Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

5. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 15, 1977

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Habib
  • Ambassador Todman
  • Janet Ruben, USOAS (notetaker)

• GUATEMALA

  • Foreign Minister Molina

SUBJECT

• BILATERAL BETWEEN GUATEMALA AND US

The conversation started with an expression of concern by the Foreign Minister for the Secretary’s statement in support of the elimination of Article 8 of the OAS Charter.² Secretary Vance noted that the OAS is the only international organization which has such an Article in its Charter. Molina thinks that territorial disputes should be resolved before new states are accepted for membership.

They then went on to discuss the problem of mini-state membership in the OAS. Vance said that he feels strongly about the universality of membership. Molina said that if you extend universality too far, you end up with domination by the mini-states. For example, Dominica would have the same vote as the U.S. and Brazil in the OAS, were Dominica to be a member. He could not offer a solution to the problem of the mini-states, but referred to an idea which came up at the U.N.: that of relating voting power to the number of shares owned, as in a private corporation. Vance said that that system would never work at the U.N. because once the charter has been written, it is difficult to change. Molina agreed, noting that once application for membership in an international organization has been presented, no one is going to deny the country membership.

Vance asked how many new islands would be affected by a new policy on mini-states. Habib interjected that there would be four or more island-states in next two years: Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, and St. Lucia. He added that Grenada, Barbados, and Surinam, all very small, already are members. Both men agreed on the need for a study on the situation, but neither could propose a solution. Molina did feel, however, that it was important not to end up with an organization composed of a silent majority of “Mini-States”.

Then they went on to discuss Belize which was the main issue in this bilateral. Molina reminded Vance that it is a very touchy subject for Guatemala. He referred to a Guatemalan constitutional provision written in 1945 which gives the reasons for the Guatemalan claim to the Belize territory. Short of being able to obtain the re-incorporation of Belize into Guatemala, which Guatemala considers a legitimate claim, Molina said that he would like to have some formula to resolve the issue which he would be able to use to persuade the Guatemalan public. Any acceptance of a different position than re-incorporation would require a change in the Guatemalan Constitution, he said. This would not be an easy process, but Guatemala does want to resolve the issue.

Vance expressed concern that the positions of Guatemala and Great Britain seem to be hardening and that inevitably this would lead to a collision course.³ Molina agreed that such a collision course would be a disaster, adding that Guatemala’s position is not inflexible. He said that Guatemala understands the position of Belize in the International community, where many are calling for independence for Belize.

Vance asked whether Guatemala would accept acquisition of territory up to less than the Monkey River. Molina stated that the Monkey River was the limit, and Vance asserted that if that is the case, then Guatemala is certainly on a collision course. He said that if Guatemala is willing to accept less territory, there would be a possibility of compromise.

At this point, Molina said that no concrete solution had been proposed so far. Vance asked what would happen if the British proposed some amount of territory less than up to the Monkey River and Molina hedged, saying that he did not know, and would have to see.

Habib interjected that Rowlands once had suggested the inclusion of rights to the territorial sea and access to the sea as one way to compensate Guatemala for giving up Belize. He asked whether this proposal were still alive. Molina said that it never amounted to anything and that this idea had been intimated but never formally presented. Habib suggested that the Moho River could be the limit for Guatemala under an alternative arrangement, and Molina answered that the territory between Guatemala and the Moho is mostly swamp land and not worth much. When Vance asked whether access to the seas was the most important factor for Guatemala, Molina replied that it was an important factor but only one of several. Habib said that the satisfaction of recognition of Guatemala’s territorial claim would be an important element in a settlement.

When Vance mentioned that there would be a meeting with Rowlands on July 6 and 7, Molina noted that he previously had told Rowlands that compromise would require sacrifice for both sides. He said that he would be happy to take a proposal to Guatemala for discussion, but that in any case the Guatemalans would not accept the idea of financial compensation.

Vance reiterated the importance of not letting positions get frozen at this point, reminding Molina that this would lead to an impasse which could easily lead to a military confrontation over Belize.

Molina went on to say that he had recently spoken with the Mexican Foreign Minister about the possibility of his mediating the dispute. They decided that this would not work because of Mexico’s own claim to a portion of the Belize territory.⁴ Vance then asked who would be able to mediate, and Molina replied that Vance would be an excellent mediator. Otherwise, he could see mediation by two or three people. Habib asked whether the OAS Secretary General could serve as mediator. Molina said that he would be fine as a friend of the parties, but that he would present a much less forceful image than the United States would in the resolution of the dispute.

Vance asked Molina’s opinion on another formula through which each party would choose one mediator, and those two people would choose a third. Molina’s reaction to this suggestion was positive. He recalled a boundary dispute some years ago between Guatemala and Honduras in which this system was used to resolve the problem. In that case, the third member of the arbitration commission chosen was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. When Habib asked whether the U.S. could mention these ideas to the British, Molina agreed. Habib emphasized the pressure of time and importance of prompt action, and Molina agreed. Molina said that he wanted to settle the dispute before the Guatemalan elections which are to take place next March. He went on to say that he knows that Britain has been exerting heavy pressure on other countries on its behalf and against Guatemala. This was done most recently at the Commonwealth Conference where he said pressure was exerted on the English-speaking Caribbean countries.⁵ He also said that the British have been exerting their influence on the non-aligned group and at the U.N. Habib asserted that it was better to keep the discussion of this issue out of the U.N., for he doubts that the U.N. could solve it.

Vance reiterated that he would not rule out an American as the third person on an arbitration panel. For example, he thought Arthur Goldberg would be an excellent arbitrator. Molina agreed that such an arbitration panel would be a solution, should direct negotiations fail. Habib pointed out that there is direct pressure, especially on this Labor Government for Great Britain to rid itself of its last colony. Molina then went on to say that if Belize should gain its independence, Guatemala would cooperate fully in development plans of the country and to insure that Belize established comfortable relations with the rest of Central America. Guatemala might even offer financial assistance to Belize. He emphasized, however, that Guatemala’s role in Belize’s development was not a condition for compromise on the whole problem. Vance summed up by saying that we would propose a compromise territorial solution to the British or a mediation panel if a negotiated settlement were not possible. He emphasized that he did not want to see someone in Central America pushed to the limit and then explode.

Todman meanwhile encouraged Molina to think of a territorial settlement below the Monkey River, saying that we were not proposing this, but that it should be kept in mind as a possible alternative.

Vance then asked Molina for his views on the maritime rules. Molina said that a new law was being discussed in Congress when he left last week. He urged the U.S. to be patient and said that a solution would soon evolve. Vance noted with enthusiasm that this was a good way to resolve the problem. Vance promised to be in touch before Molina’s meetings on July 6 with the British and Molina thanked the Secretary and said that this would be a big help.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 24, Guatemala: 2/77–12/78. Confidential. Approved by Special Assistant William Twaddell in S on July 11. The meeting took place in St. George’s, Grenada, where Vance was attending the OAS General Assembly meeting June 14–16.
2. On June 14, during the seventh regular General Assembly meeting of the OAS held in St. Georges, Grenada, Vance called for the elimination of Article 8 of the OAS Charter, which barred American States from joining the OAS if they had a border dispute with a current OAS member. See telegram Secto 6003 from Grenada, June 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770212–0907) Vance informed Carter in telegram Secto 6011 from Grenada, June 16, that the Caribbean delegations at the OAS “spoke in favor of Belize independence and Guatemala made a strong defense of its position.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2180)
3. In telegram 128822 to multiple posts, June 3, the Department reported that the British had “decided to move for Belizean independence as soon as possible” and that they were prepared to take the risk that the Guatemalans might respond militarily. Rowlands asked the United States to support the British decision, and Habib offered to consult Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770199–0129) In telegram 134268 to London and Guatemala City, June 10, Habib noted that Vance wished “to await the outcome of any Mexican mediation effort” and the UK-Guatemalan talks scheduled for July 6–7 before deciding on the U.S. position regarding Belize. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070–0687) In telegram Tosec 60011/138379 to the Secretary’s delegation, June 16, Luers informed Vance that Owen did “not believe U.S. should take lead at OASGA in supporting Belizean independence, but would appreciate sympathetic and constructive support as appropriate for Caribbean Commonwealth initiative.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770212–1031)
4. Following its independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico claimed inheritance rights over northern Belize.
5. The Commonwealth meeting of Heads of Government met in London June 8–15 and issued a communiqué endorsing “early independence” for Belize and calling “upon all states to respect the right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, vol. XXIII, 1977, pp. 28503–28505)