32. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State1
12235. Subj: Angolan Talks: Final Session Nov 22.
1. Summary: The Angolan Govt asserts that dip recognition of Angola by the US is a necessary next step before normalization can proceed further and for the development of trade or assistance. Jorge asks what the United States would do if Angola were attacked by the SAG? End summary
2. Angola view on Namibia:
FonMin Jorge opened session by giving following exposition of GRPA view of Namibia situation: GOA doubts that Group of Five2 will exert sufficient pressure on SAG to bring about SAG cooperation with UNSC resolutions on Namibia. Despite Oct visit of five FonMins to Pretoria, SAG is going ahead with unilateral elections.
[Page 65]GRPA sees two possible scenarios for Namibia situation: either Group of Five will put firm “even violent,” pressure on SAG to conform to UNSC resolutions, or the armed struggle will intensify. If the Five continue to abstain on, or even veto, Chapter Seven sanctions, the international community will interpret this as a contradiction of the proposals espoused by the Five in UNSC. If SAG goes ahead with elections, this will lead to a situation similar to Rhodesia in 1965.3 The so-called leaders emerging from the elections will claim they have been chosen by the people, when in fact the people have been forced to elect them. This will lead to inevitable military confrontation, with OAU which recognizes SWAPO, Angola continuing to provide assistance to SWAPO in this situation. (Comment: In fact, GRPA is now restraining SWAPO.)
3. US response on Namibia:
In reply McHenry referred to Front Line, particularly GRPA, support for Group of Five efforts. He reviewed Pretoria meeting and subsequent developments. The Five felt that at Pretoria meeting the problems the SAG had raised earlier may have been resolved. But Five could not commit SYG on arrival of UNTAG and date of election. Hence, Ahtisaari trip was thought essential and could have served to distinguish prospective unilateral December election from “real” elections and test SAG sincerity. The idea of Ahtisaari trip not have been accepted, we have since sought to emphasize the necessity of some sort of contact between SYG and SAG, whether in New York or elsewhere. We have made it clear to SAG on a number of recent occasions that time for a negotiated settlement is running out, that an internal settlement will have no international support and will not work, and that they will be held accountable for any actions they take in Namibia or against Angola to exacerbate the situation. As for SAG intentions, even the SAG probably does not know what they are, but this should become clear in the next month. Just as we have cautioned SAG, we hope that GRPA will urge SWAPO to refrain from actions which could exacerbate present delicate situation. Jorge acknowledged need for restraint at delicate point in negotiations but said that South Africa daily continued violence against Namibia, Angola and even people of South Africa.
4. Angolan security:
Although Jorge had said at outset that security concerns had been adequately discussed, after Namibia discussion he raised it in a very pointed form: “If we were convinced that SAG was about to carry out [Page 66] further aggression against Angola, what would the US do?” The GRPA was not seeking an immediate reply, but wished USG to think about it. Moose replied that we would not undertake to answer this question in the abstract. Much would depend on the circumstances of such an event. Origins of and responsibility for violence are often difficult to determine with so many armed forces in the area. In any event, we would take back to Washington the question raised by Jorge. McHenry observed that SAG tended to forget that SAG presence in Namibia and thus on Angola’s border was illegal but SAG nevertheless blames everything on SWAPO. Jorge’s question underscored the need to concentrate on resolving the cause of the problem. In reply to Moose’s request that he elaborate on his earlier reference to “physical presence of SAG forces in Angola,” Jorge cited Nov 11 Neto speech which describe SAG trucks crossing into Angola with “men and equipment” of SAG army; SAG helicopters landing in Angolan territory, unloading personnel, “planning actions,” and rescuing UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi; SAG hot pusuit of SWAPO forces into Angola; firefights between SAG and GRPA forces; and SAG overflights of Angolan territory “to select targets for attack.”
5. Normalization of US-Angolan relations:
Jorge observed that despite a variety of contacts at various levels, GRPA believes USG had not given serious consideration to normalization. GRPA wished to establish and maintain relations will all states on basis of universally accepted principles without any preconditions and without regard to system of government or alignment. On this basis a number of capitalist countries have asked to establish relations with GRPA. GRPA’s position is that diplomatic relations “must first pass through phase of de jure or de facto recognition.” Hence in establishing relations with US, first step is US recognition of People’s Republic of Angola. “This means that for purposes of normalization the first step will have to be taken by the US.” GRPA position is that any or all trade or technical cooperation should take place within a formal framework of diplomatic relations. (GRPA had previously said it would study our offer of humanitarian assistance and did so again on this visit. Moreover, Jorge ignored three mentions which we made of trade as an agenda item for these talks.) Noting a certain volume of trade already exists, Jorge said that “these developments are jeopardized for lack of a formal framework.”
6. US response on normalization
Moose said US position on normalization was clouded by events of recent past and took into account: a) attitudes of US body politic; b) origins of Angolan Government; c) its relations with other governments; d) GRPA’s role in politics and security in South-Central Africa; [Page 67] and e) presence of foreign military forces and their prospective role in neighboring countries.
Moose acknowledged obvious importance which GRPA attached to its sovereignty, its deep concern for its security, and its aspirations for the well-being of its people.
Moose said we would convey GRPA positions to President and Secretary. Moose said there were many important areas in which USG and GRPA could work together and that many serious concerns were shared together. US looked forward to continuing cooperation on these issues and, in any event, neither had any choice as issues at stake were too important for either to ignore.
7. Obstacles to normalization
Jorge asked Moose to elaborate on factors which inhibited normalization since, in his view, these were obstacles that did not normally govern establishment of relations between states. The GRPA viewed such questions as foreign troop presence as internal affairs. One thing was quite clear, Jorge said: There were no pre-conditions on the Angolan side to the establishment of relations.
Moose said that he had spoken not of conditions but of considerations in terms of US public opinion and policy implications. Moose said it was quite clear that the GRPA and the Angolan people came to their independence at a time when the American people did not clearly understand the realities surrounding those events, and that confusion remained in the American mind as to what had happened when it was all over. Continuing disaffection today in certain areas of Angola tended to perpetuate questions arising from the war such as the degree of GRPA control and popular support. Moreover, continuing large presence of foreign combat forces might somehow be related to the internal dissidence and be injected into the future politics of the region.
Jorge said Angolans appreciate the frankness with which Moose had spoken. He categorically denied the validity of “opinion in certain circles that the government of Luanda is not the Government of Angola.” It simply is not true, he said, that vast areas of Angola are not under GRPA control, as skeptical journalists accompanying Belgian Fon Min Simonet had acknowledged following recent visit to alleged UNITA and FNLA strongholds. Jorge concluded that US public opinion suffers from same false impression resulting from general American lack of awareness of international developments. GRPA by contrast had carefully prepared Angolans for normalization of Angola’s relations with Zaire, which had not been easy to accept.
Reverting to question of Cuban presence as obstacle to US normalization of its relations with Angola, Jorge asked rhetorically whether [Page 68] US in recognizing Djibouti had taken into account the presence of some 7000 French troops there at the time.
8. Next steps in relations
Concluding, Jorge said GRPA was prepared again to take up normalization question once USG found itself in a positive frame of mind and could see its way beyond these various conditions. In meantime GRPA wishes USG to know that it has control over all its territory although it continues to have to contend with terrorist acts which, in the end, count for little. GRPA would also continue its policy of establishing relations with those countries which wished to do so.
9. US press access to Angola
Acknowledging that US had great deal still to learn about Africa, Moose suggested that better US press access to Angola could aid this process immeasurably. It was within GRPA power to take facilitating measures to create better understanding for Angola within US. Jorge replied that GRPA would take Moose’s suggestion into account.
10. Americans in prison
Asked if USDel had other points it wished to raise, Moose said we would like to have GRPA permission for one member of delegation, for humanitarian reasons, to visit American citizens incarcerated at Luanda. Jorge said he would see what could be done.
Moose raised specific case of AmCit George Gause who had been in prison for a considerable time on charges of reportedly illegal possession of firearms but had never received a trial. On last visit to Angola, USDel had been unable to see Gause because he was hospitalized. Moose stressed that, whatever their actions or the individual merit of their respective cases, all citizens have equal rights to our concern under US law. Jorge expressed unfamiliarity with Gause case but undertook to bring it to attention of the competent authorities to see what might be done. (Comment: Visit did not materialize but assistance of FonMinistry officials and of the Italian Amb has been enlisted in getting to the prisoners mail and packages which delegation had brought out.)
11. Closing statement:
Jorge expressed appreciation for USDel’s visit and for frank and open approach taken to the talks. He hoped better US understanding would develop of Angola’s people, its party and govt which would lead to establishment of relations. In this regard he said he trusted US would not be last country to recognize Angola. Jorge asked Moose to convey to highest authorities in USG Angola’s desire to establish a fully independent country, one truly independent also economically, so that the Angolan people might enjoy the full benefits of their hard-won independence.
[Page 69]12. Comment follows septel.4
13. S/S please ensure appropriate lateral distribution.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 11/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- The Five refers to the five Western governments on the UN Security Council: Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.↩
- Reference is to Rhodesia’s November 1965 unilateral declaration of independence from the United Kingdom.↩
- Not found. The conversation between Jorge and Moose was reported in telegram 12235 from Kinshasa, November 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1823)↩