136. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
1967. Department pass to Ambassador Young, AmEmbassies Maputo, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Cape Town, Lagos. Subject: Comments on Ambassador Young’s Visit to London. Reference: (A) London 1952;2 (B) London 1951.3
1. During his brief stop-over in London, Ambassador Young managed to meet and talk with most Whitehall figures involved in the problems of Southern Africa. Several themes worth noting came out of these discussions.
A.) The British sense that recent efforts to resolve the Rhodesian problem have run out of steam, or at least that phase one of the exercise is at a close;
B.) They have no real ideas how to proceed with a phase two and cannot come up with suggestions until they have a better picture of the plans of the Carter administration. They are anxiously looking for signals from Washington and probably hoped for more definite directions from Ambassador Young;
C.) The British know they cannot directly or through Vorster get to Smith. They therefore regard the new Washington/Pretoria relationship as crucial and the centerpiece of whatever new policy emerges. Until that relationship is established, there will not be much of a British policy for the U.S. to support;
D.) They expect that American and British policies will continue to be step in step in Southern Africa but they are at the same time faintly uneasy. Do we share the same view of the Patriotic Front? Do we share the same view of sanctions on South Africa? Do we share the same view of Soviet intentions? Probably yes, but maybe. . . .
E.) The British believe negotiations are still possible and all parties except Smith continue to look for an acceptable settlement. Vorster remains a willing partner. But the British are disturbed that events in [Page 371] Southern Africa are fast becoming uncontrollable. Decisions by the OAU and the attractions of the guerrilla war as a “soft option” may make efforts at genuine negotiations irrelevant.
2. Ambassador Young’s meeting with Sonny Ramphal was disturbing.4 Although some of Ramphal’s remarks may have been played for Anyaoku’s ears, his comments on the Patriotic Front had the sound of a bandwagon.5 He belittled Muzorewa and declared that “all Africa” would soon support the Patriotic Front. The conversation implied the dilemma that may soon face us: If one urges consideration for the Bishop one is anti-African.
3. The Ambassador’s visit underscored the high expectations which people hold for the Carter administration and for Young personally. He forcefully expressed the administration’s commitment to majority rule, and there was barely a door he could enter without being ambushed by photographers and journalists.
4. The Ambassador’s prediction about the Byrd Amendment is the best news Africanists here have heard for a long time.6
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- In telegram 1952 from London, February 3, the Embassy reported on Young’s meeting with Commonwealth Secretary General Ramphal and Nigerian Commonwealth Representative Emeka Anyaoku. Ramphal urged the United States to “use its leverage with South Africa to press Ian Smith, repeal the Byrd Amendment, take additional steps to halt the recruitment of U.S. mercenaries, and insure that there is no slacking of pressure on the Namibia.” (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 135.↩
- See footnote 2, above.↩
- Telegram 1952 reported that Ramphal told Young that the Front Line’s endorsement of the Patriotic Front was, “the only means to ensure the continuation of the military struggle that would force Smith to a negotiated settlement.” (See footnote 2, above.)↩
- As reported in telegram 1952 Young told Ramphal and Anyaoku that the prospects for repeal of the Byrd Amendment were “very good in view of the administration’s firm commitment to that goal and the change of mind among traditional opponents of repeal in the U.S. Congress.” (See footnote 2, above)↩