Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

237. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 1, 1979

SUBJECT

• Case-Javits Determination Options (S)

The attached material from State sets forth the two negative options which Cy discussed with the British last week.² (A positive determination statement has also been prepared as a contingency, but is not included in this package.) (S)

A brief description of the two negative options are at Tabs A and B.³ (U)

Option A. The “commitment to lift sanctions if Salisbury makes certain improvements” is essentially the “conditional acceptance” option you looked at with interest last week. It sets forth some fairly specific conditions which would have to be substantially met before sanctions could be lifted,—including constitutional improvements, a referendum, and some form of new elections, unless all parties arrived at an entirely different solution. (S)

Option B. The “negative determination with commitment to keep sanctions issue under review” is the “conditional rejection” option presented last week. It differs from Option A in that the conditions it sets forth are very general in nature. (S)

Our objectives should include the following: (S)

—to preserve our good will with the several African states and the Third World.

—to maintain a neutral stance that will allow us to influence movement toward a viable solution.

—to provide a strong leadership on the Hill which could prevent the lifting of sanctions by the House.

—to force the U.K. to “get out front” on the sanctions issue and to the extent possible, put some distance between ourselves and the U.K. without an open break.

—to be seen to be making a considered judgment which is consistent with the terms of Case-Javits, and at the same time is just and reasonable.

—to demonstrate a recognition of changing circumstances which could form the basis for a viable settlement, and to show a willingness to be flexible in helping to achieve such a settlement. (S)

While both options would further these objectives, it would appear that Option A (with more precise conditions) would be more effective in furthering all objectives except the last—as it would be seen as less flexible than Option B. That in good measure is its strength in that it forces the British out in front, requires the Congress to ignore the call for UN-sponsored elections and a more equitable constitution. It also means that should the Congress overrule us, we at least will have had the “right” position. (S)

Option B is apparently preferred by the British as it fits more readily with their present strategy of waffling until we go first. (S)

Reporting. Both State options say that you will report to Congress after six months. I think it preferable that you say that you will direct the Secretary to report on a regular basis, say monthly. This could help to prevent a psychological build-up to a “new Case-Javits determination” next December.⁴ (S)

Timing. The scenario presented at Tab C is important, and includes a thorough briefing schedule for people on the Hill. We should also consider a special early briefing for the Black Caucus,⁵ and perhaps follow-up briefings for select non-governmental organizations who should be helpful in supporting your determination on the Hill. (S)

(We have some reason to hope that the AFL–CIO will reaffirm their pro-sanctions position on about June 6, and this support could be critical.)⁶ (S)

At any rate, I feel you should prepare to make your announcement as early as possible, perhaps on Thursday, June 7, and no later than Monday, June 11.⁷ (S)

I suggest that we have a final decision and a strategy meeting on Tuesday, June 5, with Cy, Andy and the Vice President.⁸ (S)

Draft Statement. At Tab D is a draft negative determination statement prepared by State. The “excerpts” to each option (under Tabs A and B) would be inserted for pages 10–12 of this draft, as applicable. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That we establish a schedule of action consistent with the scenario attached, with a Thursday, June 7, announcement date, and that pending final decisions and modifications growing out of our meeting on Tuesday, June 5, we begin to work on final drafts of your determination and background briefing, consistent with the “conditional acceptance” option, (defined conditions) at Tab A.⁹ (S)

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹⁰

Washington, undated

COMMITMENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS IF SALISBURY MAKES CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS

Description

Having reached a negative determination on the basis of certain major flaws in Salisbury’s arrangements, we could suggest ways those flaws might be corrected that would warrant a lifting of sanctions. These could include (a) improvement in the Salisbury constitution to allow true majority rule while protecting the rights of the minority; (b) a popular referendum under impartial supervision on the improved constitution; and [(c) at the same time as the referendum, new elections open to all parties.] However, we would make clear our willingness to lift sanctions if all the parties, internal and external, agreed on an entirely different solution.¹¹

Analysis

Constitutional improvements. The Presidential announcement would describe generally the improvements we would seek. In press backgrounders and testimony we would provide greater detail, citing:

—More equitable white/black representation in parliament and elimination of the white blocking vote on most constitutional changes and major legislation;

—Elimination of white control over the police, military, civil service, judiciary and other commissions;

—Provisions to ensure expeditious removal of de jure and de facto discrimination;

—As alternative assurances for whites, specially entrenched protections of individual rights, including property and pensions.

These improvements would eliminate a major criticism of the internal settlement.¹² They might also be acceptable to many in Congress as a justification for maintaining sanctions as a lever. However, it is likely that Muzorewa would have to reject a call for explicit constitutional changes. Constitutional changes alone would not necessarily improve the de facto conditions of Rhodesian blacks and would not offer a basis for settlement of the fighting. Were we to make this our sole criterion for lifting sanctions, we could expect strong African criticism. Some of our European allies would also be concerned that failure to pursue a solution to the war would exacerbate tensions generally between the West and the Third World. The British now seem more aware of the need to deal with international implications of the war. This will be reinforced in their consultations with other governments.

Elections. By including impartial elections open to all parties among our objectives, we are far more likely to gain African and international support. We could make clear that if fair and impartial elections were held, we would lift sanctions even if the Patriotic Front refused to participate.

This approach would find support among those in Congress who believe the Administration must seek to maintain sanctions to broaden and improve the internal settlement, and must set forth specific conditions under which sanctions would be lifted. However, Congressional opponents would regard new elections as an unreasonable and impracticable goal. The British believe they would be rejected immediately by Muzorewa. Unless we could convince the British to support elections and pursue that objective actively, then our position on the Hill would be further weakened.

In short, including elections would make our position more attractive to the Africans and provide a fair basis for a settlement. This is important to our credibility in Africa, even if the will to settle remains lacking among the parties. But elections are likely to be rejected by Muzorewa, many in the Congress, and the British.

Referendum. If new elections are not sought, our principal objective could be an impartially-(probably UK-) supervised referendum on an improved constitution. To allow a true test of opinion, we should insist that the ban on internal ZANU and ZAPU and other opposition parties should be lifted. This approach might be more readily accepted by the British and might help mitigate African and liberal domestic criticism of our abandoning elections. It would nevertheless encounter resistance from Salisbury and its Congressional sympathizers.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Box 119, Zimbabwe: 6/79. Secret.
2. See Documents 235 and 236.
3. Tab B is attached but not printed.
4. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Monthly better.”
5. Tab C is attached but not printed. Carter underlined “a special early briefing for the Black Caucus,” and wrote “no” in the left-hand margin.
6. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Push this quietly.”
7. Carter placed a question mark in the left-hand margin. Carter made the announcement of a negative determination on June 7. For text of the announcement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 1012–1014. Vance explained the decision in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12. For text of his statement see Department of State Bulletin, August 1979, pp. 26–29.
8. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “ok.”
9. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Beneath the recommendation Carter wrote: “Bristish status—history “No goverment (except S.A.?) recognized “Case-Javits amendment “Assessed carefully “Determination “4% of population is white “Muzorewa, etc. chosen by Smith “Even whites, only 40% approved up or down vote “Constitution written, approved by 4% “no broad referendum “Cannot be amended to provide equality unless overcome veto by 4% “Parliamentary vote—white=7 blacks “White 4% will continue to control police, military, civil service, judiciary “Elections—75,000 soldiers deployed—peaceful almost 2/3 voted “Informal political parties affiliated with opposition were banned and prohibited by gov’t from expressing opposition to the elections—not permitted to hold rallies or meetings or to advertise in Rhodesian newspapers.” An unknown hand wrote “Blame on both sides” next to this handwritten point and drew an arrow pointing to it. An unknown hand wrote “NO” next to “Muzorewa etc. chosen by Smith” and “Even whites, only 40% approved up or down vote.”
10. Secret. Brackets are in the original.
11. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Specifics exceed Case-Javits.”
12. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “May be better to describe these defects vs advocating solutions.”