Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

95. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 12, 1978, 2:35–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to Nicaragua

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
  • Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
  • Ambassador David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

• Defense

  • Stanley Resor, Under Secretary for Policy
  • Mike Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary

• JCS

  • Lt. General J.A. Wickham, Director, Joint Staff
  • Brigadier General James H. Johnson, Deputy Director, Current Operations

• DIA

  • Rear Admiral W.D. Robertson, Vice Director for Operations
  • Edward Heaton, Analyst

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • [name and title not declassified] National Foreign Assessment Center

• White House

  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Robert Pastor

MINUTES OF MEETING

David Aaron opened the meeting and explained its purpose: to examine the current situation in Nicaragua and assess options that may be available to minimize the damage to U.S. interests and indeed to advance our interests. He asked Christopher for an assessment, and Christopher turned to Pete Vaky.

Situation in Nicaragua

Vaky explained that the situation in Nicaragua is one in which there is fairly widespread opposition to Somoza’s continuing in power involving many groups. This opposition does not have much organization or program; the principal point of unity among all the groups, which range from the Church to the Sandinistas, is opposition to Somoza’s continued rule. Nonetheless, the opposition has been growing. Somoza says that he does not intend to leave, and that the alternative to his rule is chaos. Parts of the opposition include the Sandinistas, whose recent raids indicate a surprising capacity for independent action. Vaky believes that the purpose of the raid was to show moderates that peaceful opposition to Somoza won’t work, and that the Sandinistas are increasingly a legitimate voice. As time passes, the opposition will increasingly turn to the Sandinistas as the only group who offers the possibility of overthrowing Somoza. Somoza can hang onto power for a long time, but only by using increasingly repressive measures. It is possible that within a couple of weeks the Sandinistas will be able to strike again. The longer violence continues, the fewer the options for finding a middle position. A solution apparently will not be generated internally.

Vaky said that the Central Americans’ mediation effort, which we had placed so much hope in, is collapsing. Nor does he believe that the OAS will be able to move on the issue either, since a two-thirds vote is necessary.

The one power, in Vaky’s mind, which everyone is looking to, is the United States. The only chance for negotiated agreement is if we stand behind it and push it. The question is should we do that, or should we let nature take its course?

Aaron asked Turner to comment on the current conflict and on the Sandinistas.

Turner said that with regard to the current military situation, the National Guard remains loyal and 6,000 strong. As for the Sandinistas, it is divided up into three groups, with approximately 1200 guerrillas. The Sandinistas have caused a great many problems for the Guard, and presently have four cities under siege. Esteli and Masay have been placed under martial law for the next 30 days,² and the National Guard intends to clean these two up, but Turner does not believe that it will be able to completely assert its control in the four cities at this time without unnecessarily jeopardizing the security of Managua. Still, the National Guard remains unified. If, however, there are defections from the Guard, it will take a much longer time to regain control.

The Sandinistas and the Moderates

With regard to outside support for the Sandinistas, Turner said that they do not get that much outside support, except for some guidance and training from Cuba. As for the general strike, it appears to be much more effective today, and is supported by business and the moderate opposition, which he then described. There is some question about how the moderates will react to a U.S. mediation initiative, and it probably depends on what kind of guarantees the United States will be able to give. There are some who believe that an expression of concern by the United States would be sufficient, while others believe that only an absolute set of guarantees to Somoza will work. In short, there is a real danger that if the United States commits itself to active mediation, that we could split the moderates down the middle. For one thing, we don’t know who will speak for the moderates.

Turner summarized by saying that if we intervene, the problem becomes how do we force the coalescence among the different moderate groups. The extent to which we will be able to do this will be contingent on how convincing we are that we intend to get Somoza to depart. On the other hand, to the extent that we convince the moderates that we are trying to get Somoza to leave, we are going to decrease the chances of obtaining Somoza’s cooperation for a mediation effort. In answer to a question from David Aaron, Turner said that the moderates are divided, not with regard to the fact of our getting involved, but much more on the effectiveness of our getting involved, and what that will mean for the future political situation in Nicaragua. He also said that one shouldn’t expect Latin American support for any effort on our part; even those who would support the United States would probably do so very quietly. Some might condemn the U.S.

Vaky said that the Foreign Minister of Mexico had called him to ask when we would be getting rid of Somoza. Christopher and Pastor interjected that the Mexicans would probably be the first ones to condemn us for intervening.

Vaky said that no one has yet talked to the opposition groups in the sense of trying to get them to coalesce. It is possible that merely talking to them will encourage a process whereby this would become possible.

Armacost asked why the Central American initiative has not yet gotten off the ground, and Vaky said that the Presidents themselves—Romero, Lucas, and Paz—are not very able, are friends of Somoza, and suspicious of Carazo. Furthermore, he believes that Somoza probably got to these Presidents first, and convinced them that he was the best guarantee against a Communist take-over.

General Wickham said that he was prepared to address the problem from a military standpoint, and would like to reinforce what Turner had already said. He spoke today to the Commander of SOUTHCOM on the secure line and he believes that Somoza will get through this crisis. The National Guard is fully able to dominate the situation; they may not even need any military equipment. Wickham said that there were 18 U.S. military in the country. Pan American Airlines is still flying in, although not at night. And our Ambassador hasn’t even pulled the chain and asked U.S. citizens to leave. In short, Somoza has the situation under control.

In response to a question from Aaron about which part of the Sandinistas are in control, [less than 1 line not declassified] Vaky said that the Tercerarios were seemingly in control right now, and that they were different from the other Sandinista groups in that they were willing to mix with non-Marxist groups. Many of those in the Tercerarios are sons of well-to-do families; and indeed some are children of the Group of Twelve. In response to a further question from Aaron, Vaky said that the Group of Twelve is down to ten; they are a mixed group, including businessmen, a priest, and lawyers.

The Options

Christopher then surveyed the options and also where we have come from. Up until a couple of weeks ago, we have pursued a policy of neutrality and non-intervention. We have tried to walk a fine line. Our Ambassador has had instructions to this effect, which he has followed, sometimes too rigorously. We can consider this policy of neutrality and non-intervention as the first option.

The second option is to dissociate ourselves from the Somoza regime. We could bring home our Military Group, eliminate economic aid, and perhaps pull our Ambassador out. Christopher said, however, that he believes that none of us think this option would be very effective.

A third option would be to offer more support to Somoza than we have in the past. We ought to think about this earlier rather than later. If we are faced, down the road, with a hard decision which is actually between Somoza and the Sandinistas, we may have to support him. Still, over the long haul, we don’t think this is a good option either for pragmatic or for idealistic reasons.

The fourth option is mediation and to try to see if the opposition forces can be encouraged to coalesce. There are two variations under this option: (a) Mediation by others with encouragement and support by the United States; or (b) Mediation by ourselves. We have veered toward 4(a) with our support of the Central American mediation effort. Clearly, 4(a) is preferable to 4(b), but ultimately, the issue we will have to face is which of the two is more effective. The problem with 4(b) is that it has us doing exactly what we have said we would never do: to tell the Nicaraguans how to organize their government. This is an unattractive option. Still, the reason it is plausible is because the United States has historically played such a large role in the region. Christopher said that he believes that we have not played out 4(a) sufficiently. Over time, we should play that out more, putting U.S. prestige firmly behind the idea of a mediation effort.

How should we do that? One way would be to send someone from here to talk to the Central Americans about the situation there and to collect some facts. If we send someone to Nicaragua, it would be much more than as a fact-finder. It will look as if we are doing the mediation ourselves, and we should avoid that at this point. Therefore, he recommended that we send someone to the Central American countries, but not to Nicaragua, and perhaps also to a few interested neighboring countries.

Aaron asked whether there was complete agreement around the table on the analytic point that there is increasing polarization in Nicaragua, that the situation is deteriorating, and that over time, we will have fewer options.

General Wickham said that from strictly a military standpoint, the National Guard is strong. If, however, we were to pull the rug out from under them, it would hurt the National Guard and seriously erode their stability. He suggested that we give some idea to helping Somoza and the National Guard, and then after the crisis is over, we could “knock his head” to get him into line. Wickham urged great care in dealing with the National Guard in the future.

Aaron asked whether the loyalty in the National Guard is transferable to someone other than Somoza.

Turner said that it was possible that it was transferable to Somoza’s step-brother, Jose, or to his son.

Vaky said that if there were a constitutional succession, the National Guard would naturally participate. Furthermore, he believes that loyalty is indeed transferable. However, if there is a continuation of violence and the National Guard is forced to shoot kids, this will definitely erode the institution’s capability. They may then reach the point where they feel that the National Guard will suffer unless Somoza goes.

Newsom asked what would be the outcome if we chose 4(a) and sent someone to confer with all of Central America except Nicaragua. What kind of impact would that have on Somoza if we did such a conspicuous move toward the other Central American countries and excluded Nicaragua?

Vaky said that it was o.k. as long as we continued to communicate with Somoza.

Turner said that if we support Somoza it is a downward spiral, leading to more and more repression and stronger and stronger support for the Sandinistas. He said that it would be a while before Somoza was very weak, but it would eventually happen. Robertson agreed with that assessment. [less than 1 line not declassified] if mediation were to occur, we would have to be very clear about the signals we send.

Vaky said that Somoza has been lecturing us precisely because he has been trying to win us over.

Aaron summarized the discussion. He said Christopher had presented the options which we will have to face. There was an important choice between three broad courses of action: first, to not involve ourselves with regard to the outcome. This includes the first two options mentioned by Christopher. Secondly, we could support Somoza. Thirdly, we could recognize that Somoza’s remaining in power will risk genuine radical change in the region, and we should take steps to avoid that. These are the three broad courses of action. For tactical reasons, it is conceivable that we may take one of these positions while still supporting the objective of another. In other words, we could support Somoza temporarily, even though we had in mind the third option.

With regard to the next steps, Aaron said that if we choose number three, there are two or three things we need to do. We need to get a more coherent picture from interested countries in the region. This is extremely important, also to insure that we obtain as much support as possible should we choose to shift from option 4(a) to 4(b). If we did, we would want to make sure, for example, that Panama and Venezuela were completely behind us.

Newsom asked just how interested Venezuela and Costa Rica were in a mediation effort, and Vaky responded that we were being pushed by Perez, but we were stimulating the Costa Ricans.

Newsom asked if the Central Americans’ initiative doesn’t get off the ground, and the OAS gets bottled up, will the states around Nicaragua be very concerned? (At this point David Aaron left, and Christopher chaired the meeting.)

Vaky said that if the situation deteriorates dramatically, the other Central Americans will get involved. Pastor said that there were already reports today that the Salvadoreans and the Hondurans had sent volunteers to fight with the Nicaraguans. These reports are not confirmed, but one cannot exclude the possibility that such volunteers would be sent if the National Guard were deeply in trouble.

Christopher said that if the situation deteriorated, we would be hearing a lot of noise from Venezuela and Panama as well. He said that we really can’t afford to wait much longer without jeopardizing the moderate opposition in Nicaragua.

Turner said that it is at least conceivable that as the situation deteriorates, the moderates may get sufficiently afraid that they would have a greater incentive to organize themselves better. Vaky said that the different moderate groups would view the deteriorating situation differently and prescribe different solutions. And Newsom said the propensity for people to rationalize themselves out of a choice in a difficult situation is very great. This could continue to happen until there are no options left.

Christopher asked Resor what were his ideas, and Resor said that he didn’t have any comment.

Christopher then summarized by saying that there appeared to be a consensus to recommend option 4(a), making it clear of our support for a mediation effort. We should send someone down to Central America to probe why the Central American initiative has not been more successful, and perhaps to try to get it moving as well. There are many questions for that person to answer. We should also consider the possibility of bringing our person to Costa Rica to discuss with the person who would be in charge of the mediation effort there what the next steps should be. Christopher recommended an additional instruction—to step up our contacts with moderate groups within Nicaragua.

Christopher said that option 4(b) would be played by our sending someone there to deliver a message to Somoza face-to-face. If we went this route, and we may have to recommend that at some point, we will have to be very certain about the conditions which would be outlined for Somoza. But we are not there yet. That option—4(b)—has so many unattractive qualities to it that we don’t want to do it unless we really have to.

Heaton said that Somoza had already told our Ambassador that he would throw him out if he ever brought that message.

Vaky said that Somoza had to say that, and furthermore our Ambassador cannot be the one who does that. We will have to send someone else. Vaky said that there was another wrinkle that we should look at. Somoza, of course, has had open-heart surgery. We ought to seriously consider what will happen if he has a heart attack, or if something happens to him. We ought to examine things on a contingency basis.

In answer to a question from Robertson, Christopher said that our goal is to try to get Somoza to understand the need to pave the way towards a moderate solution. Robertson asked whether Somoza had pledged that he would do that in 1981. Vaky said that the problem is that the opposition will not wait until 1981.

Aaron returned and said that if someone would be going to discuss these matters with leading Central Americans, he should also talk to Somoza. If we took option 4(b)—though we are not ready for that now—then we would have to talk to Somoza directly. But regardless, Aaron feels that we should see Somoza, or else it will look too much as if we are trying to mobilize international support against him by going to all of the capitals except Managua. He does not think it is advisable to talk with different groups when he is there in Nicaragua. For example, he wouldn’t see the Group of Twelve. The only point would be for the person to touch base with Somoza before and after in order to make it appear as if it is a fact-finding trip throughout Central America.

New Developments

Aaron then described several new developments, including the alleged bombing by Nicaragua of the Costa Rican border and Somoza’s press conference.³ He then asked how did these affect the next steps?

Vaky said that a similar situation arose in October, and the Permanent Council of the OAS sent down a fact-finding mission. The incident does open the way for active U.S. intervention through the OAS.

Christopher said that he believes there is much more advantage to us working through a multilateral institution towards a multilateral solution than if we do things on our own. In answer to a question from Aaron, Vaky said that it is possible to have an American participate in an OAS Peace-Keeping mission, although he didn’t think it was likely that this mission would be able to be sent to Panama. Aaron said that he thought it would be important to touch base with Venezuela and Torrijos, and perhaps we should think about two missions: one for the OAS and one by us. Newsom pointed out that an OAS mission would be constrained from interfering in Nicaragua, or getting involved in any mediation effort.

Vaky said that he interpreted this latest development as an attempt by Somoza to lash out at the Sandinistas, and he did not rule out the possibility that Somoza may want to bring the temple down with him. It increased the likelihood that Panama and Venezuela will urge an OAS mediation effort. As for us, he believes that we should call for an immediate cease-fire and a fact-finding mission.

Aaron concluded the meeting by stressing the extreme confidentiality of the exchange. Christopher said that on the record, the U.S. position is still one of encouraging the Central Americans’ mediation initiative, and we can stick with that.

Armacost asked what the trip by the U.S. person would mean in terms of option 4(b). Aaron said that even if the President decided on option 4(b), still we would want to seek international support. Even if the Central Americans do not want to play the frontal role, we will need their support.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 33, Nicaragua: 9/1–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Telegram 4263 from Managua, September 11, reported that violence was continuing in several Nicaraguan cities and that the Nicaraguan Government had declared martial law for thirty days in the departments of Esteli and Masaya. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780370–0264)
3. See Document 98.