280. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Cooperation with South Africa in ocean surveillance (S)
(TS) By memorandum, dated 31 December 1975,2 from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Presidential approval was conveyed that the U.S. accede to the request of the Government of the Union of South Africa for cooperation in ocean surveillance, to the extent of facilitating the review of requests for export of equipment and data necessary to upgrade the South African ocean surveillance system. It is understood from commercial contacts that parallel notification of approval to proceed with providing South Africa a modern ocean surveillance capability was provided to the South African Ambassador in Washington by Secretary Kissinger and/or General Scowcroft and was one of the topics covered in a subsequent Kissinger/Vorster meeting. In return for cooperation in facilitating this commercial sale, the South African government has committed to make the information derived from the ocean surveillance system available on call to the U.S.
(TS) In keeping with the above approval, International Signal and Control Corporation received a munitions control license to conduct a study to fully define the system and has now applied for specific license issuance for hardware items as the first subsegment of the study has been completed and approved. Saunders Associates is a partner with International Signals in this effort. The Barlow-Rand Corporation is the contracting firm for the government of South Africa in acquisition of the system.
(TS) The completed system would provide South Africa with a modern system capable of [3 lines not declassified] coastal and harbor radar and surveillance systems, and internetting automated data processing and communications capability to rapidly integrate and interpret the collected data. The study and subsequent provision of equipment do not extend to capabilities which would involve sensitive technology transfers or direct U.S. involvement.
[Page 856](TS) The following factors support a recommendation for granting approval for further licenses:
—The proposed system is entirely passive in nature, and has no potential use in internal government matters.
—When completed the system will provide information on the movements of naval and merchant marine traffic around southern Africa which will not be available from other sources, with no financial expenditure by the U.S. Government.
—As the competition for resources increases over the next decade, the available information is expected to make a very substantial contribution to U.S. economic intelligence. It will also have the potential for contributing to monitoring of USSR arms traffic and naval movements in the region.
—The decision to “buy U.S.” recognized the advanced competence of Saunders and International Signals in manufacturing [less than 1 line not declassified] equipment and developing the management information system to correlate the collected data. Should the licenses be denied, comparable systems of lesser technical capability can be obtained from either the Federal Republic of Germany or France (which had earlier bid on the system), in which event the U.S. would have no call on the data derived.
—At least 36 months will be involved in procurement and installation once the hardware acquisition phase has begun, with a total expenditure certain to be in excess of $60 million. The system would, however, lack value until the systems integration effort had been completed. Substantial political leverage would thus accrue during the acquisition phase as South Africa would strongly desire to complete the system and get a return on its investment.
—Security on the part of all commercial firms involved and the Government of South Africa for the fact of U.S. Government cooperation has been superb and can reasonably be expected to continue.
(TS) I therefore believe that we should proceed with granting licenses for the export of reasonable amounts and kinds of ocean surveillance equipment to South Africa in support of the previously approved cooperation. The appropriate timing of such approval needs to be considered. In my view, we should find an occasion when the U.S. wants to send a signal of reward for a South African action that moves in the direction of our policy for southern Africa.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 10/77. Top Secret; Sensitive.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 279.↩