Office of the Historian

493. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, January 12, 1981, 10:00–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • El Salvador and Nicaragua

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
    • Ambassador William Bowdler, Ass’t. Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
    • Ambassador Lawrence Pezzulo, American Ambassador to Nicaragua
    • Mr. Philip Stoddard

  • Defense

    • Mr. Frank Kramer
    • Ambassador Frederick Chapin

  • Joint Chiefs of Staff

    • Lt. General John Pustay

  • Central Intelligence

    • [name not declassified]
    • [name not declassified]

  • White House

    • Mr. David Aaron

  • National Security Council

    • Mr. Thomas Thornton

I chaired a meeting of the SCC this morning to discuss the implications of intelligence reports about Nicaraguan support to Salvadoran insurgents.2 We have not been able to develop our intelligence information any further since our source is not available at present. Secretary Muskie will be talking to you about this later today; he will have discussed it previously with Zbig and Harold Brown. (S)3

The principal issue is whether you find that the recent intelligence reports require you to terminate further assistance to Nicaragua and demand repayment of previous assistance. (The legislation gives you the option of waiving immediate repayment even if you make a positive finding.) (S)

[Page 1302]

1. You can terminate aid and invoke the repayment provisions of the legislation. While this would be an unequivocal move, it would dangerously undercut the position of those Nicaraguans who are willing to cooperate with us and the demand for repayment could unleash a violent anti-US reaction. (Ambassador Pezzulo said that the risk of “another Tehran” was so great that he would recommend withdrawal of our mission.)

2. You could postpone any finding until we have had a chance to go back to the Nicaraguan Government to tell them that we have concluded that they are supplying insurgents in El Salvador; and unless they desist we will have to invoke our legislation. This could force a debate within the junta and perhaps lead to termination not only of these small air operations but also of possible much larger-scale support to the insurgents. We will not, however, be able to confront them with details since we have to protect our source; hence, we may not have the desired effect. Also, under the best of circumstances, it would be some time before we could be sure they had complied.

3. You could cut off assistance now but withhold demanding repayment until we had a chance to see how they react. This would provide valuable flexibility; it would, however, provide only a temporary respite if they continue to support the insurgents. (S)

State hopes that you will be able to take some intermediate step rather than decide on a complete invocation of the legislation. Their line of thinking is contained in the attached paper. (S)4

The SCC looked into three other questions:

—It is difficult, if not impossible, to mount effective surveillance and interdiction operations that would cut off supply of support of the insurgents by air. Even if we could, it would just be dealing with the tip of the iceberg. Nonetheless, some unilateral US reconnaisance flights could have a useful psychological effect and DOD will look into the possibility. (S)

—The SCC recommends that we proceed immediately with the supply of two helicopters from CINCSOUTH stocks to El Salvador. (S)5

—DOD will develop a package of lethal and non-lethal material that can be supplied to El Salvador rapidly if the decision to do so is made. Some of this would be drawn from CINCSOUTH war reserves. The SCC made no recommendation to proceed with the delivery of such a package at this time. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 1/13–15/81. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the page. Aaron sent the summary of conclusions to Carter under cover of a January 12 memorandum in which Carter approved of moving six helicopters to El Salvador immediately. Davis sent a description of the mini-SCC meeting to Turner in a January 13 memorandum (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 36: (SCC) Nicaragua)↩
  2. The minutes of meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 183, SCM 161 Mini-SCC El Salvador 1/12/81.↩
  3. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Muskie by telephone from 6:59 to 7 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation has been found.↩
  4. Attached but not printed is an undated paper drafted by Cheek entitled “Presidential Determination on Nicaraguan Support for Salvadoran Guerrillas.”↩
  5. Carter neither approved nor disapproved of this recommendation; see, however, footnote 1, above, and Document 494.↩