240. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts1
179368. Subject: Rhodesia: Bishop Muzorewa’s Meeting With President Carter.
1. Summary. President Carter met today (July 12) with Bishop Muzorewa at Camp David. Secretary Vance was the only other person present for the substantive discussion. The President made all of the points which Prime Minister Thatcher had suggested. The Bishop’s response followed the lines of his conversation yesterday with Secretary Vance.2 On the return helicopter flight, Muzorewa implied to Secretary Vance, for the first time in his Washington visit, that he has begun to consider the possibility [of] changes. In doing so he raised the question of what the British Government would do to help him if he lost the confidence of the whites. End summary.
2. In his meeting today at Camp David with Bishop Muzorewa President Carter, accompanied by Secretary Vance, stated the U.S. position on Rhodesia in terms similar to those employed by Secretary Vance yesterday (July 11). Early in the conversation the President reiterated the points suggested by Prime Minister Thatcher, including:
—Muzorewa needs wide international acceptance;
[Page 709]—Z/R constitution must be changed particularly the blocking power;
—There must be a real transfer of power, including in the civil service, judiciary, police and military;
—Smith must go; and,
—The war must be brought to an end.
President Carter did not discuss either new elections or a constitutional referendum.
3. Bishop Muzorewa responded to the President’s points along the same lines he had used with Secretary Vance yesterday. He argued that the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia did in fact support the constitution. President Carter said that he did not agree with him.
4. On the return helicopter ride to Washington, the Bishop sent his aides to one side in order that he might speak privately with Secretary Vance. He asked what he should do: Would it be enough just to remove the 28 seat white blocking power? Secretary Vance said that the Bishop must go back to fundamental principles. The Bishop must gain the support of his people. In order to do this he must demonstrate that a real transfer of power has occurred and that he is in fact governing the country. Simply removing the white blocking power would not be enough. Real changes must be made. The USG will not specify these as they must be worked out by Muzorewa with the British. Secretary Vance then underscored the basic points made by the President, including the need for Smith to go and a demonstration that the constitution is supported by the people. Secretary Vance emphasized the necessity for the Bishop to do his utmost to make possible an end to the fighting. This would require meaningful changes which would convince his neighbors that he had brought about real majority rule.
5. Muzorewa said that he would “go talk with the British” but that “they must answer one question: If I do these things and lose the whites, what are British prepared to do to help me in a continuing war? I run a real risk of losing them (the whites).” Secretary Vance questioned whether this were truly the case. Muzorewa conceded, “well, it is a risk.” He observed that he had the feeling that the Americans and the British “saw things very much alike.” Secretary Vance confirmed that this was the case.
6. Secretary Vance told Muzorewa that the USG wished Muzorewa well; that we fear he will fail if he does not make serious changes. The Bishop commented that the Secretary’s words were “The first comforting thing I have heard.” Secretary Vance told Muzorewa that Z/R had great potential, that it was a fertile land with potential for industrial development. Z/R could be very successful if there were peace. It would be tragic to see it torn apart, its people hurt and their [Page 710] aspirations blocked. On parting the Bishop said that he hoped to see Secretary Vance in Z/R “soon.” Secretary Vance replied, “someday.”
7. Comment: Muzorewa’s question about the sufficiency of removing the white blocking power was the first indication during the Washington visit that Muzorewa is taking seriously our insistence upon change. His question about the possible flight of whites, and the active support he might then expect in a continuing war, points up the importance of emphasizing to Muzorewa that making the kind of progress which Africans will regard as fair is essential if the war is to be brought to an end.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0616. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to London, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Pretoria, Maputo, Lusaka, Lagos, and Monrovia. Drafted and approved by Moose. Sent for information Immediate to USUN and the White House.↩
- See Document 239.↩