Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

112. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

New York, March 20, 1979, 0158Z

Secto 3005. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Contact Group Meeting With SWAPO March 19.

1. (C–entire text).

2. Contact Group met at Ministerial level March 19 with SWAPO delegation to Proximity Talks. Following is detailed report of that meeting.

3. Vance—On behalf of the Contact Group I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you. We are near to a Namibia solution, what is needed now is a constructive approach which will make it possible to implement this solution. We support the Secretary General’s report² but some details remain to be settled before the report can be implemented. If the settlement is to work, we must have the full cooperation of all parties in every detail. We will meet with South Africa later this afternoon to confirm this with them. We hope you could confirm your readiness to allow the ceasefire to begin and to refrain from infiltration of armed personnel. We are taking action to get South Africa to refrain from raids on your bases in Angola. We urge you and South Africa to support the Secretary General’s proposal for UNTAG composition. If we can agree on these matters, we can get on with implementation of Resolution 435. I would appreciate knowing your views on these and other matters.

SWAPO—First, Honorable Minister, let me apologize for the absence of our President Comrade Nujoma. Unfortunately your invitation came when he was already engaged in a program and he was not able to disengage himself. Let me assure you that SWAPO will nevertheless seriously consider the matters which are to be discussed. Also, let me thank you, Honorable Minister, for inviting us once again to New York to discuss Namibia. As your guests in New York we would like to know more of the purpose and your proposed end result of this meeting. On our part, we thought the SYG’s report was clear enough. We thought that there were only some administrative problems to be discussed with the SYG’s staff but when we received your invitation, we thought we had better come to New York and learn about any remaining problems. We would like to know what you feel are the remaining unresolved details. Also, we should like to remind you that 14 days ago in Luanda we stated our position clearly. The present meeting is taking place against the backdrop of South Africa wanting to get rid of SWAPO. We are being forced into negotiations with South Africa and we do not accept them. No one can do this to us. We are spilling Namibian blood and we will eventually win. However, the question should be asked why South Africa is attacking neighboring countries when the South Africans already had their invitations from the Contact Group to come to New York. The answer is they do not want this solution and this possibility weighs very strongly on our minds. We have always fought this war of liberation on Namibian soil and not on the soil of neighboring countries. You mentioned the ceasefire. In an earlier discussion, in New York or elsewhere, we said that we and the Frontline would scrupulously observe the ceasefire. We say it again now. We have Namibian soldiers fighting inside Namibia. The proposal provides that they are to be restricted to base. We have no problem with that. Now someone is bringing up the new element of monitoring SWAPO bases outside Namibia but we don’t accept anything like that. If the Front Line is willing to guarantee the ceasefire, what more can anyone want? We are here at your invitation and we hope to learn from you.

Vance—The hoped for result of this meeting would be agreement on the three outstanding issues. The first issue will be the treatment of armed SWAPO forces inside or outside Namibia. The second would be the ceasefire and you have answered that by saying that you would scrupulously observe it. The third would be the composition of UNTAG and Waldheim has informed me that this is a detail which has yet to be worked out. Perhaps some of my colleagues would like to comment.

Van Well—I should like to emphasize that solutions to these problems are very urgent. We understand that SWAPO agrees with this view. We endorse fully the Secretary General’s report of February 26 which is wholly consistent with earlier documents. We had hoped the Secretary General’s report would be sufficient to give the green light to the settlement, but this was not the case. The question now relates to details regarding treatment of armed SWAPO personnel inside and outside Namibia. We thought this was sufficiently clarified but this was not so and we are willing to help the Secretary General to get further clarification.

As we see it, there are three possibilities for armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia: Lay down their weapons and join the political process; keep their weapons and join the main SWAPO armed forces outside Namibia; or stay in Namibia and keep their arms, but be subject to monitoring by UNTAG. We thought the question of the treatment of SWAPO personnel outside Namibia was clear and finalized with the agreement to scrupulously observe the ceasefire but this must now be further clarified. We believe there are further details to be worked out on such matters as liaison offices and on cross border relations with UNTAG. Some parties in the Front Line feel that this can be done with military representatives and others feel that more clarification is necessary.

SWAPO—You mentioned three possibilities. The report of the SYG takes care of the questions of monitoring. When we met with the military delegation of the Secretary General we told them this. We think that a false impression was created in Pretoria, Cape Town, and elsewhere that it would be easy to tell the neighboring countries that SWAPO bases should be monitored. This was settled in the SYG’s report which makes it clear that SWAPO forces inside Namibia should be monitored. We even suggested a number of SWAPO forces to be maintained. There may be fewer of our troops in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire; we don’t know. As to external monitoring, we have the word of the Front Line States. Are they being questioned as to the sincerity of what they say? We were going to discuss UNTAG composition with the Secretary General but we have no problem with discussing it here if you want to bring it up. We do have a problem with liaison offices. Will they be civilian or military? We need clarification on this and we were going to ask the Secretary General about it. We think the Secretary General is being overly strict in trying to reach an accommodation on this. We have said for some time that we are ready to sign a ceasefire agreement.

Vance—Let me say this on composition—we are not suggesting that it should be discussed here, but it should be settled before everyone leaves New York since the settlement cannot go forward until we have agreement on UNTAG composition. On liaison offices, if you had been present at our discussion with the Secretary General, you would know that we intend that these should be staffed by civilians, but you should hear this from the SYG. We wanted to clarify the other outstanding issues because, as Dr. Van Well said, the time is now and we should go ahead with clarification on these points so that the settlement can go ahead.

Owen—You are correct about the impression that got around about monitoring and South Africa did make too much out of it. You will find the question of links between UNTAG officers and liaison officers across the borders to be acceptable to the Front Line States. Also if you could put what you said about observance into language, that would be helpful. You said “by the time of the ceasefire” there might be 2500 armed SWAPO troops in Namibia. This causes problems as, let’s be blunt about it, South Africa fears large scale infiltration. We don’t know what your strategy is on bases. You might want to declare all your men in Namibia, in which case you might have more than 2500 men. Or you might have them assemble in your bases outside. A clear statement of your intention regarding your forces in Namibia might be helpful here.

SWAPO—As I said in the beginning the question of restriction inside or outside Namibia is covered in the SYG’s report. All our forces in Namibia should be confined to base but we see no reason to talk about leaving them there or bringing them out. When the ceasefire is signed, we will be able to tell our forces to obey. We don’t want these people to lie around Namibia so that when the ceasefire is violated SWAPO will be blamed. So we are saying the UN should give them bases and even count their arms and ammunition. This was taken care of in the Secretary General’s report. We even went as far as bringing in the Front Line States. Now we are wondering why this matter is being reopened. This is one of the points where we are in full agreement with the proposal. Restriction of SWAPO forces to base in Namibia is included in the proposal and is the one and only correct option for us to choose. We will not have our forces lay down their arms or to leave Namibia. We are agreed with the Secretary General’s latest report that SWAPO forces inside Namibia should be restricted to base and would not be prepared to entertain either of the other two options which Van Well mentioned. If we are talking about no deviation from the plan, this is what we should do. You mentioned Angola which has scrupulously agreed to the ceasefire. If in the case of liaison offices you are talking about the same offices which are already there this is ok, but if there are to be new offices, you must be planning to bring in different people. When Waldheim told Neto on the phone of his proposal for liaison offices Neto replied that he did not understand English well and requested that the information be sent to him via telex. When the telex arrived, Neto understood that the SYG was referring to a military office and he rejected the idea. We also rejected. However, President Kaunda and Seretse Khama were told something different—they were told that the offices would be peopled by civilians. If there are to be civilians in the liaison offices, we would have no problem.

Vance—Do we understand then that you accept the idea of UN liaison offices in the Front Line States including Angola provided they are staffed by civilians?

SWAPO—We say this for SWAPO. We have said this before in Luanda.

Vance—But there could be communication between the civilians in Angola and UNTAG in Namibia.

SWAPO—Do you mean the UNTAG military in Namibia?

Vance—No, civilians.

Stirn—Time is pressing and something must be done now. We are not trying to renegotiate anything. We agree with the UN decision and are just trying to implement their principles. Experience shows that it is important to agree in advance on the details of implementation. We must achieve a situation such that everyone can be confident of fair implementation and there will be no misunderstanding. You took the action you deemed necessary, and it took you where you wanted to be. We have no problem with this in principle. You should now consider, in light of the political process, whether there is still a need for armed SWAPO forces inside Namibia. Will this be good for you in Namibia during the political process or would it be useful to have 200–300 SWAPO people monitored in Namibia under arms? On the other hand, might it not be more to your advantage to have your forces outside Namibia so that you would be prepared to take further action if it appeared necessary.

SWAPO—It does seem that, in spite of our repeated statements, the stand of the Five does not take account of SWAPO’s position regarding restriction to base. The plan does not talk of confining SWAPO troops to base in Angola or Zambia. It was never discussed that SWAPO armed forces should leave Namibia. We are now being confronted with a tactical move to accommodate the South African desire to have SWAPO troops outside Namibia. This amounts to a renegotiation of the proposal and we do not think that this is advisable. We have never accepted monitoring outside by UNTAG nor SWAPO troops leaving Namibia and our position on these matters has not changed. In addition you must consider that there is a war on in Namibia. The idea of a ceasefire as a first necessary step recognizes this. We originally did not want the South African forces to remain in Namibia during the transitional process. Comrade President Nujoma used to insist on this. Now if the presence of SWAPO armed forces during the transitional period might constitute a hindrance to the electoral process how about the presence of South African forces? We cannot wish the present reality in Namibia out of existence. It was agreed that there is need for restriction of troops in Namibia and the case should be closed on that.

Vance—I think we understand your position very well. Do any of my colleagues have any questions.

Jamieson—Is it then a fact that you want to stay with the monitoring by UNTAG of your forces in Namibia? You want to stay with that position and the other alternatives are of no interest to you at all?

SWAPO—The other options are not solutions.

Owen—Let us make clear if you accept restriction to your bases outside Namibia under your agreement with the Front Line States. You don’t accept UNTAG monitoring outside Namibia, but do you accept a similar role for the Front Line?

SWAPO—I do not understand the need for the question, as SWAPO has agreed to the ceasefire and the Frontline States have given specific undertakings to you and the Secretary General in this regard. We do not foresee problems which would necessitate a public statement on this. We do not accept the concept.

Vance—Paragraph 12 of the SYG’s report of Feb 26 says that all SWAPO forces in neighboring countries will be restricted to base and you say you accept the SYG’s report.

SWAPO—It is not an either/or situation. We disagreed with paragraph 11 of the SYG’s report and intended to bring large numbers of our forces into Namibia. Now, however, we have dropped that and only talk about our forces already inside. The Secretary General’s report says that there shall be no monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia and this is correct. I think the recent formulation is stretching the point and this is one of our reservations on this.

Young—You said something a minute ago which could be very important. You said that no SWAPO troops will be infiltrated into Namibia, in effect, after the ceasefire. If by that you mean there will be no movement of troops from outside Namibia into Namibia we could perhaps support this with South Africa.

SWAPO—We dropped our demands for a three-week delay between the declaration of the ceasefire and its implementation and we have also dropped the idea of bringing in troops after the ceasefire.

Owen—Are you prepared to stop your infiltrating prior to implementation of the ceasefire?

SWAPO—No.

Young—But South Africa is likely to mount a major military effort to stop you and there could be some major military battles just before the ceasefire takes effect.

SWAPO—Either one has a ceasefire or one does not.

Young—We could interpret the delay between the declaration and the implementation of the ceasefire as a period needed for SWAPO and South Africa to inform their troops of its terms. If SWAPO could then view the ceasefire as being in effect from the time they agreed to it and use the interim period only to inform your troops while halting infiltration, this would be a big help. You should talk with the SYG on this. This might also help us to address the potential problem of South African bombing of your outside bases during this interim period.

Owen—Also we must clarify the question if SWAPO accepts paragraph 12 of the SYG’s Feb 26 report.

SWAPO—Suppose we wanted to send 200 of our troops to school as students. That paragraph would tie them to artificial restrictions.

Owen—No it wouldn’t. They would no longer be armed forces in that situation and there would be no problem there.

SWAPO—They are either armed forces in bases or they are not. What is the problem here?

Owen—Failure to restrict your forces to base after declaration of a ceasefire would permit your people to develop new bases along the border. South Africa fears this. As we have been unable to get UNTAG monitoring, we have had to accept the Frontline undertaking. It is extremely important that you let them carry out their undertaking and that you not establish new bases along the border.

SWAPO—Let us return to the statement in the Luanda document. In any case, according to the plan, there should be no monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia but the Front Line has promised that the ceasefire will be scrupulously observed. We can send our people to school as students under this. Why not take the Front Line’s word?

Vance—The distinction is whether your people are armed. If so they should be restricted to base.

SWAPO—I think that the Luanda statement is the best formula here.

Owen—I do not. You may be associated with the Luanda statement, but South Africa is not. We are trying to get everyone associated with the Secretary General’s report. We can hardly tell South Africa that you have agreed to the letter of the plan if there is a disagreement on the first sentence of paragraph 12.

SWAPO—There is a question of confidence here; of trust. This questions our sincerity when we say that we will observe the ceasefire. After all, what guarantee do we have that South African forces, as they withdraw, will not interfere with the electoral process?

Young—It is not a question of confidence or trust. You said that you agree with the Secretary General’s report. For the first hour of this meeting, both of us were saying that we agree with the SYG’s report. As long as you still say that you agree, we have no problem.

SWAPO—As long as it doesn’t imply that we promise anything regarding restriction of SWAPO forces outside Namibia as a result of the reinterpretation of the plan by the SYG, we agree.

Young—But questions of the movement of troops and the establishment of new bases during the ceasefire period would establish new elements which go well beyond the terms of the SYG’s report.

SWAPO—We do not accept that portion of the SYG’s report which includes restriction of our troops outside Namibia. We do not ask South Africa to restrict their troops inside South Africa. There is no justification for asking us to do this outside Namibia.

Owen—If you insist upon this, South Africa will want to interpret paragraph 11 of the SYG’s report to mean that there should be no SWAPO forces under arms in Namibia monitored or not. Do you want to trade off on this?

SWAPO—But our position is in keeping with the proposal on this subject.

McHenry—Do you, under your interpretation of the ceasefire, feel that you would be permitted to establish new bases near the border? If so, you can hardly expect others to observe the ceasefire.

SWAPO—We have said that we will observe the ceasefire scrupulously. We are not going to try to throw the South Africans out of Namibia.

Owen—If you hold to your objections in paragraph 12 and South Africa insists upon its interpretation of paragraph 11, are you prepared to make a trade off?

SWAPO—Monitoring of SWAPO forces inside Namibia, as described in para 11 of the SYG’s report, is provided for in the plan.

Jamieson—So is the restriction of SWAPO forces outside Namibia.

SWAPO—Where is this provided for in the plan?

Owen—It was always our interpretation that the plan provided for the restriction of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. The question of the treatment of SWAPO forces inside Namibia only arose when it became a problem what to do with armed SWAPO personnel in the country. Again I have to ask whether you want to trade off on these two issues?

SWAPO—I’m not sure I understand the sequence here. First the plan applied to our forces outside and then outside but not inside or was it inside but not outside and now only inside? (laughter)

Owen—We are not trying to renegotiate anything. We can accept the SYG’s report. We thought you could also. But apparently you cannot live with the first sentence of paragraph 12. South Africa cannot live with paragraph 11. We would prefer that you accept all of the SYG’s report. This would make it easier for us.

SWAPO—If anything was ever said indicating that SWAPO accepted restriction to base of its forces outside of Namibia, this was very wrong.

Jamieson—My memory is quite clear on the negotiating sessions where this subject was discussed. Many of your own spokesmen mentioned that you had no bases inside Namibia. Yet you agreed to the restriction of SWAPO to base therefore you must have been referring to SWAPO bases outside Namibia.

Van Well—We know that you have bases outside Namibia and that they are under attack by South African forces. We believe you when you say that you will observe the ceasefire. Is it perhaps the word “restricted” that bothers you in this formulation? Could you live with “remains in bases” as a voluntary undertaking on your part?

SWAPO—Obviously the aspect of compelling us to stay in our bases is disturbing, but I am concerned at the misunderstanding of our position on this subject. We would never have agreed to anything including restriction to base of our forces outside Namibia.

Vance—We are running way over our appointed time. I believe we have identified one area on which we have strong differences and we will have to come back to this in future meetings.

Vance

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, USUN, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.
2. Waldheim’s February 26 report, which served as the working settlement proposal. See footnote 4, Document 103.