30. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State1
12233. Subject: Angolan Talks: Opening Session, November 21.
1. Summary: US and Angolan delegations met for over two hours afternoon November 21 for discussion of Angolan security concerns. Several key elements in current GRPA thinking on subject crystallized in course of meeting: (a) heavy preoccupation with southern border instability to virtual exclusion of northern border about which GRPA seems relaxed for the moment; (b) concern in this connection with SAG intentions and alleged “actual physical presence” of South Africans in [Page 59] Angola; (c) absence of rhetoric about SWAPO but reaffirmation of unconditional GRPA support for SWAPO and speedy conclusion of internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia; (d) ruling out of any reconciliation with UNITA which was dismissed as narrow-based tribalistic terrorist group devoid of either domestic significance or support and which would disappear once external aid ceased; (e) justification of continued large Cuban military presence on historical grounds as well as alleged shifting emphasis of Cuban presence from combat role to technical assistance and training of Angolan cadres. GRPA sought USG assistance on: (a) ensuring early genuine Namibian independence; and (b) ending outside aid to UNITA.
Second session to continue discussion of security question set for morning of November 22, septel sent.2 Full memcons being despatched from Kinshasa. End summary.
2. Southern border threat. Number of significant points emerged on Angolan perception of its security situation: (a) Angolan FonMin Jorge emphasized southern border instability with noticeable lack of concern about present border relations with Zaire; (b) GRPA absolutely convinced that SAG would commit further aggression against Angola, sooner or later; (c) in such event, Angola would not conceal fact that it preparing to meet this aggression with “every means at its disposal—national and international—to preserve Angola’s national sovereignty, territorial integrity and revolutionary process which is consistent with aspiration of Angolan people”; (d) in this regard Angola would be involved anew in war not because it desired this route but because SAG would have forced it upon Angolan people; (e) as long as Namibia not independent there would be clashes and military conflict, even conflict on a major scale owing to Angola’s unconditional support for SWAPO as legitimate representative of Namibian people and fact that political and social system Angola had chosen seemed objectionable to South Africa and its allies; and (f) GRPA was convinced that Western intelligence should have known of SAG military buildup on Angola’s borders. Moose enumerated recent steps taken in Pretoria and Washington to highlight urgent USG concern at SAG actions in regard to Namibia/Angola border. US policies were directed at enhancement of security in South-Central Africa which accounted for our persistence on Namibian question which has such important bearing upon Angolan security situation. Criticism of USG/South African contacts ignores fundamental belief that such exchanges are aimed at facilitation of ultimate solution. Moose said USG prepared to approach SAG again on border threats when it was felt this would be useful. (In this connection, [Page 60] Moose sought and received Jorge’s assent to importance of Angola’s exercising restraint on SWAPO.)
3. US aid with Angolan security. Jorge then turned to possible US role in this grim situation, stating there were “certain measures” US and other Western powers could be taking: (a) insure that Namibia achieved independence on internationally acceptable terms as soon as possible; and (b) to bend every effort to end external assistance to UNITA. He reiterated that in case of attack GRPA would use “all means, national and international, to combat such aggression”.
4. UNITA. While UNITA had caused MPLA some problems, Jorge strongly denied periodic rumor in Western circles that UNITA “occupied” certain Angolan provinces. He depicted UNITA as “creation of Portuguese colonial armed forces created to fight against the MPLA which was only movement that had waged genuine independence struggle”. GRPA views UNITA as “primarily tribal in origin whose support depended on the Umbundu (Ovimbundu) who are terrorists and racists, and allied with those who support apartheid”. In such circumstances Jorge asked rhetorically how certain countries could consider collaboration with this organization, or could even remotely suggest that the GRPA endeavor to achieve reconcilation or a government of national unity with UNITA. As Angola, in contrast to UNITA, upheld principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference and non-use of violence, Jorge failed to understand how certain countries would not accept Angola’s right to choose its own political-social system and its determination to build a socialist society.
5. Clark Amendment. Jorge stated Angolan concern over events of last spring, relating to the Clark Amendment, citing specific members of the NSC Staff as having played a role in those events which raised questions about their attitude toward UNITA. Moose responded firmly to this charge citing the President’s statements with regard to non-interference in Angolan affairs, emphatically denying any support for UNITA or encouragement of others and citing subsequent gestures toward understanding with Angola. After another exchange on this matter Jorge let it drop.
Pursuing Jorge’s remarks on UNITA, Moose stated that we should explore this question further including the fact that the presence of Cuban forces in Angola is one reason why some governments may still be providing assistance to UNITA.
6. Benguela Railway. Reopening of Benguela was a fruit of detente in Central Africa and could contribute importantly to economies of Angola, Zaire and Zambia. On historical note, Jorge remarked that when MPLA had succeeded in expelling South Africa and Zaire, it found 130 bridges destroyed. UNITA confined itself to sabotage, pillaging, bomb planting, and terrorism. Sabotage is difficult to control in vast country like Angola and two more bridges had been destroyed recently.
[Page 61]7. Concluding, Moose stressed the concept that normalization was an objective which could flow from the process of dealing with problems which US viewed as threatening the stability of the area including Namibia, Rhodesia and Angola/Zaire, emphasizing that the introduction or threat of introduction of foreign military forces into such situation made their resolution more difficult and would affect US ability to play a constructive role. It is essential for US and Angola to work together to break the complex “chicken and egg” syndrome involving Angolan security and Cuban military presence.
8. Another meeting set for morning of November 22.
9. S/S please insure appropriate lateral distribution.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 11/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Document 31.↩