239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil1
178632. Following repeat State 178632 Action London, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Pretoria, Maputo, Lusaka, Lagos, Monrovia, Info USUN New York Jul 11.
Quote: State 178632. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Meeting With Muzorewa.
1. Summary. Secretary Vance met with Bishop Abel Muzorewa alone today2 for approximately one and a half hours. The Secretary made all the points set forth in the messages to the President from Prime Minister Thatcher 3 as well as those conveyed in Ambassador Brewster’s conversation with Ian Gilmour.4 It was agreed that discussion of the need for constitutional changes would be continued tomorrow at Muzorewa’s meeting with the President and the Secretary.5 The Secretary found it significant that Muzorewa concentrated on the question of recognition and at no point mentioned sanctions as such. Secretary Vance found Muzorewa more self-confident than at his last meeting with him. While not negative, Muzorewa was essentially non-responsive to the Secretary’s main points. End summary.
2. Secretary Vance opened the conversation by asking Bishop Muzorewa’s view of the current situation in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Z–R). Muzorewa acknowledged that he was having a hard time and that the answer to his problems depends upon what the UK and US will do. If these governments support him he would be accepted by a large [Page 706] number of other states and a momentum would build to his benefit. If the UK and US do not support him, it will be difficult for him to survive. The war was not going well and the Patriotic Front are prepared to fight on.
3. Secretary Vance told the Bishop that the British Government is faced with the decision whether to recognize the Government of Z–R. This question is up to them. The British have recognized the progress which has been made, are prepared to work with Muzorewa and wish to ensure the widest possible acceptance of Z–R. It is critical that Muzorewa be prepared to engage in this process.
4. In order to find a solution to the Rhodesia problem there would need to be changes in the constitution such as elimination of the white blocking power, greater black representation in the public services and defense forces, together with a genuine attempt to achieve a wider agreement permitting an end to the war.
5. Secretary Vance recalled that Muzorewa had previously told him that the present constitution was not one which he had wanted to sign. Muzorewa had said at the time that he had to take what Smith had offered or break with Smith and go his own way. Muzorewa had said that he did not like the 28 white seats and that he wished that they were not there. In view of this, the Secretary asked why it was not now possible for Muzorewa to undertake changes. Muzorewa responded that if he were to go back on provisions such as the 28 white seats he would be accused of breaking his word to the whites. This would be difficult for him politically and would make it impossible for him to hold the whites in the country, and that he needed them.
6. Secretary Vance said that he understood that problem, but suppose the British said that in order to achieve legal independence the constitution would have to be changed to remove the blocking powers and to do away with various entrenched clauses. Muzorewa could then say to the whites that these changes must be made in order to achieve legality. Muzorewa responded, thoughtfully, “I take your point.” The Secretary said that the President would want to talk about what Muzorewa was prepared to do. It was agreed that this would be discussed further tomorrow.
7. Shifting the focus, the Secretary asked why the Bishop should not jump at the chance to increase greatly the number of black Rhodesians in the armed services, police and civil service. Muzorewa responded that he obviously would like to do so, but that he did not have enough qualified people available. For example, Muzorewa had found his own office staffed by five white persons. All but one, George Smith, have now been replaced by his own people. Smith, however, was a competent person and he was glad to have him (George Smith is accompanying the Muzorewa party).
[Page 707]8. Muzorewa noted that the army is already 82 percent black. But the Secretary commented that the officers are almost entirely white. Muzorewa said that he could not replace the white officers, for example, who could take General Walls’ place? The Secretary responded that the real problem was that Muzorewa did not have the power to replace an official such as Walls: the whites could block such a change. Muzorewa responded that the Secretary did not understand the constitution, that it did not prevent him from making such changes. (Note: According to our reading of the constitution Muzorewa is absolutely wrong on this point and the Secretary may take this point up with him tomorrow.)
9. Secretary Vance asked Muzorewa why he did not get rid of Smith. Muzorewa argued that he needed Smith to hold the whites. Asked under what circumstances Smith could go, Muzorewa’s response was that Smith would go in exchange for recognition. The Secretary asked how Muzorewa could be sure; Did he trust Smith? Muzorewa believed that he could trust Smith but that Smith would not leave in return for the prospect of future recognition. Secretary Vance expressed doubt that Smith could be trusted and pointed out that until Smith is gotten rid of Z–R’s neighbors will never accept the new government.
10. Pursuing the question of neighboring parties, the Secretary asked Muzorewa about Nkomo and Mugabe. Muzorewa said that he had written to both but had received no reply. The Secretary asked whether Muzorewa would be prepared to invite them to a meeting. Muzorewa seemed willing to consider this but the subject was not pursued and there was no discussion of what Nkomo and Mugabe might be invited to discuss.
11. Muzorewa said that he had written the Front Line Presidents but that they would not talk to him; his only contact had been an indirect one with President Nyerere. The Secretary expressed the belief that Nyerere would be prepared to accept a new government in Z–R if the constitution were amended, if Smith were gone and if Muzorewa were to make a genuine effort to reach agreement with the Patriotic Front. Nyerere would not allow the Patriotic Front to play a blocking role. If the Patriotic Front were to refuse a genuine offer this would not inhibit Nyerere from making his own decision. The Secretary on the other hand doubted that President Samora Machel, was prepared at this time to have anything to do with Z–R authorities. Continuing, he felt that Kaunda’s attitude would depend on Nkomo and that Neto had too many problems of his own, particularly with Namibia, to be interested in Rhodesia.
12. At one point the Secretary asked Muzorewa about Chikerema and Sithole. Muzorewa replied, “Chikerema is feathering his own nest and you know about Sithole.”
[Page 708]13. The Secretary asked Muzorewa what he expected out of the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. In Muzorewa’s view that will depend upon what the UK and US do or don’t do. The Secretary expressed belief that the Commonwealth would recognize the realities of the new situation provided Muzorewa was prepared to move. Otherwise, he said, the outcome will be bad from Muzorewa’s point of view.
Vance
Unquote
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790323–0403. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Gerald J. Whitman (ARA/ECA); cleared by Richard V. Fisher (S/S); approved by Madison M. Adams, Jr. (ARA/ECA).↩
- July 11. In telegram 178815 to multiple posts, July 11, the Department announced the recall of telegram 178632 to change handling to Exdis and the destruction of all copies. Addressees were informed that the report was shared with the British Embassy in Washington on July 11. The telegram was re-sent with the correction. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790314–0664)↩
- None found.↩
- In telegram 13282 from London, July 9, the Embassy reported on the conversation: “Gilmour said the Prime Minister had just answered the President saying she would like us to concentrate on building Muzorewa’s confidence. He suggested we make clear to the Bishop that we and the British are still working closely and that he must show he is an effective leader of his new government. Moreover, we should let the Bishop know that the British genuinely want to work with him to find a solution. Gilmour also thinks it important that Muzorewa be disabused of his illusions, particularly that if Britain recognizes Salisbury most of the world will follow suit.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0634)↩
- See Document 240.↩