Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State¹

San José, September 13, 1978, 1952Z

3898. Subj: Nicaragua MFM. Ref: State 231820.²

1. Summary: Carazo is pleased that we have acted quickly to seek a strong OAS response to the current situation and that we have outlined the steps we would like to see emerge from MFM. He still holds out hope for some kind of mediation, but no longer finds it either politically attractive domestically or most feasible that such a move proceed in a CA context. The GOCR is intent, however, on pressing other CA countries to get behind the OAS MFM call.

2. Carazo agrees completely on the need to have a strong show of support for convocation under Article 59 and was gratified that we are taking quick and forceful action to help obtain such support. He said that Costa Rican Ambassadors in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala have been instructed to press the governments in those countries to vote in favor of convocation, but Costa Rica does not now plan demarches in other LA capitals. Carazo also expressed agreement with the listing provided of USG views of what an MFM might achieve (Para 6, reftel).³ He endorsed specifically the contemplated OAS fact-finding commission to Nicaragua and Costa Rica; he did not react to the phrasing of an MFM “call for ending incursions from one territory into another”.

3. With respect to a possible OAS call for support for some kind of mediation, Carazo said that the events of Sept. 12⁴ make it difficult politically or even useful for Costa Rica again to lead or even engage in a mediation effort. (On the previous day, after I had informed Carazo of Ambassador Solaun’s report of a positive response among Nicaraguan business and industrial leaders to the CA initiative,⁵ Carazo said it would not surprise him to learn that Somoza had authorized the Sept. 12 attack in good part because of his displeasure over such support evoked by the GOCR mediation initiative.

4. Carazo concluded that other Central Americans, with the possible exception of Honduras, had shown themselves finally to be opposed to Central American mediation. He was aware from contacts in Guatemala that different officials there were expressing differing views on the initiative, but believed that the final outcome would be distinctly negative. In Honduras, he said, there was more flexibility, in part because Honduras shared the border problem with Nicaragua. In any event, Carazo said, Costa Rican leadership of a mediation effort following the Sept. 12, incident would now be unacceptable to the Costa Rican public. However, he still hoped that some kind of mediation effort might prosper and said that Costa Rica would support mediation by any useful combination of countries were that possibility to arise through an OAS call for external mediation.⁶

Weissman

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Nicaragua Cables: 9/11–16/78. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent Immediate to Caracas, Santo Domingo, Lima, Mexico City, Bogotá, Quito, Bridgetown, Kingston, Paramaribo, Panama City, and Managua. At the top of the page Pastor wrote: “The death of CR Int.,” a reference to Carazo’s efforts at mediation in Nicaragua. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 231820 to multiple Latin American posts, September 13, the Department issued instructions to Embassies to “exert every effort” to ensure host nation support for the MFM convocation at the OAS. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780372–0758)
3. Paragraph 6 noted the U.S. view that the MFM should “express hemispheric concern; authorize the sending of a fact-finding mission, along the lines of the fact-finding mission the Permanent Council sent last October to Nicaragua and Costa Rica; call for ending incursions from one territory to another; and underline support for the mission of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and a call for a prompt report by it. (Ibid.)
4. See footnote 2, Document 331.
5. In telegram 4286 from Managua, September 12, the Embassy reported that Solaun had met with representatives of the National Development Institute, the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industries, and the Association of Automobile Distributors and that “all groups were in favor of the Carazo mediation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780371–0193)
6. Pastor underlined the portion of the paragraph beginning with the word “would” and ending with the word “mediation.”