Pursuant to the request the Department received from the National
Security Council,2 attached is a paper
setting forth the position of the Department of State on this
matter.
Attachment
Position Paper Prepared in the Department of
State
3
SUBJECT
- Sanders Associates of New Hampshire—Maritime Surveillance
System Contract with South African Government
Background
Sanders Associates, a New Hampshire firm, has a contract for study of
the South African requirements for maritime surveillance equipment
with the South African Government. The contract was arranged
pursuant to a White House determination in December 19754 that the
U.S. would agree to a request
from South Africa for cooperation in ocean surveillance. This
agreement was opposed by the Defense Department, the NSC staff and the State Department,
but the White House overruled these objections. The White House also
authorized the State Department Office of Munitions Control to view
sympathetically, but on a case-by-case basis, eventual exports of
reasonable amounts and kinds [Page 854] of ocean surveillance equipment, which the study might show to be
required by the South Africans.
In April, 1977, following a review of the matter, Secretary Vance determined that export of
this equipment would be incompatible with the Administration’s
policy toward South Africa, as well as inconsistent with our
long-standing arms embargo.
Department of State Position
The Department of State continues to believe that sale of this
equipment to South Africa, which is in effect military cooperation
with that country, contravenes our present policy towards South
Africa, and would expose us to sharp criticism. The following points
argue strongly against authorization of the sale:
—Sale of this equipment would make a mockery of what the Vice
President said to Prime Minister Vorster about our commitment to a progressive
transformation of South African society. To follow that declaration
with such a significant break with our arms embargo policy would
indicate to the South Africans that we are not serious about our
policy and that we have accepted their arguments on the strategic
importance of their country to us.
—Military cooperation with the South African Government would
undercut the progress we have made in generating better
understanding and acceptance of American goals among black African
states and other Third World countries.
—United States Government approval for this sale, when it became
public knowledge, would have sharp domestic repercussions,
generating adverse reactions in the Congress, the press and the
public at large, and causing confusion about our intentions in
southern Africa.
—The value of any intelligence we might obtain from such an
arrangement would be far outweighed by the damage the sale would do
to our new approach to South Africa as well as to our relations with
black African countries.
