Office of the Historian

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanzania to the Department of State1

Dar es Salaam, April 14, 1978, 1310Z

1664. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Meeting With Nyerere.

1. Summary: Secretary met with President Nyerere morning April 14 for hour’s discussion of key points preparatory to Malta II meeting in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere remained generally supportive of US/UK approach. He accepts that it is crucial that President Commissioner have powers of “both the Head of State and Prime Minister”, although he still argues in favor of some kind of special role for the Patriotic Front among the Nationalists. He did not dispute the fact that any “all parties” discussion cannot be confined solely to the Anglo-American Plan, but we will not know how well he reflects (or has influenced) PF attitudes until we meet with him this afternoon. He still wants to “save” Bishop Muzorewa. End summary.

2. Secretary and US delegation (Young, Spain, Easum, Low, Lake, Edmondson and Thornton) met with President Nyerere morning April 14 for hour’s discussion. Nyerere was accompanied by Foreign Minister Mkapa and other Tanzanian officials. President’s letter to Nyerere was handed over at end of meeting.2 US meeting with Nyerere took place after two-hour session between Secretary and Dr. Owen (including Lord Carver, Graham, and other UK officials—septel3). This was in turn followed by a separate Owen and British delegation meeting with Nyerere.

3. In response Secretary’s query as to how Nyerere saw the Patriotic Front’s current position, the President said that the PF now accepted the major premises of the AAP but there could be problems during Malta II on details. He thought the UK and the PF could work them out.

4. The Secretary queried President Nyerere on a number of specific points, which the Secretary indicated he believed to be important. Nyerere’s replies were:

A. He had not discussed the question of amnesty with the PF. He did not know how they felt about it.

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B. The division of function between the Resident Commissioner and the Nationalist leaders was the essential point. Nyerere thought there was agreement in principle on this. The Resident Commissioner would have to have the powers of “both a Head of State and a Prime Minister”. Nyerere did not want to get into details. He argued for “non-equality” in favor of the PF in the political as well as the military field. He believes the PF should have a special position but made clear that the division of functions between the Resident Commissioner and governing council was more crucial than one seat more or less on the government council.

C. Nyerere believed that the Patriotic Front would go along with our present thinking on the police.

D. A UN presence in Rhodesia would not be a problem to the PF, although they would probably wish to define its role in maintaining law and order.

E. PF was prepared to go to an all parties meeting.

F. Nyerere appeared to accept, albeit somewhat reluctantly, that such an all parties meeting could not be confined solely to the AAP and would be open to all questions on all points.

G. According to Nyerere the PF would after all have some questions about Lord Carver’s military plan. Nyerere’s position (which probably reflects current PF views) was that we should not try to deal with numbers at the beginning. We should accept that the liberation forces were the “base” of the new army. Once we had defined the Patriotic Front forces, how many wanted to go home and how many wanted to stay, etc, we could then turn to defining which Rhodesian defense force people would be added to them as “acceptable elements”.

5. Toward the end of the meeting Nyerere reemphasized his hope that we would stick to the Anglo-American Plan. After Ambassador Low, at the Secretary’s request, had given Nyerere a brief fill-in on his and Graham’s meetings in Salisbury,4 Nyerere reiterated his desire that we should try to find some way to “save” Bishop Muzorewa. He emphasized that Muzorewa, unlike Sithole and Chirau, was a real leader. Muzorewa wanted elections. Why did he prefer the kind contemplated under the Salisbury Agreement when he could have internationally acceptable ones under the AAP?

6. Comment: Nyerere remains supportive in principle of the US/UK approach. He still seems reasonably flexible. We will have a better idea of how well he reflects PF views after our meetings with them. These are scheduled to get under way at 4:00 p.m. April 14 and to continue through Saturday. (Nkomo is still insisting on leaving no later [Page 599] than 5:00 p.m. Saturday.) Nyerere apparently accepts, at least partially, the importance of trying to get South African and Rhodesian cooperation in any settlement.

Spain
  1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Cape Town, Gaborone, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria, and USUN.↩
  2. Document 198.↩
  3. Document 202.↩
  4. See footnote 6, Document 202.↩