Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

202. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Dar es Salaam, April 14, 1978, 1325Z

Secto 4028. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Vance-Owen Meeting Morning, April 14.

1. Summary: Secretary Vance and Owen decided morning April 14 that goal of Dar es Salaam meeting is to gain PF agreement on essential principles of Anglo-American proposals (AAP), which could then be used to moderate Salisbury Group’s hard line against further negotiations with the PF. Owen repeatedly stressed that Front Line and others must understand that AAP cannot be imposed by UK/US on group. Accordingly, Owen repeated UK position against binding agreements on details with the PF which might later have to be broken at an all parties meeting. Uppermost in Owen’s mind is desire not to limit options and flexibility of UK/US in case parties themselves (notably Nkomo and Smith) are able to work out a deal outside bounds of AAP. End summary.

2. Secretary Vance and Owen met alone briefly at Ambassador Spain’s residence morning April 14 and were then joined by Ambassador Young, Lord Carver and members of respective delegations for further discussions.

3. Owen began group discussions by noting that an important objective of Dar meetings must be to convey to PF and FL understanding that the AAP is an outline for a negotiated settlement, that whole range of details, including cease fire, must be negotiated among the parties and that there can be no imposition of the AAP on the Salisbury Group. He said that FL is “hankering” for agreements in Dar which could be imposed upon others and this must be counteracted. He noted, however, that we would lose FL support if we adopted position of simple arbiter between the parties without advancing our own proposals. We must walk a thin line to get the PF more on board the AAP, but without setting in concrete agreements that would have to be broken up with “pneumatic drills” at an all parties meeting. In response to inevitable PF question, we will say that anything we agree to here must be consistent with AAP and that we will support it at an all parties meeting. However, we cannot agree to be “locked in without flexibility.”

3. Secretary Vance agreed with Owen’s approach, noting the importance of leaving Dar having created a sense of progress in negotiations and with agreements on general principles with the PF. There ensued discussion on what these principles should be and how to structure the negotiating scenario with the PF. Owen noted that we should plan our Dar conversations keeping in mind the issues that are of most concern to the Salisbury Group. He identified two, the role of the Resident Commissioner,² and our proposed military arrangements “based on the liberation forces” as particularly upsetting to the Salisbury Group.³ Low and Graham added the UN role as another major issue.⁴ In reflecting on these Salisbury concerns Owen elaborated on possible new approaches which might form the basis of agreement among the parties themselves. In doing so, he pressed his point that we should not commit ourselves to firm agreements here that would limit our flexibility to accept a settlement achieved by the parties themselves, not in total accord with the AAP. He noted that “we are all adults—we know what’s going on,” in an apparent allusion to continuing Smith-Nkomo contacts.

4. During discussion of role of UN Ambassador Young said that there could be no settlement without a UN force: “It would be suicide for us.” Owen doubted that a UN peace-keeping force would be needed under all circumstances, but agreed that some UN presence if only to observe elections, is mandatory and that we could not back off on question of a UN role of some sort. UN involvement is necessary to get international acceptability for a settlement and our ability to facilitate UN acceptance should be biggest selling point for continued cooperation with UK/US settlement effort in Salisbury. Graham and Low noted that the Salisbury Group was particularly adamant in its loathing for all things UN. This was exacerbated by the Security Council’s refusal to allow Muzorewa to speak. Low argued that Prem Chand’s presence in Salisbury would be like waving a red flag. However, Owen said that Waldheim had told Chand that he could go to Salisbury, if the FL do not object. Amb. Young asserted that Chand’s personality and prestige as a civil servant would diminish opposition to him. Graham and Low disagreed, but it was left that Chand would probably go on to Salisbury, if he wanted.

5. Discussion on the role of Resident Commissioner focused on his authority over police and military arrangements. Lord Carver repeated that there could be no give on his position that he could not make changes in the police before he had appointed a new Commissioner of Police. He specifically repeated this when Edmondson asked about the possibility of disbanding the para-military police support units. Owen noted the possibility that the parties themselves could come to agreement on the composition of the military force, but that under no circumstances could a British Resident Commissioner become involved in a situation in which some guerrillas were left armed and outside of the country, not under the control of the RC as a guarantee exacted by the PF (meaning Nkomo) as price for settlement. In relation to Owen’s mention of the possibility of a non-UK transitional administrator Lake suggested that we use the term Resident Commissioner and Neutral Administrator interchangeably and not refer only to the latter, lest this raise PF and FL apprehensions about our withdrawal from support of the AAP. Owen agreed, though Lord Carver noted obvious distinction between RC acting as agent of HMG and Neutral Administrator operating only as Chairman of Governing Council or with additional responsibilities agreed to by the parties.

6. The Secretaries agreed that we would maintain our position on composition of Governing Council despite fact that this would probably be unacceptable to the PF. At best, PF would argue for at least a 50–50 division of representation between itself and the Salisbury Group. Owen, noting that in the Salisbury Agreement the Executive Council keeps power over the military, said that we should not exclude the possibility of the Governing Council being granted the same authority if such is agreed to by all the parties in further negotiations.

7. Owen said that he was very relaxed about how to structure the meeting with the PF, scheduled for 4 p.m. today, and thought that we might begin by asking what they wanted to talk about. It was further decided that in raising issues we would first talk about the UN presence, then proceed to the composition and role of the Governing Council, and then onto the role of the Resident Commissioner/Neutral Administrator.

8. Secretary Vance noted that he would stress in his meeting with President Nyerere, which followed immediately upon the US/UK morning discussion, the favorable effect there would be in Salisbury and elsewhere to public agreement with the PF on general principles relating to amnesty, the police UN presence, Governing Council and the participation of all parties in the settlement process. The Secretary noted he would stay away from the question of the Resident Commissioner’s powers unless President Nyerere raised it. He also noted that he intended to hold the FL to their Lagos promise to obtain a PF public statement agreeing to participate in an all-parties meeting.

9. In discussing the Salisbury and all-parties talks Owen noted a recent statement by Muzorewa’s representative in Scandinavia⁵ and David Smith’s comments in Salisbury to Low and Graham which indicate that there might be more flexibility in the Salisbury position than was apparently indicated in the formal Low-Graham meeting with the Executive Council representatives.⁶ It is an irony of history, noted Owen, that Ian Smith is probably now more flexible about negotiations with the PF than his African associates. It was agreed that the Salisbury Group wants to flex its muscles and establish its position of power before even considering negotiations. Owen pointed out that we are on the horns of a dilemma; it is really too early to expect the Salisbury Group to act on further negotiations, but we must nevertheless try to convince them in order to maintain our credibility with the FL. He noted that it was also important to make a strong demarche to the Salisbury Group and to the South Africans before the Executive Council “crosses the Rubicon” and orders raids into Zambia which might trigger Cuban involvement. Owen said he would not object to going directly to Cape Town to express our concerns to Vorster himself in order to wake Salisbury and South Africa up to the great danger of Cuban involvement, whether the internal settlement is working out or not.

10. In relation to the site of an all-parties meeting, Owen expressed preference for Rhodesia and thinks that Nkomo could be made to see advantages for him in that venue. Failing that, the talks should take place at Livingstone Victoria Falls in order to get negotiations “into a Rhodesian context.”

11. The most significant point of difference in Vance-Owen meeting emerged over discussion of observers’ role. Owen repeated his concern that we should not set precedent at this meeting which we might have to live with at an all-parties conference. He wants to make clear that the observers are here at invitation of the PF and the Tanzanians, and expressed some concern about the Mozambican objection to the presence of the Nigerians. The Secretary responded that we should not make an issue of the observers, let them sit where they wanted, but not at the table itself. He agreed with Owen that they should not speak during the meetings. The Secretary argued for flexibility and rejected Owen’s request that we reach a decision now on not having observers at an all-parties meeting. He and Owen then agreed that the matter of observers at an all-parties meeting should be left open, and, of course would have to be discussed with the Salisbury participants in any event, if such a meeting looked like a real possibility.

Vance

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Lusaka, Pretoria, London, Gaborone, Maputo, Cape Town, and Lagos. Vance was in Dar es Salaam for meetings on Rhodesia with British Foreign Secretary Owen and leaders of the Patriotic Front.
2. The Anglo-American Proposals called for the Resident Commissioner to “administer the country, to organize and conduct the general election . . . and to take command, as Commander-in-Chief, of all armed forces in Rhodesia, apart from the United Nations Zimbabwe Force.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28646)
3. According to the Anglo-American Proposals, a new army loyal to the people and Government of Zimbabwe would be established. Enrollment would be open to all citizens, but based on the Liberation Forces and include acceptable elements of the Rhodesian Defence Forces. (Ibid.)
4. Reference is presumably to the United Nations Zimbabwe Force.
5. Not found.
6. In telegram 2049 from Pretoria, April 11, Bowdler reported on the Graham-Low visit to Salisbury. During a meeting with deputies to the Executive Council, Graham explained the proposal for an all-parties conference: “They said they refused to enter into any negotiation of the internal agreement, meet anyone outside of Salisbury or participate in a meeting that included representatives of the Front Line, though they offered discussions in Salisbury with Nkomo and Mugabe if the latter would renounce violence.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780155–0653)