249. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and Frank Moore of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Congressional Consultations on Lifting Sanctions on Rhodesia (U)
Per your instructions, we consulted with key Congressional leaders and members of the Black Caucus.2 (U)
In addition to the time pressure created by Mrs. Thatcher’s visit, you are being pressed by Senator Helms’ warning to us that he will move his disapproval resolution Friday if he has not received assurances by that time that sanctions will be lifted. In light of the British position, he would have no problem winning on the Senate floor. (C)
The consultations were pretty much as might be expected: Byrd, Stevens, Pell, Zablocki, and Fenwick supported early action and indicated that we should show solidarity with the British. Church said he would support you either way. Javits said he would support lifting, but at one point indicated that it might be a good idea to wait until Monday when the House will consider a bill identical to his and Church’s calling for lifting sanctions at the time of the arrival of the British Governor or January 1, 1980, whichever is earlier. Wright, on the other hand, thought it would be better to lift before the bill comes to the House floor. (C)
Bill Gray did not think you should lift now. Because he is a key member of the Black Caucus, we are reporting his views at some length. He believes that to lift without agreement is not in our best national interest and would offend Africa and the Third World. He believes we should not be pushed into an unwise course of action by Helms. His principal concern is that we demonstrate sensitivity to proposed procedures at the UN, and he would like to see at least informal UN acceptance along the lines suggested by McHenry. He says it is important to us that we not show disregard for the UN at a time we are relying on it in relation to Iran. (C)
Dick Moose, who spoke with Gray, reported that at no point did Gray question your good faith in dealing with the Caucus and other black groups, even if you were to lift without agreement. Gray’s con [Page 727] cerns are substantive and not political. His public reaction even in the worst case would be reasonably stated in substantive terms. Gray appeared impressed with the fairness of the ceasefire arrangements and the UK steps to implement elections. “A thoroughly decent reaction.” (C)
Charlie Diggs and Cardiss Collins are circulating a Dear Colleague letter urging you not to lift “until an election procedure is agreed upon” and “until there is evidence that the ceasefire will be effective.” They also urge the U.S. not to act until there has been appropriate action by the Security Council. (C)
Moose, who saw the letter, comments, however, that its tone is moderate, suggesting that it is designed to gain the widest possible acceptance. There is no reference to the fact that you were backing off a commitment to the Black Leadership. (C)
Solarz would certainly support and expect prompt lifting of sanctions in the event of an agreed settlement (within 48 hours). Solarz believes there may be a risk in lifting sanctions before the Lancaster House Conference is over because if we do so and the Conference thereafter fails, our action in lifting sanctions could be cited as a reason for its collapse. He would not suggest that we wait a long period of time to see if it would succeed and would agree that at some point we would have to make our own decision on the basis of the fairness of the proposals. (C)
If you were to decide to lift before the Conference is over, Solarz would not volunteer any criticism; however, he would feel bound to say he has misgivings along the above lines, i.e., that our action might be responsible for the failure—if he were asked, which he most certainly would be. He accepts Moose’s judgment that proposals are fair and is impressed by steps the British are taking to set up election procedures. (C)
At the end of the day, we had not yet been able to reach O’Neill and Parren Mitchell. We will get you a separate report.3 (U)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 89, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 12/79. Confidential.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 248.↩
- Not found.↩