Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

4. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, April 19, 1977

Belize Dispute: A More Active U.S. Role?

Issue for Decision

Should the U.S. lend a hand to help resolve the Belize dispute.

Setting

On April 1 you discussed with the British Foreign Secretary the possibility of having the U.S. attempt to ascertain the minimum Guatemalan territorial demand.² This memo lays out some of the options open to us. There is some time pressure as the next round of negotiations is set for late April or May.

Background/Analysis

Territory is the key to settlement. Guatemala insists that it must have a face-saving “slice”. The British say they cannot force Premier Price to give up more than a “token amount”, if that at all. The difference between a “slice” and a “token amount” has been exceedingly difficult to bridge.

Our Consul General in Belize believes that rather than cede territory as the price of independence, most Belizeans would prefer to remain a colony.

The Guatemalans are just entering a Presidential campaign in which being tough on Belize is a prerequisite of political life.³ It is our Embassy’s assessment that the Guatemalan military and political leadership is unwilling to face up to signing a compromise settlement—without a substantial cession—in the midst of the campaign. They want only to stretch out the negotiating process.

In addition, Exxon is actively exploring for oil in the southern sector of Belize, in the area where the British have hinted at being willing to offer some cession.

If negotiations fail, as seems likely, and the U.K. decides to begin the independence process, the centerpiece of British strategy will probably be the next UN General Assembly. They will probably try for an explicit UN Resolution calling on HMG to grant independence within some specified time period. They will have to back it up with some type of defense arrangement and will want to involve the U.S. in some concrete way.

The U.S. tried to mediate this dispute in 1965–68.⁴ Our proposals were rejected out of hand by both sides and used for several years as an excuse to avoid serious negotiations.

The Options

Option 1. Maintain our present policy of neutrality and no active U.S. involvement.

ARA would inform the British that we have carefully considered their request and have determined that a more active U.S. role at this time is unlikely to alter the negotiating process in any significant way.

Pro:

—Keeps up the pressure on both sides to face up to the hard compromises necessary if a negotiated settlement is ever to be reached.

—Our involvement is unlikely to change the equation in any meaningful way, and we may be tarred with the brush of failure if we enter the fray.

Con:

—Is not responsive to oft-stated (and refused) British and Guatemalan requests for a more active U.S. role.

—With overwhelming support in each of the last two UNGA’s, eventual independence for Belize is inevitable. Why is the U.S. not helping?

Option 2. Have our Ambassador in Guatemala call on the President and attempt to find out what their minimum territorial demand would be.

To assure ourselves of British seriousness, and to test whether agreement is possible, we may want to first ask the British to state privately to us their own maximum territorial position. If they are unwilling to provide the information, we may want to cut off our involvement.

Alternatively, we can approach only the Guatemalans. If they react positively to our approach and appear willing to talk seriously, and within a reasonable time frame, we could continue our efforts. We would make it clear to both sides that we are not committed beyond this initial fact-finding role. Subsequent to approaching both governments we could then decide whether to proceed further. One danger in this approach is that if the Guatemalan position remains inflexible the British may proceed to grant independence on the basis of our failed intervention in the negotiations.

Pro:

—Is responsive to the British request.

—Shows that we are concerned enough about the future of the area to at least try to help.

—May elicit from the Guatemalans a more realistic territorial position that could form the basis of a settlement.

Con:

—It will be difficult to limit our involvement to this one step. We might find ourselves drawn in as an active mediator with both sides depending on us to make the tough decisions and leaving them free to reject our proposals (as happened in 1968).

—One likely Guatemalan reaction would be that we are merely acting in behalf of the British. They might then confine themselves to repeating their already stated demand (about ¼ of Belize).⁵

—Alternatively, they might seize on this initiative as an indication of renewed U.S. involvement and because of their unwillingness to address the key issue try to string us along for as many months as possible.

Option 3. Promote an active mediatory effort by a “disinterested” third party such as OAS Secretary General Orfila.

This would be in keeping with President Carter’s stated hope last Thursday that the OAS would become more involved in such situations.⁶ In addition, you told the Guatemalan Foreign Minister in March that we would be talking to Orfila about this.⁷ It would also keep the U.S. out of the middle.

Orfila has already discussed this problem with the Guatemalans and the British, although neither sees him as a serious mediator at this point.

Pro:

—Build up the OAS as a regional, problem-solving body.

—The Guatemalans are aware of the weakness of their position. An impartial mediator may provide an “honorable” way out.

Con:

—The Belizeans would be highly skeptical that a “Latin” mediator would be impartial.

—Both the Belizeans and the Guatemalans would be free to reject the mediator’s proposals and blame him for the failure of the effort.

Recommendation:

ARA recommends Option 3. It offers some hope of success and would, at least, keep the U.S. out of the middle.⁸

ALTERNATIVELY, Option 1. It restates our position that a more active U.S. role is unlikely to change significantly the outcome of the negotiations.

ALTERNATIVELY, Option 2. We try to sound out the Guatemalan position, after having asked the British what their own maximum offer is.

OR, Option 2. We try to sound out the Guatemalan position without learning what the British maximum offer is.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770065–1634. Confidential. Sent through Habib. Drafted by Platt. Charles Bray initialed the memorandum on Todman’s behalf. A stamped notation indicates that Vance saw the memorandum.
2. Vance was in London March 31–April 1 to discuss the recent arms control talks in Moscow. A substantive record of his conversation with Owen regarding Belize was not found.
3. Guatemala held Presidential elections on March 5, 1978. See footnote 2, Document 26.
4. See footnote 2, Document 2.
5. Telegram 2263 from Guatemala City, April 14, noted Guatemala’s 1975 rejection of any settlement less than all territory south of the Monkey River line, or about ¼ of Belize. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770130–0538)
6. The text of Carter’s April 14 address before the Permanent Council of the OAS is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 33. See also Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 611–616.
7. See Document 3.
8. Vance’s assistant, Jackie Cahill, initialed Vance’s approval of Option 3 on April 22. However, citing Vance’s April 1 offer to Owen to “consider sounding out the Guatemalan minimum territorial demand,” telegram 102154 to Guatemala City, May 5, instructed Boster to ascertain Guatemala’s requirements without proposing that the U.S. Government assume the role of mediator. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770157–0438) In telegram 2896 from Guatemala City, May 10, Boster reported that Guatemala’s minimum territorial position remained the Monkey River. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770164–1203)