Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

248. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter ¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Rhodesia

Lord Carrington raised Rhodesia with me during our December 10 meeting.² After briefly describing where things stood at the Conference, he asked that we support HMG’s final cease-fire proposal as fair and reasonable, and that on the arrival of the British Governor in Salisbury (now scheduled for this week), we recognize the Governor’s authority and immediately lift our own sanctions against Rhodesia. Without this kind of support from us, Carrington believes the PF may continue to hold out and that the good chance for an all-encompassing settlement will be lost.

I told Peter that we could support their detailed cease-fire proposals both publicly and with the Front Line states. They will be developing in the next day or so a final olive branch for the Patriotic Front on the issue which will make it clear that to the degree the PF forces implement a cease-fire, the need for any deployment of Rhodesian security forces is reduced. This is the final issue to be negotiated in reaching a final settlement on the basis of the recent agreement in principle on a cease-fire.

With regard to our lifting sanctions when the Governor General arrives, I emphasized that this depended on our ability to show that, in accordance with our previously stated position, a process leading to impartial elections had actually begun. In particular, I reiterated that their setting an electoral date would be particularly helpful.

In subsequent discussions with Tony Lake and Peter Tarnoff, Tony Duff said that fixing a final date for the elections now could produce a negative reaction from the PF, but that the British might still be able to do so if it would guarantee that we would lift sanctions. After discussion of this and other ways in which the British could meet our concerns, they came up with the following statement Lord Soames could make on arrival in Salisbury:

“The electoral process has already been set in train by ordinances which come into effect today establishing the powers of the election commissioner and making provision for the election council. All parties which can agree to campaign peacefully will be able to do so freely. All parties which wish to participate in the election should register by 28/31 December (date to be decided). The British Governor is taking today the legislative action necessary to bring into force those parts of the Independence Constitution required for elections to be held.”

I believe that this statement meets our concerns, and that we should first consult with Congressional leaders and then go back to the British saying that we can lift sanctions within a day or so of Soames’ arrival.³

The trickiest aspect of this is that there may not yet be an agreed settlement at that time. We have written to Helms that our position depended on there being an agreed settlement; without one, we would consult with Congressional committees on what to do when the Governor General arrived and UK sanctions were lifted.

I recommend that, even if there is no final settlement, we suggest to the committees that we lift sanctions with the British, paying particular attention in these consultations to the Black Caucus.⁴ I have a number of reasons for suggesting this:

—It is consistent with the November 14 determination⁵ and the letter to Helms.⁶

—The final British proposals are fair, and we have said many times that no party should be allowed to have a veto over our sanctions policies by holding out against fair offers.

—With Soames’ statement, our position would be defensible at home and in Africa. Andy Young has publicly said, for example, that if the PF does not accept fair settlement proposals, we should lift sanctions anyway.

—If we do not support the British, we would encourage PF intransigence.

—If we did not lift sanctions ourselves, the Congress would likely do so very quickly. We should lift on our terms, and portray it as a positive rather than negative development.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 120, Zimbabwe: 12/79. Secret. Christopher forwarded the memorandum to Carter under a December 11 covering memorandum. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. In telegram Secto 12007 from Paris, December 10, Vance provided notes on his meeting with Carrington and Thatcher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790569–1090)
3. Carter underlined the last phrase of this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Consult, let me know results.”
4. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “do so & Solarz.”
5. See Document 245.
6. Not found. An unsigned, undated copy of a letter to Helms is attached to a December 3 memorandum to Vance from Brzezinski, who noted that Carter had no objection or changes to the letter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 89, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 12/79)