97. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- The Jorden Mission to Central America
The situation in Nicaragua is deteriorating very rapidly.2 As a result of conversations between our Ambassador and several opposition groups, these leaders recognize the urgency of a unifying effort on their part, and yesterday designated three people as the leaders of [Page 269] the opposition.3 They also urged an international mediation effort for humanitarian purposes,4 and the State Department has responded today by urging Somoza to “accept mediation and seek an enduring resolution of the crisis.”5
The opposition has made clear that they will not negotiate with Somoza, and indeed the first and most important step in negotiations should be the resignation of Somoza. To them, he is the problem; Somoza is the reason why the Sandinistas are as strong as they are today. We agree with that assessment; Somoza must step down soon, or else the Sandinistas stand a very good chance of discrediting moderate opposition and seizing power. If Somoza were to resign and be replaced by moderates, like these three leaders, with the institutions in place, we believe that the Sandinista support would decline, their hardcore forces contained and a moderate solution enhanced.
The critical ingredient at this time is the nature of the international mediation effort. To be effective, we believe that the USG needs to be involved but we should not be out in front. We are sending Ambassador Bill Jorden to visit the Central American Presidents (and ultimately perhaps others as well) to exchange analyses of the situation and seek their leadership and support for international mediation.6 Ambassador [Page 270] Jorden will not have instructions to support the removal of Somoza. However, it is important to recognize that that is the direction that all these efforts are leading and, rather than slide into such a policy decision via cables, I believe it is important to have a clear-cut policy decision on this issue.
At an SCC Meeting earlier this week,7 Warren Christopher outlined three options:
—We remain passive and seek to position ourselves to earn the support of whoever survives the current struggle;
—We support Somoza in overcoming the current crisis with a view toward seeking a more orderly transition of power to more moderate elements sometime in the future; or
—We can support a mediation effort aimed at bringing the new coalition of moderate forces into power now in an effort to control the Sandinistas.
The discussion in the SCC and intervening developments have made clear that the first option will in all likelihood result in a radical regime and increased bloodshed. Similarly, the downward spiral of violence and polarization makes the second alternative impractical in the judgment of the SCC principals. It is therefore the SCC’s recommendation that we pursue the latter course, making every effort to keeping the Latin American countries and, in particular, the Nicaraguans themselves, out in front. However, our support is crucial. For good or ill, our influence and importance are such that a transfer of power to moderate elements in Nicaragua in this time of crisis will not take place without American behind-the-scenes support.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the basic policy of seeking mediation with the view toward the transition to a more moderate government in Nicaragua.8
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 1/77–11/78. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent through Brzezinski, who did not initial the memorandum. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Carter’s evening reading for September 13 contained an item prepared by ARA/CEN, noting that Vaky had briefed the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Nicaragua and “found a general consensus that a mediation effort initiated or supported by the United States was urgent.” Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “I agree that we should consider this quickly.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 33, Nicaragua: 9/13–30/78)↩
- In telegram 4342 from Managua, September 15, the Embassy reported that Nicaragua had been placed under martial law for thirty days as the Nicaraguan Government “combats the current wave of disturbances.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780375–0297) In telegram 4369 from Managua, September 15, the Embassy reported that Solaun had delivered a diplomatic note to Somoza “requesting that GON take measures to evacuate US citizens and their families from the cities and surrounding areas of Leon, Esteli, and Chinandega as well as any other areas in Nicaragua where the lives of U.S. cits [citizens] might be in danger.” Solaun also suggested that Somoza declare a ceasefire in these areas that had witnessed heavy fighting between the Sandinistas and the National Guard. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780376–1136) Also see Karen DeYoung, “Nicaraguan Troops Shell Rebel-Held City,” Washington Post, September 16, 1978, p. A1.↩
- In telegram 4341 from Managua, September 14, the Embassy reported that Alfonso Robelo had informed Solaun, on an “extremely confidential basis, that the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) had appointed him, Sergio Ramirez (Group of 12) and Rafael Cordova Rivas (Union of Democratic Liberation—UDEL) to represent FAO in any contact with Carazo.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780374–1263) See also Karen DeYoung, “Somoza’s Foes Claim Unity,” Washington Post, September 15, 1978, p. A1.↩
- Solaun notified Vaky in telegram 4345 from Managua, September 14, that Ramirez, Rivas, and Robelo, speaking for the “opposition,” had appealed for “immediate international assistance to end violence and help victims and will negotiate mediated political truce without preconditions.” Solaun noted the “key factor” behind the opposition’s appeal was the Nicaraguan Government’s “use of aircraft against dissidents in population centers, arrest of oppositionists or their family members, deaths of some well-connected youths in unclear circumstances, the GON’s imposition of martial law (which opposition believes will be used to hide barbarous acts) and lastly, the indication that insurgency in some cases appears to have gotten out of control of FSLN as well as GON.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780374–1124) The next day, in telegram 4373 from Managua, the Embassy reported that Solaun had received a written “appeal for mediation,” which represented the “united thinking of a number of majority groups.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Cables: 9/11/78–9/16/78)↩
- Hodding Carter made the statement urging Somoza to “accept mediation” during the September 15 daily press briefing at the Department of State. (Telegram 234535 to Managua, September 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780376–0586)↩
- In telegram 235983 to multiple Latin American posts, September 16, the Department informed Ambassadors that Jorden would be dispatched to the region “for the purpose of trying to stimulate and assist in the organization of an effective multilateral mediation effort in Nicaragua” and instructed them to seek host government participation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Cables: 9/11/78–9/16/78)↩
- See Document 95.↩
- Carter indicated his approval and initialed below the approval line.↩