Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

494. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Security Assistance to El Salvador and Government of Nicaragua Involvement in Supplying Arms to Salvadoran Guerrillas

Issues for Decision:

1. Whether to expand at this time security assistance to El Salvador to include use of FMS credits for six helicopters and grant lethal equipment funded under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act.²

2. Whether to determine on the basis of recent intelligence that the Government of Nicaragua is supporting terrorism.

Background:

Issue I:

On December 18 we made clear to President Duarte that our resumption of military assistance was contingent on demonstrable progress in three areas: transfers within the military; reduction in the violence originating from the security forces; and rapid progress in the investigation of the murders of the four American churchwomen. Following the President’s decision on January 2 to permit some IMET to go forward we told Duarte we would shortly review the question of further assistance giving special emphasis to progress on the investigation of the churchwomen.³

The offensive of the past weekend confirmed that the leftist guerrillas have received a substantial supply of arms from abroad, including heavier weapons such as recoiless rifles and machine-guns. Although the government forces contained the offensive, they expended considerable material and lost their last transport helicopter. Their need for military assistance is now greater and more urgent.

Issue II:

[2 lines not declassified] Nicaraguan Government (GRN) involvement in supplying arms to Salvadoran insurgents. [2 lines not declassified] a rural airstrip at Papalonal, Nicaragua, is being used by DC–3 (C–47) and twin-engine Cessna aircraft to fly arms and munitions to Salvadoran insurgents. One of these Cessnas crashed in El Salvador on November 25. [3 lines not declassified] Efforts of this magnitude could not be undertaken, we believe, without the knowledge and approval of senior officials of the Nicaraguan Government.

This evidence is persuasive and it could be considered as coming close to meeting the standard of “conclusive” established for your determination last September. What remains unclear is the nature and extent of official Nicaraguan involvement. We still do not know the specific high-level officials involved or how they actually participate in the arms traffic. Nevertheless, the evidence could support a new finding by you under Section 536(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that the Government of Nicaragua (GRN) is supporting terrorism in El Salvador.

Analysis of the Issue:

We have combined these two issues because they are inter-related and because what is at stake in both cases is our overall strategy for the entire Central American region. El Salvador is the key to that strategy. What we seek is to assist the moderate military/civilian government of President Duarte to defeat the Marxist guerrillas and carry forward its reformist program. Such a victory will:

(a) protect an important flank for Honduras and enable it to get on with its plan to return to constitutional government in 1981;

(b) remove a major source of concern for Guatemala and encourage the Lucas government to curb violence and go for open elections in 1982; and

(c) force the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to reassess the direction of their revolution and the course they want to follow vis-a-vis Central American integration.

We therefore need to proceed with both issues in a manner which will advance our regional strategy.

Expanded Military Assistance

Progress on the three areas of concern to us have been mixed. Our primary concern, the investigation of the murders has been reasonably thorough and professional, although the investigation was stalled for two weeks during the holiday season. The Commission has developed some leads. The FBI plans to deliver to the Commission this week their assessment of the evidence obtained from the two autopsies performed and the visit of their technicians to El Salvador. The Salvadoran Embassy in Ottawa will interview the group of Canadian missionaries who talked with the women at the airport. President Duarte and Vice President Gutierrez have instructed the Foreign Ministry to ask the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to observe the investigating commission’s work. We will urge the IAHRC to do so when the request is received.

The military supply requirements of the Salvadoran armed forces have become greater and more urgent during the past month. The leftist guerrillas have received substantial supplies of arms and ammunition from Cuba and elsewhere and demonstrated during the past weekend that they know how to use them. In successfully containing the offensive the government forces expended supplies that will have to be replaced. Their most urgent need is for transport helicopters, having lost their last one. Although the need is clear, we question whether this military equipment should come exclusively from the U.S. We have not supplied any lethal equipment to El Salvador since 1977. They have waged a successful counterinsurgency campaign to date with relatively little non-lethal supply from the US. Although we are the best and fastest source of helicopters, they could obtain arms and ammunition from other sources. They would face funding problems, however.

Opposition to our military assistance to El Salvador is growing in this country, especially among religious, academic and human rights groups. Although Congress would probably go along with non-lethal equipment and the transport helicopters, arms and ammunition would be strongly opposed by many Democrats, especially in the House. We would be in for a very rough time.

Determination on Nicaraguan Support for Terrorism

Following extensive inter-agency deliberations in the SCC we have concluded that some concrete action on the new information is required. Our first step however should be a very strong demarche to the GRN and the Sandinista (FSLN) leadership because:

—Our October 1980 aid agreement and exchange of letters with the GRN obligates us to first advise them and explain our reasons for making a determination of their culpability. We have made several previous demarches on the subject but have not yet stated that we are contemplating a new determination.

—We do not have substantial, convincing and credible proof of Nicaraguan involvement sufficient to support our determination before world public opinion. If we proceed without this, we may emerge the loser.

—If we give up the leverage of our aid program in a manner which does not impose new restraints on the GRN, the likely result would be increased unhindered Nicaraguan support for the Salvadorans, the opposite of what we wish to achieve.

—Our intelligence suggests that only a small group of high level FSLN officials working with the Cubans is involved in the arms trafficking to El Salvador. Our demarche will open up the issue within the GRN and FSLN and force a full airing of it. This could produce a decision that it is in Nicaragua’s interest to curtail the support operations.

Options:

Issue 1

There are four options for expanding our military assistance to El Salvador:

a) Go ahead only on the FY–81 FMS deliveries of non-lethal equipment and IMET;

b) Go ahead with the FMS and IMET and deliver two helicopters and hold back on the other four;

c) Go ahead with the FMS, continue IMET and deliver all six of the helicopters.

d) Go ahead with the FMS, continue IMET, deliver all six helicopters and furnish some of the lethal equipment and additional supplies requested by the Salvadoran military on a grant basis with funding under the Section 506 emergency drawdown authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

We recommend that you approve option b. This increase in aid would be responsive to the progress made so far and to the increased military threat. By holding back on the other four helicopters we would:

a) retain some leverage on the investigation;

b) gain some time in which to monitor performance of the civilian-military restructuring;

c) turn over an on-going military assistance program to the new administration.

Issue 2

We believe that our sole option at this time is to proceed at once with a strong demarche to the GRN/FSLN. A telegram implementing this is attached. After receiving the GRN/FSLN’s reaction we can consider next steps. If a formal determination is called for, we will have the option of making it but waiving the sanction of demanding immediate repayment of the $40 million already disbursed under the Nicaraguan Supplemental.

Recommendation:

Issue I:

That you authorize us to sign and implement the FY–81 FMS loan agreement, continue with IMET training and deliver two helicopters and the non-lethal equipment under FY–81 FMS.⁴

Alternatively,

That we implement the FMS agreement for non-lethal equipment and continue with IMET training but take no action on the helicopters.

OR,

That we implement the FMS agreement, continue with IMET training and proceed with delivery of all six helicopters.

OR,

That we implement the FMS agreement, continue with IMET, deliver the six helicopters and furnish some of the arms and ammunition and other supplies requested on a grant basis with funding under Section 506 authority.

Issue II:

That we proceed with a strong demarche to the GRN on its support for terrorism per the attached telegram.⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 12/80–1/81. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the page and wrote: “To Ed, David.” Muskie attached the memorandum to his January 12 Evening Reading memorandum to Carter, in which he described the fighting in El Salvador and noted: “There has been no indication of popular support for the guerrillas, let alone a popular uprising.” He also reported that the “Salvadorans have requested helicopters, arms, and ammunition from the US.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Evening Reading Jan.–June 1981)
2. Public Law 87–195; 75 Stat. 424.
3. See Document 457.
4. Carter indicated his approval of this option.
5. Carter indicated his approval of this option and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Strengthen. Set as immediate a time limit as possible.” Attached but not printed is a draft telegram stipulating a démarche on GRN support of Salvadoran guerrillas. Carter wrote on the draft copy: “Strengthen. I need [a] quick response.” (See footnote 2, Document 328) Aaron sent the memorandum containing Carter’s decisions to Muskie and Brown under cover of a January 13 memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 21, El Salvador: 12/80–1/81)