250. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Rhodesian Sanctions (U)
State, NSC and the White House staff, as well as Ambassador McHenry have engaged in extensive consultations regarding the lifting of sanctions on Rhodesia. (S)
In sum, it is clear that should you not lift, Senator Helms will move a resolution on the Senate floor by mid-day tomorrow, with probable success. On the other hand, should you lift prior to an agreed settlement, the Black Caucus and others will be angered and frustrated. (S)
In addition, this issue is of utmost importance to the UK, and should you not lift, or at least express strong support for the UK and an intention to lift, Mrs. Thatcher will be left in an “extremely awkward position.” (S)
Although we cannot be certain, it now seems quite probable that the Patriotic Front forces will reach final agreement within a very few days. If so, any Black anger at lifting would probably be of limited duration. (S)
It appears that you have essentially two options:
(1) To lift sanctions, proclaiming that your conditions have been met, i.e., the Governor has assumed authority and a process leading to impartial elections has begun.
(2) To announce your unconditional support for the UK’s assumption of authority, and for the settlement proposals and agreements, but stop just short of a final lifting,—by saying we expect a settlement momentarily, and therefore will be setting in motion steps to lift. (S)
Option one has the advantage of decisiveness, although it runs the risk of Black anger, particularly if final settlement is long in coming. (S)
Option two will probably have the effect of really pleasing no one, although it would probably tend to blunt Black anger. Its main advantage would be to buy time for a few more days during which we hope the Patriotic Front will come to final agreement. On the other hand, it will tend to further prolong the situation and make your [Page 729] ultimate decision to lift sanction look like caving to the British or being rolled over by the Congress.
It is desirable that you issue a statement prior to noon tomorrow in advance of the Helms resolution. Appropriate statements for both options are now being drafted. (S)
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve Option One.2 (U)
State concurs.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 7–12/79. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “Zbig.”↩
- Carter approved the recommendation and wrote below it: “Carefully notify Congress & press. I suggest midnight 12/16/79 J.”↩