238. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
12590. Dept also pass to Tokyo for the Secretary. USUN Eyes Only for Ambassador Young. Subject: Rhodesia: Moose/Lake Meeting With Duff/Day.
Summary: Moose and Lake met with Duff and Day following their session with Harlech (septel).2 While Harlech had presented the conclusions of his trip, he did not draw any policy conclusions. Duff was prepared to go further, although he underscored that much of the FCO thinking remains tentative and the round of consultations will not end until the Commonwealth Conference in August.
Duff said the FCO had now identified three “essential ingredients” for a new initiative: a) as the legal authority Britain must offer a solution; b) the constitution must be improved in several important respects; c) there must be a genuine effort to accommodate all the parties. Harlech will go to Salisbury July 2 to begin the next round of consultations. He will stress to the Bishop that a) he must demonstrate he is in control of the government and able to improve the African lot; b) that improvements in the constitution are necessary; c) lifting sanctions will not solve his fundamental problems. In addition, they will suggest that Smith is an impediment. The British hope we will make the same points to Muzorewa in Washington and add the belief that he must work closely with the British to find a solution.
It is apparent that the British still intend to lift sanctions in November. But they hope to retain leverage with Muzorewa by arguing that this will not resolve his problems.
It is not clear how and when a British initiative will unfold. Constitutional proposals will likely form the centerpiece of their initiative in the hope that if this can be agreed, a subsequent, wider, political process of accommodation will flow from it. They accept the point that having a fair proposal on the table would allow the Frontline to press the PF and strengthen our position vis-a-vis the Frontline.
Duff noted privately that British policy is evolving in useful directions—i.e., towards recognition of the need for efforts at accommoda[Page 702]tion among the parties as well as progress in Salisbury. We noted the evolution in U.S. policy which also tends to bring us closer together.
The conversations were encouraging. The British, or at least the FCO, are clearly working towards more than simply trying to make Salisbury barely acceptable. They are prepared to launch their own initiative, they are open regarding our own role in the process. It is thus clear that we will have no problem “keeping the British out front”, and, to mix the metaphor, also staying in step in the coming few weeks. They want our immediate support with Muzorewa and the Africans, and in view of their current position, we believe we should give it.
Down the road, of course, we may well run into differences on what would constitute a fair proposal for a political accommodation. But the trend is encouraging. End summary.
1. Moose and Lake met with Tony Duff, Derek Day, Robin Renwick, and Peter Barlow June 27. Day led off with his impressions of Rhodesia following his three-week visit to Salisbury. Overall, he found a wide-spread and genuine desire to finish the war and return Rhodesia to normalcy. The whites are frustrated by the consistent demands of the security forces and the bleakness of the economic picture; the blacks suffer from growing intimidation and harassment, general disruption of their lives, and receding employment prospects. Day believes that all are willing to pay a price for a settlement. Their idee fixe, however, is that the lifting of sanctions and recognition by the US and UK will bring this return to normalcy. Day said he had not made much headway in efforts to explain that the situation is more complicated than that. The mere lifting of sanctions would not result in a deescalation of the fighting.
2. Day said the Muzorewa government is becoming “a government of national disunity.” The Bishop is encountering growing political opposition as the parliamentary parties continue to fragment. Still, the whites see the leadership alternatives to Muzorewa as worse and they want to reinforce the Bishop’s position. There is declining interest in Nkomo.
3. Beyond these immediate political problems there is growing African skepticism about what Muzorewa can deliver. So far there has been no winding down of the war and no visible improvements in the African lot. The Bishop said nothing in his Presidential address.
4. Day said that the heavy hand of the whites is still pervasive in Salisbury. Little has changed in governmental operations. The whole burden of advice going to the Bishop flows through the same efficient machinery. The bureaucracy in Salisbury lacks the political sensitivity that normally would be expected from a new government. Muzorewa is sensitive to this white presence, and while Day believes that hardly [Page 703] anyone regards the constitution as inviolate, the Bishop fears major changes could provoke a white exodus.
5. Renwick then took up the conversation. He described the South African attitude as expressed by Fourie as accepting that neither the U.S. nor the UK will lift sanctions in the immediate future. They also know that Smith must go and assume there may be some leeway for negotiated change. Renwick said Richard Luce has now touched base with a number of African moderates who are impressed by Muzorewa’s achievement and unimpressed with the Patriotic Front and their inadequacies. None of these moderates, however, feel the Salisbury arrangement provides a sufficient basis for a solution. They, too, believe Smith must go and the constitution must be changed.
6. Lake said that our policies and continuing congressional consultations will require that we define in the coming period what we mean by “progress”, e.g. what changes can be generated from inside Rhodesia and what efforts can be mounted there to reach an accommodation with the other parties. Duff answered that while Britain has not yet set a firm course, the results of the Harlech and Day missions have clarified the initial ingredients of a new policy. These are: (a) The UK as the legal authority must be involved in the solution; Muzorewa, while an important new factor, cannot provide a solution on his own; (b) There must be some improvements in the constitution, e.g. the number of white seats, the veto power, the white dominated commissions; and (c) There must be an attempt to find agreement among all the parties. Lake said the key on the constitution is whether it is explicitly based on the Salisbury version or whether it is presented as something new. Duff said that the British are examining the option of putting forward a constitution as the centerpiece of its initiative. By incorporating initial changes, the document would be consistent with the draft constitution of the AAP but nonetheless appear as a version of the present Salisbury constitution. Questioned about ways of bringing the parties together and the difficult but important issue of how to offer the Patriotic Front a fair process of political accommodation, Duff said he personally believes we should focus on the constitution and only subsequently tackle the problem of the political process that would flow from it, including the possibility of new elections. We emphasized the importance both of a fair proposal and of giving no one a veto over a fair political process.
7. The British are still undecided how and when to begin the new initiative. Day will return to Salisbury on July 1 followed by Harlech the next day. Harlech will press Muzorewa to demonstrate that he is indeed in charge of the new government and that the situation of the blacks is improving. Without being specific, he will also press for Muzorewa to recognize there must be changes in the constitution. The [Page 704] FCO will share his brief with us and let us know the results of these explorations and suggest similar points we might make to Muzorewa when the Bishop arrives in Washington. They believe it is important we specifically stress to Muzorewa that (a) the lifting of sanctions will not help him gain wide international recognition or end the war; (b) he must consider important constitutional changes as well as make a serious attempt to accommodate the Patriotic Front; and (c) we must all work together, especially the Bishop with the British. When Muzorewa comes to London after Washington, Mrs. Thatcher intends to make the same points. We promised to report on our talks with Muzorewa and to suggest particular points the British might wish to pursue with him in London.
8. As this effort with Muzorewa unfolds, the British simultaneously plan to inform the Frontline and African moderates of the general conclusions of Lord Harlech’s mission. They will stress their belief that extreme resolutions at the OAU Conference would only further complicate the Rhodesia problem. The British hope that we might make the same point in our contacts in Africa.
9. For the moment, Duff said, they view the Commonwealth Conference in effect as the conclusion of this initial phase of consultations, although there is an argument to be made for outlining the new policy at the conference. He said that Harlech found little enthusiasm for the idea of a Commonwealth Contact Group on Rhodesia, largely because it would be viewed as a British device for shunting its responsibility. At this stage, Duff does not foresee either an all parties conference or a shuttle. Neither is ruled out for later but both involve a process that runs the danger of bogging down. He initially argued that the Frontline should not be deeply involved in whatever process unfolds, but then agreed with our point that they are the key to PF performance.
10. While Lord Harlech may come to Washington in mid-July, the British now have in mind that the key US–UK consultations about both policies and diplomatic process should take place soon after the Commonwealth Conference, perhaps during the second week in August.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Europe, Box 26, 6/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Gaborone, Lagos, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 12589 from London, June 27, the Embassy reported on the session with Harlech. (Ibid.)↩