Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

468. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Aaron), and the President’s Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)¹

Washington, June 8, 1979

SUBJECT

• PRC on Central America—Monday, June 11, 1979, 4:00 p.m. (U)

1. Overview

The PRC on Central America could not be more timely, occurring at the moment when it is urgent for the USG to devise an answer to the central question posed by the PRM (attached at Tab A): Can we find a strategy to preserve and strengthen the middle (groups and democratic process) in a region spiraling downward in violence toward political polarization?² If we fail to construct an effective strategy, we may soon face the prospect of leftist governments in the region or the necessity of US intervention—the first will be unacceptable politically in the US, and the second would toll the death of the President’s Latin American policy. (S)

The PRM provides a lot to discuss and decide in a short time. In this cover memo, I will follow the proposed agenda for the meeting and propose some specific outcomes under each heading. (U)

2. US Objectives

In addition to the more general US objectives which are listed on page 6 of the PRM and should be ratified by the PRC, let me suggest that you identify several more specific, instrumental objectives or optimal outcomes which could serve as goals toward which we can concentrate our energies and resources.³ These optimal outcomes include:

—Throughout the region, a strengthening of centrist groups and the linkages among them, and a swing toward democratization. (S)

—A resolution of the Honduran-Salvadorean border dispute, progress on the Belize dispute, and a new vigorous phase of regional economic cooperation. (S)

—In Nicaragua, an early and orderly departure of Somoza in favor of a broad-based coalition, or failing that, preparatory moves toward a 1981 electoral process in which broad sectors of the moderate opposition will participate. (S)

—In El Salvador, a political opening leading to meaningful elections for parliament in March 1980 or earlier, if possible, and the presidency in 1982. (S)

—In Honduras, the free and fair elections for constituent assembly (permitting the participation of the Christian Democratic Party) in April 1980, leading to a civilian presidency. (S)

—In Guatemala, an end to political assassination, as part of a process creating an atmosphere for meaningful presidential elections in 1982. (S)

The reason why you need to identify these goals is simply that until now, our Ambassadors have lacked purpose in their communications with government officials, and this necessarily has made our policies seem scatter-shot, incoherent, and inconsistent. With a more specific focus, our Ambassadors could begin altering the mindset of local officials. This would not only improve the prospects of reform in the region, it would also help our image considerably, and thus enhance our influence. (S)

3. Approach and Strategies to the Region

While the thrust of our policies must be directed to national situations, there are, in addition, a number of approaches we must use in all the countries. The PRM is right on the mark when it recommends (p. 8) that we take steps to revise perceptions of US withdrawal, vacillation or disinterest. The logic of our human rights policy is causing us to dissociate from the repressive governments. We can reverse that only if we successfully sell the following formula to Congress and the Central American governments: The US is prepared to raise its profile and get involved in a positive way with economic aid, etc., if the governments demonstrate a commitment to socio-economic reforms and to broadening the base of political participation.⁴ If that formula is accepted, we need to take the following steps:

1. Begin a dialogue with Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica and seek to get their support for a common approach, especially to strengthen centrist groups in the region.⁵ Our preference would be to play a supportive role to other initiatives, but we should be prepared to lead. (S)

2. Begin discussions with Western Europeans, Canadians, and Japanese on a common approach, and explore the idea of setting up a Central American Development Group (modeled on the Caribbean Group) to coordinate aid to the region, to encourage regional economic cooperation, and to provide added leverage in pursuit of our objectives. (S)

3. Publicly articulate a policy to the region, preferably during a visit to the region within a month by a high-level delegation (Vance or Christopher).⁶ (S)

4. Consult closely with Congress to explain what we are doing. (S)

5. Expand and intensify our contacts in the region—with centrist groups, regional institutions, government officials, and open contacts with army leaders and directly or, through intermediaries, with leftist groups.⁷ (S)

6. Send a blunt warning to Cuba and to all other countries (Israel, Argentina, etc.) that are supplying arms to the region, and explore the possibility of sub-regional arms restraint.⁸ (S)

7. Strengthen and expand our Embassy representation in the region. (S)

4. National Strategies

While Nicaragua may be the key to the Central American crisis and will probably occupy a good share of time during the discussion at the beginning, I strongly recommend that we leave a discussion of US strategy to Nicaragua until the end of the PRC meeting. Otherwise, Nicaragua will so dominate the discussion that we will find little time left for anything else. This can be done because each national strategy is reasonably self-contained. (S)

—El Salvador. The preliminary steps listed on p. 14 are sound and necessary.⁹ As to the tactical question—whether to begin by giving a carrot or withholding it for more concessions by the Salvadorean government—I would recommend combining the two options in the PRM.¹⁰ Clearly, we need a policy which will provide our support contingent on credible steps toward reform on the part of the Salvadorean government. We should match their words with ours, their steps with our steps. We should fully discuss the steps we propose to take with a mix of opposition groups to make sure it will not diminish our credibility and that the steps are viewed as significant by them. We should be guided by their advice, but we should err on the side of the positive, try to lead with a carrot rather than a stick. Our peg is free legislation and municipal elections in March 1980, but we should be prepared to explore the possibility of earlier elections. (S)

—Guatemala. Our objectives include human rights, social reforms, free elections, and a more cooperative foreign policy. I would recommend a more active, higher profile approach along the lines suggested by the steps on page 20.¹¹ (S)

—Honduras. As a country with no significant violence and a sustained interest in development, we should single out Honduras for an aid “bonus,” and encourage the government to permit a free, civilian election in April 1980. (S)

—Nicaragua. To the extent that it is possible, we should focus on the medium-term issue described in the PRM: how to guide the Nicaraguan political process through the difficult problem of political succession from personal dynastic rule. This assumes that the current violence in Nicaragua represents the second more violent cycle of crisis in Nicaragua, and that Somoza and the National Guard will emerge battered, hopefully shaken, and intact in a few weeks. I believe this to be the case. If there is time, it would be useful to discuss what we should do if the National Guard disintegrates in the next couple of weeks and Somoza leaves, but frankly, such scenarios are best dealt with when there is some probability of them happening. (S)

I would recommend a strategy that combines elements of options #2 and #3 (p. 10).¹² Our new Ambassador should get there immediately and begin working with the moderate opposition to restore their confidence and our credibility. He should be equally frank with Somoza: unless all sides fashion a moderate political transition (which does not include Somoza) within three months, Nicaragua will probably fall to the Sandinistas. We cannot expect Somoza to accept the prospect of his departure until everything is nailed down. We need to orchestrate international pressure in a way which doesn’t back him into the wall, but instead gives him a “silver bridge.” We should think about engaging conservatives like Charlie Wilson in this task. We need to expand and intensify our contacts in Nicaragua to include discussions with the Sandinistas and the National Guard. (S)

In addition, we should increase the level of our emergency assistance for the Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras, but also in Costa Rica. (S)

5. Conclusions

The most important instrument we have in our arsenal of influencing developments in Central America is “legitimacy,” which happens to be the one commodity the governments in the area lack. Increased aid will be important to serve our objectives, but not so much as making our objectives public and clear, extending and intensifying our contacts, and relying on the astuteness of our Ambassadors. While I know you leave the question of representation to State, I really think you ought to at least pose the question at the PRC meeting: Do we have our best FSO’s and Ambassadors in Central America? If not, shouldn’t we move them there? The fact is that our representation in the area is our weakest, and we are paying the price for it.¹³ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 76, PRC 111, 6/11/1979, Central America. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it. For the minutes of the June 11 PRC meeting, see Document 469.
2. Not attached. The 40-page revised response to PRM 46 entitled “U.S. Policies toward Central America” is in the Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs), Numbers 1–46, Box 97, PRM 46: U.S. Policy Toward Central America, (6/8/79).
3. The eight objectives listed in the response to PRM 46 (see footnote 2, above) were: “movement toward more open political systems, free elections, and democratic processes; strengthening of centrist and moderate groups and the linkages among them; a diminution in the appeal and power of radical elements and Castro-linked groups; economic and social development which would improve the services and opportunities available to the people, and reduce the vulnerabilities and frustrations that lead to political tensions; renewed momentum toward greater regional economic cooperation and integration as an effective framework to foster modernization and reduce intra-regional tensions, including demographic problems; better observance of human rights, an end to terrorism from both left and right, and a cessation of such practices as political assassination and torture; resolution of the area’s international conflicts, especially the Honduras-El Salvador dispute; and a friendly perception of the U.S. and willingness to cooperate with us for larger goals, including strategic considerations related to both the Panama Canal and the hemisphere’s security.” (Ibid.)
4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
5. Brzezinski drew a vertical line, checkmark, and an arrow in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
6. Brzezinski drew a vertical line and an arrow in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
7. Brzezinski drew a vertical line and a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
8. Brzezinski bracketed this sentence and drew an arrow pointing to the brackets in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
9. The strategies toward El Salvador noted on page 17 (not page 14, as noted in Pastor’s memorandum) in the response to PRM 46 (see footnote 2, above) were: “Public definition by us that we believe dialogue and internal accommodation and reform offer the only peaceful solution to the nation’s problems, and an announcement by us that we will support efforts by the Government and the opposition to this end; We would tell Romero the same thing, define for him the things he should do—electoral reform, amnesty, wider political participation; We would increase our contacts with economic/business/military elements that currently support Romero to gain their support or acquiescence for a process of political opening; We would do the same thing with labor, the PDC and the MNR, urging them to close ranks, participate in a meaningful dialogue and develop proposals for the Government to consider; We would seek out constituent elements of the BPR for the same purpose; We would make clear to the Government—and to other actors—that our support will be conditioned upon progress.” (Ibid.)
10. The response to PRM 46 (see footnote 2, above) included two tactical options for El Salvador: “an ‛encouragement’ approach, which would involve some immediate indications of support as encouragement to enable Romero to move in the right direction, although on-going assistance and help would be directly related to progress” and “a ‛reciprocal’ approach, which would begin with a distanced posture and would extend support only after the Romero Government had taken steps.” (Ibid.)
11. Brzezinski drew a vertical line and a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. The response to PRM 46 (see footnote 2, above) included three possible levels of engagement regarding Guatemala: a “low profile policy of as normal relations as are consistent with human rights conditions and simply wait to see what happens;” “somewhat more active steps of discussing human rights/assassination questions with the Lucas regime to seek an improvement in this situation, increasing contacts with enlightened elements in the military and society in general to stimulate support for a fair election and a civilian President in 1982;” or a “more active posture” informing Lucas about “steps to end political assassination and official involvement in violence” including: “centralization of intelligence and anti-subversive activities in a single office with clear prohibition on use of torture, with immediate notification of all arrests to that office and open access to that information; and prohibit hiring of regular military personnel by private landowners,” and “the naming of a highly respected special prosecutor to pursue investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the Fuentes Mohr and Colom Argueta assassinations.” (Ibid.)
12. Brzezinski underlined “#2 and #3 (p. 10)” in this sentence. The response to PRM 46 (see footnote 2, above) included four basic options regarding Nicaragua: 1) “Support Somoza to put down the Sandinista insurrection and eliminate the danger of external intervention, then seek a transition formula with Somoza and the centrist forces;” 2) “Seek first to convince Somoza to negotiate his early departure, then work to design a transition for a successor government. Stand ready to isolate him if he refuses;” 3) “Take an active lead now to catalyze a negotiated transition, dealing with all sides, offering to help and proposing ideas;” 4) “Remain neutral, disassociate from Somoza, let nature take its course and wait for a future opportunity to re-engage.” (Ibid.)
13. Brzezinski placed two vertical lines and an arrow in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence and wrote at the bottom of the page: “Why not propose a Central American Confederation?”