Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

135. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, February 3, 1977, 1350Z

1951. Department pass to Ambassador Young. Subject: Ambassador Young’s Meeting With Foreign Secretary Crosland.

1. Amb Young, Cooks, Keogh and Seitz saw Foreign Secretary Crosland (with Tony Duff) February 2. Crosland opened on Rhodesia with the flat statement that “We have no idea what to do next. It’s as simple as that.” He said that Secretary Vance’s recent statements had been very helpful,² but he fears that Smith will nevertheless go for an internal option. If the fighting escalates and Cuban forces are introduced, Smith will count on a swing in US/UK public opinion, which along with the South Africans, will bail him out. Young asked for suggestions from the British on actions the U.S. might take concerning Rhodesia.

2. Foreign Secretary Crosland again said that the British found Secretary Vance’s recent statement on Rhodesia extremely helpful. The U.S. must get across in Africa the idea that the “Smith regime has had it”, that it cannot rely on the U.S. for support.

3. Crosland reported on what he called a very uncalm interview between Ivor Richard and President Kaunda of Zambia.³ He asked Young to try to learn two things during his trip:

—What, in calmer moments, Kaunda and Nyerere think might be next steps.

—What tack the Front Line Presidents plan to take regarding Muzorewa and Sithole.

Crosland said it would be “embarrassing if we were compelled to drop Muzorewa.” He added that it would be “very hard for us” to adopt Nyerere’s suggestion that Geneva be reconvened with only the UK and the Patriotic Front in attendance, with the results to be forced on Smith.

4. Crosland said the South Africans are in a “cleft stick” on Rhodesia. They can’t put more pressure on Smith because of their own public opinion, but neither can they back him fully and openly. Crosland said Vorster can communicate with Smith, but for the moment the South Africans do not know what to do.

5. Ambassador Young said he was positive about the progress made so far. Since Ambassador Richard began his efforts, at least some cohesiveness had been achieved by the nationalists. Front Line Presidents now had some leadership which they could in some sense control. Young said he did not rule out getting the nationalists to agree to a reasonable set of proposals. He stressed that a major problem remains the security concerns of the white community. “They won’t volunteer for chaos,” Young said, and added that he would explore with Kaunda and Nyerere the question of assurances to the whites. He reported that among early U.S. moves would be a successful effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment. There would be some opposition in Congress to repeal, but this could be overcome since an important liberal democrat from a steel-making district changed his position to favor repeal. (John Dent-D. PA.)

6. Tony Duff suggested that the Ambassador on his African trip point out to those he meets the dangers of ratifying the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people. Another “SWAPO situation”, he said, would infinitely complicate the problem. Crosland agreed.

7. Young noted the increasing willingness to accept radical solutions, and shifts in frame of reference in which Rhodesian developments were discussed. He concluded by remarking that he believed it important to discuss these matters with the Nigerians.

Spiers

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See footnote 4, Document 132.
3. In telegram 299 from Lusaka, February 1, the Embassy reported on Kaunda’s meeting with Richard in which the British were subjected to “rude abuse during an emotional diatribe on Western responsibility for the continued supply of oil going to Rhodesia in spite of the embargo.” Kaunda also stated that he would not attend the Commonwealth Conference in London, and that Zambia and the United Kingdom “had now come to a parting of the ways.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zambia: 1/77–5/78)