Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

467. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Aaron), and the President’s Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)¹

Washington, May 21, 1979

SUBJECT

• Central America in Crisis: A Priority Challenge for U.S. Foreign Policy (C)

The Central American Chiefs of Mission Conference,² which was held last week in Costa Rica, was a timely and important opportunity to focus the USG’s attention on an area in a state of revolutionary ferment. The purpose of the conference was to address the questions described in PRM–46 (on Central America),³ to test the practicality of ideas and proposals originating in Washington (Vaky and I), and give our Ambassadors in the field a better sense of our thinking and a larger role in the policy-making process. All these purposes were achieved; the dialogue in the conference was enormously useful in advancing our thinking on the subject. I left the conference with a better feeling for the nature of the region’s crisis, more specific ideas on ways to tackle them, and a firm belief that these issues are among the most important you, Secretary Vance, and the President will face this summer. Let me explain why. (S)

After his meeting with Lopez Portillo, Castro is reported to have said that while Cuba will not export revolution to Central America, and it doesn’t need to, indigenous forces are steering the region in his direction. As the attached study on Cuba’s role in Central America, which I asked the CIA to do, indicates, Castro’ s statement is a little disingenuous.⁴ Since last fall, and most discernably since the beginning of 1979, Castro has stepped up the level and the kinds of Cuban involvement in the region. He clearly has reassessed Cuba’s interests and possibilities in the region, and concluded, as he admitted in Mexico, that Central America is ripe for revolution. (S)

Castro’ s tactics have been to encourage unity among revolutionary groups within each country and cooperation and coordination across borders. He is training more guerrillas in Cuba, passing more arms, spending more time with these leaders than a year before. In March, he spent nearly 48 hours with the leaders of the three Sandinista guerrilla factions in an effort to unify them around a central directorate and a single strategy. He has urged them and other guerrilla groups to tone down their Marxist rhetoric and to recruit support from the middle by setting up broad national front organizations. (S)

Despite increasing domestic and international demands on his time, Castro has decided to redirect his energies to his home turf. He is smart enough to have waited until the “correlation of forces” was moving in his favor. They are moving away from us. Because of that and because of his shrewdness, we will have to double our efforts to promote our interests and prevent one, two, or more Cubas emerging in Central America. (S)

Besides the transnational ties among guerrilla groups, the individual country pictures look extremely grim:

—In El Salvador, the military government is running scared with good reason. Unlike in Nicaragua where the source of the conflict is the continuation of a dynasty, Salvador faces a genuine class struggle. Salvador is the poorest, the most illiterate and over-populated country in Central America. A small group of reactionary families control most of the nation’s wealth and have kept the military in power to defend their interests (which are defined very narrowly) and to control the masses. The fear of another peasant revolt as occurred in the 1930’s when the army slaughtered over 30,000 peasants, is still very real, but the response of the military and the oligarchy is to try to keep a lid on it. The massacre of May 8 is a symptom of this bigger problem; the kettle could blow if the government doesn’t find new and credible ways to release the steam.⁵ (S)

—In Guatemala, the country is run by a sinister group of army officers, who have been assassinating all important moderate politicians in the country. The extreme left is filling the vacuum created by these assassinations. (S)

—Honduras is the least sophisticated and developed nation. The military group running the country have promised free elections next year, but they have also proscribed the Christian Democratic party. (S)

—Nicaragua is engulfed in a civil war with both Somoza and the Sandinistas still believing they can win a military solution. (U)

Polarization is the dominant political phenomenon as the middle is assassinated, intimidated or driven to the left. As the governments become more repressive, the extreme left gets bolder and we are left without anyone or anything to support. The objective of the PRM is to develop a strategy which will get us back in the game, to steer events towards outcomes more compatible with our interests.

The problem of Central America is somewhat similar to that of Rhodesia in that we find ourselves squeezed between two unacceptable extremes (the Cubans and the South Africans in Rhodesia; the right and left in Central America); Central America is different because it is closer, and we are more exposed. A “loss” to Cuba in Central America will be as fatal to the President’s domestic political position as U.S. military intervention would be fatal to his Latin American policy. The PRM is intended to prevent both scenarios. To succeed, we will need your closest attention in early June—before the Vienna Summit—when the PRM is ready. (S)

Let me alert you to the strategy which is emerging and sketch some of the decisions that will need to be made. U.S. policy to the region is not understood very well, and the logic (and the law) of our human rights policy is forcing us to abandon the region to the extremes. We need to adopt a more activist policy toward El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and suggest a dialogue in which we would increase the level of our support and assistance (economic and security aid, visitor programs, scholarships, high-level visits), if the leaders agreed to take certain important steps that would broaden the base of political participation in the country (depriving the left of the middle). At the same time, we will increase our contacts and symbolic support for the middle in these countries and in Nicaragua, and encourage the basin democracies (Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Caribbean) to do the same. We are currently trying to identify those political decisions in each country which could most effectively open the system for the middle (defined not just as people, groups, and institutions, but also as a democratic, non-violent process). (S)

To increase our leverage, we should also consider a dialogue with the MDB’s and other donors to see whether a Central American Group (modelled on the Caribbean Group) could be established. This would not only help in coordinating aid policies, but it could give us an additional leverage to use in pursuing the political dialogue. (S)

I would appreciate some feedback on whether you agree with my assessment that Central America deserves high priority, not just in my work but in yours. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 54, PRM/NSC–46 (1). Secret. Sent for information and action. An unknown hand wrote on June 6: “David has copy.” Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “RP—I agree with your basic thesis—but need a better sense of the strategy required for dealing with this problem. ZB.”
2. For more information about the Chiefs of Mission Conference, see Document 466.
3. See Document 465.
4. Attached but not printed is a memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 2, about Cuban support for Central American guerrilla groups. In a July 3 note to Pastor, Middleton referred to this memorandum, noting: “This is the document that was leaked to the press.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 13, Cuba: 6/79) Reporter John Maclean quoted portions of this memorandum in a story entitled “Cuba and Panama Giving Aid to Somoza’s Foes: U.S. Memo,” Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1979, p. 1. See also, John Maclean, “‛Cubans all over, U.S. nowhere,’ in Caribbean,” Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1979, p. 11.
5. See footnote 4, Document 373.