Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

241. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, July 13, 1979

SUBJECT

• Descriptive Terms for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Groups² (U)

The President has approved the following more neutral terms³ for referring to the contending forces in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian conflict:

—The government in Salisbury will be referred to as the “Muzorewa Government” or the “Muzorewa Administration.” It should not be referred to as the “Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.” (C)

—With regard to the external forces, in our diplomatic usage, greater emphasis should be given to the terms “ZAPU and ZANU,” “Nkomo-Mugabe Forces,” and “External Forces.” When appropriate, they can be called “guerrilla movements.” Use of the term “Patriotic Front” should be de-emphasized; this term should not be used at all for domestic U.S. audiences. (C)

—In referring to both sides together, we should use “Internal and External parties,” or “black leaders on both sides.” (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 7–12/79. Confidential.
2. In a June 22 handwritten note to Vance and Brzezinski, Carter wrote: “I agree with Pat re propaganda designations. Suggest to me for government-wide use something better than ‘patriotic front’ and ‘liberation forces’ vs ‘Salisbury Group.’ Expedite. J.C.” (Ibid.) Carter was referring to remarks made by Senator Patrick Moynihan on June 12 when he said: “The use of those terms, the choice of those words, is fatal to the object of neutrality. I repeat, the choice of such words is fatal to the object of neutrality. When you have described one side as the ‘liberation forces’ and the other side as a group in the capital, you have summoned all the imagery of political legitimacy of the 20th century and put it on the one side and denied it to another. That is not only fatal to neutrality but, I suggest, it is fatal to clear thinking about this phenomenon.” (Congressional Record—Senate, p. S 7389)
3. In a July 6 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski informed the President of the terminology developed by State and the NSC. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 7–12/79)