Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

235. Draft Memorandum of Conversation¹

London, May 21, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Brewster
  • Anthony Lake
  • George Vest
  • Richard Moose
  • Hodding Carter

• UK

  • Lord Carrington
  • Sir Ian Gilmour
  • Ambassador Jay
  • Richard Hull
  • Sir Michael Palliser
  • Sir Antony Duff
  • Derek Day
  • Michael Yarnold
  • Hamilton Whyte
  • Stephen Wall

SUBJECT

• Rhodesia

Lord Carrington introduced Rhodesia by pointing out that the Tory government’s attitude is different from its predecessors. British governments had long held to the Six Principles which must be met if Rhodesia is to return to legality. The remaining test is the one of acceptability to the Rhodesian people as a whole, he said, and the breakthrough here began with the Kissinger initiative in 1976. The elections in April ended this process, and Lord Boyd’s report to the Prime Minister concluded that the elections were as free and fair as possible under the circumstances.² The report also stated that the new constitution was enveloped in the elections and the vote signaled acceptance of this new arrangement.

At the same time, Lord Carrington went on, there are obvious international implications in deciding how to proceed with the question. Relations with the Commonwealth and other African states, with the EC and with the US could be affected. Nevertheless, the Tory government feels duty bound to return Rhodesia to legality, to remove sanctions, and to gain international acceptability. This sentiment represents the man-in-the-street opinion in Britain and is not confined to the Conservative Party. In any event, it is impossible to foresee a renewal of sanctions by the House of Commons in November.

Sir Antony Duff gave his impressions of his recent visit to Salisbury. The mood there remains reasonably confident, he said. The black Prime Minister might form his government quickly, perhaps before the end of the month, with Smith included as minister without portfolio. Still, the government clearly needs advice on how to move forward in order to make themselves more acceptable internally and externally. Muzorewa is aware of this, although it is too early to suggest amendments to the constitution. But Muzorewa has sent conciliatory letters to the Front Line and may do the same to both wings of the Patriotic Front. He has reaffirmed the offer of amnesty to the guerillas and sent teams to more moderate African capitals.

Duff continued that the Bishop wants help in gaining international acceptance. Although he has not given much thought to negotiations with the Patriotic Front, there has been some contact with ZANU. Muzorewa is primarily concentrating on being Prime Minister, forming his government, and looking beyond the PF to OAU opinion.

Carrington said that the British government feels it must be seen to be moving forward. Duff was dispatched to Salisbury for that reason and another senior official will begin longer visits there shortly, gradually easing himself into a semi-permanent presence. This representation is important in order to push the Bishop in the right direction. Carrington continued that the British will also begin consultations with the Front Line and Commonwealth colleagues. This mission will not be undertaken by a minister, because it is only tentative. But the British intend to send a special emissary to the Front Line before the end of the month, and then possibly on to Nigeria. This emissary would have two objectives:

(a) To put forward the proposition that the situation in Rhodesia has altered significantly and the drift is in that direction; it is important that African leaders gradually accustom themselves to the inevitable;

(b) To receive whatever ideas these African leaders may have on how best to push the Bishop towards a political/constitutional position which would enhance his international acceptability. Carrington concluded with the hope that the UK and the US can remain in stride on this issue. He noted that our respective governments are responding to different rules. It is more important for the British, he said, to return Rhodesia to legality rather than to lift sanctions, whereas the sanctions issue is more important in the US.

The Secretary assured Carrington that Washington appreciated the new reality in Rhodesia. The President has not yet made his decision over the Case/Javits amendment. Time is running out, however, because we are committed to making a finding within two weeks after the new government in Salisbury is installed. At the moment we are wrestling with various options, and the British position is much in mind. The Secretary stressed that we too want to keep in step. Nevertheless, he went on, if we lift sanctions now we would be seen as lining up with South Africa against black Africa, and this in turn would present the Soviets with increased advantage.

The Secretary explained that we are now examining a solution along the lines of a conditional acceptance of the results of the April elections, e.g., sanctions will be lifted if certain things take place. No decision has yet been made on this but as examples of conditions we might like, the Secretary mentioned:

(a) Revision of the constitution;

(b) Progress towards some form of an all-parties meeting, but without allowing the PF to have a veto; and

(c) An election after such a meeting and under some form of international supervision; simultaneously, the amended constitution would be ratified in a referendum. This is only one of the options, the Secretary said, and these conditions are not meant to be definitive.

Mr. Lake added that we of course would not stand in the way if the parties themselves agreed on some other formula. Mr. Moose stressed that it is important to keep in mind the problems which face the Front Line Presidents. Their problem is a practical one as well as an emotional issue on one of principle. They need a credible alternative to a continued war. The Front Line will need something from us in order to be in position to pressure the PF to reconsider its own position. Reasonable change in Salisbury would make this easier for the Front Line.

The Secretary then briefly described the Congressional picture. In the Senate, he said, there is a clear majority in favor of lifting sanctions now.³ He estimated the measure would carry by a 5–10 vote majority. The situation in the House is quite different. Congressman Solarz is convinced that the strategic dangers in South Africa are great. Solarz recently completed hearings which aired the idea of a conditional acceptance. He could probably block a move to lift sanctions at the committee stage. Although the attitude of the House as a whole is more difficult to predict, even observers such as Freedom House and Bayard Rustin did not recommend that sanctions should be lifted now. Whatever its outcome, this debate would be a devisive political battle in the US.

Lord Carrington responded that there was little likelihood Salisbury would find the three conditions which the Secretary had enumerated attractive. He said it is in Muzorewa’s interest to preserve the present constitution in order to maintain the confidence of the whites. He said the idea of an all-parties meeting is so well worn that it would likely be received with a “horse laugh.” Carrington would find more interesting the possibility of conducting a test of acceptability on the constitution as it now stands.

Duff echoed Moose’s earlier remarks that the Front Line will need something at least to help them save face. But this would take time. He suggested that perhaps the President could make his acceptance conditional but without specifying the conditions. This formula would give more time to develop ideas with the Front Line and prepare the ground before November. Otherwise the Front Line and others would likely reject the conditions as well. Mr. Lake suggested as a possibility that amendments to the constitution could perhaps lessen the white grip on the political structure but safeguard and even strengthen the protection of minority rights, including social and economic rights. The white-chaired commissions were particularly objectionable.

Carrington gave his opinion that the PF would not accept the basis of an all-parties meeting if it were only intended to tinker with the present constitution. They would want something more fundamental than that. Mr. Luce suggested that both the US and the UK held a common objective and should therefore work to a common time scale. The sudden imposition of conditions would be too fast. At this point, Lord Carrington suggested that officials of both sides meet separately to discuss these issues further while the main meeting continued on to other subjects.

Luce, Duff, Day, Moose and Lake returned to the session one hour later. Mr. Lake reviewed what had been discussed. He said the British planned to send a high-level political emissary to the Front Line but had proposed that someone else, possibly Amb. Easum, might brief the Nigerians separately. He said we appeared to have two common goals: building on the Salisbury arrangement and conceiving a policy which might bring peace and international acceptability. Lake said the separate group had discussed a possible new option. If the Presidential determination were negative, we could state that the question of sanctions would be kept under close review without, however, specifying precise conditions which must be met. This would give Salisbury, with our help, the opportunity to reach accommodations with opposition elements both inside and outside Rhodesia. The President might offer a general formula, emphasizing democratic principles, human rights, and the removal of racial discrimination. Our two governments could be more precise on background.

Lake noted that such a general formula would help us diplomatically and aid the British in exploring various avenues, but might not help us as much in explaining our policy domestically because of its vagueness. The Secretary expressed some misgivings that this policy would not be sufficiently clear for the administration to defend on the Hill.

The Secretary and Lord Carrington agreed to resume talks on Rhodesia and to discuss Namibia on Wednesday, May 23.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Seitz. Approved by Perry on June 5. The meeting took place in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Vance was in London for a meeting with Thatcher, Carrington, and Begin.
2. In telegram 9856 from London, May 18, the Embassy transmitted the “conclusions” from the 200-page Boyd report. The report noted: “neither Patriotic Front party proffered candidates for election. Despite this we think that the result represented the wish of the majority of the electorate of the country however calculated.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790226–0719)
3. On May 15, by a 75–19 vote, the Senate called on (but did not require) Carter to lift sanctions within 14 days of the formation of a black-majority government. (Congress and the Nation, vol. 5, 1977–1980, p. 77)
4. See Document 235.