with main emphasis on Angolan rationale for Cuban presence and US explanation of questions that Cuban presence raises in consideration of future of US-Angolan relations. USDel concluded with urging of Angolan cooperation in preventing any widening of conflict in Southern Africa in same spirit it has worked with us on Namibia and Zaire, which could enhance prospects for our relations. End summary.
2. Moose opened substantive discussion of Angolan security concerns by distinguishing Carter African policy from that of its predecessors by its emphasis on conflict resolution in Southern Africa directed at independence for peoples in that area. USG ability to pursue this objective constrained domestically by limited public understanding of complexity of issues involved. US recognition that Angolan policy strongly influenced by perception of its security situation is element underlying US efforts to find settlement in Namibia and Rhodesia and [Page 62] support for Angolan/Zairian reconciliation. Moose asked Angolans to assess relationship between level of Cuban presence in Angolan in three different situations—(a) existing improved border situation in north; (b) a stabilized situation on the southern border; and (c) a Namibian settlement.
3. Zairian reconciliation. Jorge responded that Angola had taken bulk of initiatives in reconciliation with Zaire and was pleased that process was “going forward smoothly”, noting range of agreements in transportation, commercial and other areas. Moose interjected that he would be meeting with Mobutu on Nov 24 and would reaffirm the importance we attach to continued progress in implementation of practical measures of reconciliation. Jorge gracefully declined offer of US intervention with Mobutu on specific unresolved issues believing them to be susceptible to bilateral resolution. Similarly, Jorge declined US offer to see whether we could assist Angola through UNHCR in defraying costs of resettling returning Angolans.
4. Southern border. Jorge said tensions would persist on southern border as long as Namibia is “illegally occupied”. Stabilization of Namibian situation would enable GRPA to concentrate national energies on social and economic development.
5. Cuban presence. Jorge gave no ground on Cuban presence which Angolans consider essential as long as threat of further SAG aggression persists. Cuban presence, based on bilateral agreements, is being increasingly directed away from combat role to one of military training and civil projects in fields such as health, fisheries and education. Overriding GRPA concern is to develop indigenous cadres in all sectors, including military. This said, however, as long as Angola was subjected to South African threats, it would continue to seek “whatever help we need.” Jorge said GRPA could not understand duality of Western attitude on foreign military presence since the West maintained forces in South Korea and FRG, for example, and had accepted uncritically French military bases in Africa, and maintained its own military base in Cuba. Jorge said he understood US concern over Cubans in Angola in context of “longstanding conflict between US and Cuba.” He wondered aloud, however, whether we would have had similar concern if French or Germans had been involved instead of Cubans. He was sure we would not have been concerned. He suggested US and others were departing from principle of even-handed treatment of nations out of a concern to combat the development of a Socialist society and the establishment of a Communist regime in Africa. He regretted ex-colonialist powers’ efforts to maintain status quo on African continent and noted that no Socialist country was to be found among these former colonialists. Angola had been invaded by two regular armies since independence, something unique in post-independent Africa.
[Page 63]6. In response Moose noted that Jorge’s mention of the shifting nature of Cuban presence raised questions regarding the continuing requirement for so large a combat contingent which, in turn, raised the further possibility that such forces might become involved in surrounding areas, for example, Rhodesia. The US would be opposed to such intervention, either by South Africa or Cuba. Jorge agreed that foreign forces should not intervene in such situation and stated that the Angolans had no indication that Cuban forces were involved in Zambia or Namibia; that there was “no flow of Cubans from Angola to Zambia;” and that “the maintainance of Cubans in Angola is in no way related to the situation in Zimbabwe or Namibia.” Many Cubans had returned to their country and once Angola was free from any possible aggression, there would be no need for outside military presence.
7. UNITA. Jorge said he hoped [in?] the context of bilateral cooperation that the US could assist by taking actions to eliminate external assistance to UNITA. The day UNITA ceased to receive external aid it would disappear, for UNITA is insignificant as an internal force which is why it resorts to banditry and terrorist strikes. Jorge noted that Moose had indirectly acknowledged foreign support for Savimbi. Moose responded that knowledge gained by “independent unilateral means” did not imply approval and that we could not control such situations. UNITA problem had both its external and internal aspects and US wondered, granting that it was an internal matter, what Angola proposed to do about the domestic aspects of the problem.
8. Comment: The Angolans are intensely concerned over the situation in the south. Receding prospects of a Namibia settlement may have affected their evaluation of the current possibility of movement in the Cuban troop-US/Angolan normalization complex. Just as we have established a withdrawal-normalization linkage, the Angolans make a link between a Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal. There is no doubt that they regard the removal of SAG forces from their southern border as a basic security objective. A settlement in Namibia would remove the threat of SAG forces aimed at Angola’s Socialist govt and at Angolan assistance for a legitimate liberation movement. Our estimates notwithstanding, the Angolans also believe that the removal of SAG control and its forces from Namibia would also reduce if not eliminate UNITA as a threat. They believe they would then be able to concentrate on their internal social and economic development and reduce their dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. I find nothing unreasonable in this from their point of view and believe that their position constitutes an important added incentive for a strong stand with the SAG on the implementation of the Contract Group [Page 64] proposal. The Angolans regard the withdrawal of an illegal South African presence from their borders as a more legitimate and immediate concern than our concentration on the removal of Cubans from Angola.
9. The Angolans do not seem to expect movement at this meeting on the basic question which divides us. Thus, there seems little prospect that we will see President Neto, although our reception otherwise could not have possibly been more friendly. Within the terms of our instructions there seems little else to be said at this point. The Angolans have evidenced no interest in discussing trade or technical assistance matters. We plan to remain here until noon Thursday but we do not anticipate any further formal meetings after this afternoon’s session which we expect to devote to Namibia. Arrangements are being made for one of our party to visit the Americans in jail.
10. S/S pls insure appropriate lateral distribution.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 11/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩